UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT  LOS  ANGELES 


POLITICS: 

AN  ORIGINAL   INVESTIGATION 
AND   PROPOSAL 


POLITICS 

AN    ORIGINAL    INVESTIGATION    INTO    THE 

ESSENTIAL    ELEMENTS    AND    INHERENT 

DEFECTS  COMMON  TO  ALL  PRESENT 

FORMS  OF  GOVERNMENT 

TOGETHER  WITH 

A     PROPOSAL     FOR    A     POLITICAL     SYSTEM 

WHICPI  WILL  AUTOMATICALLY  PRODUCE 

THE    BEST    GOVERNMENT    POSSIBLE 

IN  ANY  GIVEN  COMMUNITY 


BY 


FRANK  EXLINE 


NEW   YORK 
E.    P.    BUTTON    &    COMPANY 

681  Fifth  Avenue 


3  J    > 


Copyright,  1922, 
By  E.  P.  Dutton  &  Company 


All  Rights  Reserved 


paiNTED  IN  THE  UNl'lBU 
STATES  OF  AMERICA 


*•  •  • 


» »  •  •  •  •   •  < 


•TC 


T 


PREFACE 

All  men  agree  that  there  is  something  funda- 
y^    mentally   and   vitally   wrong   in    the   political    and 
'^     economic  structure  of  modern  society.     This  uni- 
!p  versal   conviction   has   made   possible    the   present 
world-wide  conspiracy  and  agitation  for  the  over- 
throw of  existing  governments,  either  by  the  ballot 
or  by  violence;   a   revival  of  the  doctrine   of  the 
"International,"   which  has  smouldered  but  never 
was  extinguished  since  its  promulgation  more  than 
fifty  years  ago  by  Karl  Marx. 

Internationalism  (which  includes  Bolshevism, 
Communism,  and  most  forms  of  Socialism, — all 
'^^  professing  to  represent  the  interests  of  a  particular 
^  class  of  people  in  all  countries,  rather  than  all  the 
people  of  any  particular  country)  is  the  doctrine 
that  the  class  of  people  who  live  by  manual  labor, 
being  the  majority  in  numbers,  have  the  right,  as 
well  as  the  power,  as  such  majority,  to  abolish 
every  form  of  government  which  they  deem  to  have 
become  destructive  of  their  rights  and  liberties,  and 
to  institute  new  governments  upon  such  principles 
and  in  such  form  as  to  them  shall  seem  most  likely 

T 

20?928 


vi  Preface 

to  effect  their  safety  and  happiness  as  a  class;  thus 
paraphrasing  and  appropriating  portions  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence. 

The    doctrines    of   Internationalism   undoubtedly 
have   received   additional   importance   and   impetus 
from  their  partial  recognition  by  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence at  Paris,  especially  in  Part  XIII  of  the  Treaty; 
which  provides  for  a  permanent  "Organization  of 
Labour,"  to  consist  of  "a  General   Conference  of 
Representatives  of  the  Members"  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  and  "an  International  Labour  Office  con- 
trolled by"  a  "Governing  Body"  which  is  constituted 
of  "Twelve  persons  representing  the  Governments," 
six  "representing  the  employers,"   and  six  "repre- 
senting the  workers."  These  provisions  are  preceded 
by  a  preamble,  which  solemnly  recites  that  "condi- 
tions of  labour  exist  involving  such  injustice,  hard- 
ship and  privation  to  large  numbers  of  people  as  to 
produce  unrest  so  great  that  the  peace  and  harmony 
of  the   world   are   imperilled."      Here   we   have   a 
solemn   admission   of   the   existence   of  world-wide 
injustice  which  existing  governments  have  failed  to 
prevent,  and  which  they  apparently  are  unable  to 
abolish.     And  the  advocates  of  radical  revolution 
are  making  effective  use  of  that  admission. 

All  established  governments,  including  our  own, 
now  are  assailed  by  this  same  Internationalism,  and 
are  put  upon  the  defensive  against  an  increasingly 


Preface  vii 

formidable  propaganda  for  their  overthrow.  What 
is  their  defense  ? 

The  defenders  of  existing  governments,  and  of  the 
social  and  economic  systems  which  are  sustained  by 
these  governments,  admit  the  indisputable  fact  that 
the  poor  and  laboring  masses  of  mankind  are  de- 
prived of  that  full  measure  of  liberty  and  happiness 
which  is  enjoyed  by  the  more  fortunate  well-to-do 
and  wealthy  classes;  but  plead,  in  defense  (1)  that 
the  evils  complained  of  never  can  be  remedied  by 
the  destruction  of  existing  forms  of  government  and 
the  substitution  of  new  and  untried  forms;  (2)  that 
the  injustice  of  the  present  state  of  society  is  the 
unavoidable  consequence  of  the  present  imperfect 
state  of  political  science,  and  the  remedy  must  be 
sought  in  the  further  advancement  of  knowledge 
in  that  science,  under  the  orderly  protection  of 
existing  governments;  and  (3)  that  any  form  of 
government  that  may  be  devised  will  surely  fail, 
unless  it  is  based  upon  and  constituted  in  accord- 
ance with  a  more  perfect  knowledge  of  political 
science  than  has  yet  been  discovered  and  revealed 
to  the  world. 

This  is  a  valid  answer;  but  the  enemies  of  the 
existing  order  reply:  (1)  that  the  existing  political 
and  economic  structure  of  society  not  only  has  failed 
to  eliminate  the  fundamental  errors  which  are  re- 
sponsible  for   the   injustice   of  the   present   system, 


viii  Preface 

but  fails  to  propose  any  definite  program  of  im- 
provement or  reconstruction  which  possibly  might 
alleviate  the  evils  complained  of,  and  thereby 
obivate  the  necessity  or  excuse  for  radical  revolu- 
tion; and  (2)  that  the  proletariat  masses,  having 
no  alternative  other  than  social  revolution  or  pa- 
tient endurance  of  economic  slavery,  will  choose 
the  former,  even  at  the  risk  of  universal  chaos  and 
misery. 

The  problem  of  civilization  now  is,  to  discover 
another  and  better  alternative ;  one  which  will  afford 
a  reasonable  hope  of  a  more  equitable  distribution 
of  the  benefits  of  civilization,  without  destroying 
the  present  structure  of  society.  This  problem  can 
be  solved,  if  at  all,  only  by  a  searching  investigation 
and  analysis  of  the  ideas  and  principles  which  under- 
lie and  enter  into  the  social  structure,  with  a  view 
to  the  elimination  of  any  errors  and  false  principles, 
and  the  application  of  such  true  and  sound  ideas  and 
principles  as  are  found  essential  to  a  stable  and  just 
social  state.  The  present  volume  embodies  the  re- 
sults of  an  honest,  though  imperfect  and  incomplete, 
attempt  at  such  an  investigation. 

In  spite  of  the  vast  literature  of  politics,  there  Is 
an  astonishing  dearth  of  exact  knowledge  and  pre- 
cise definition  of  the  dominant  ideas  which  underlie 
and  enter  Into  the  structure  or  organized  society  as  it 
is  today;  particularly,  the  prevailing  ideas  of  Law, 


Preface  ix 

of  Democracy,  of  Sovereignty,  of  Public  Opinion, 
and  of  Selection   (or  election)   of  public  function- 
aries.   If  all  or  any  of  these  fundamental  ideas  are 
absolutely  erroneous,   such  errors,   alone,  are   suf- 
ficient to  account  for  the  failure  of  any  political 
system  which  is  based  upon  them  or  the  structure 
of  which  is  dependent  upon  the  strength  and  sound- 
ness of  such  erroneous  ideas.     Most  astonishing  is 
the  almost  total  absence  of  knowledge,  and  even  of 
discussion,  pertaining  to  the  fundamental  Laws  of 
Selection,  as  applicable  to  organized  society,  in  ac- 
cordance with  which  society,  as  a  living  organism, 
may  be  able  to  equip  itself  with  organs  which  are 
suitable  and  adapted  to  the  successful  performance 
of  their  several  functions,  and  without  which  no 
organism  can  survive  and  accomplish  the  purposes 
of  its  existence.     Obviously,  if  organized  society, 
in  Its  present  state  of  development,  is  destitute  of  an 
efficient  and  reliable  system  or  process  by  means  of 
which  it  can  ascertain  and  select  those  of  its  members 
who   are  best  fitted  and  adapted  to   serve   as   its 
organs  of  action,  that  fact,  alone.  Is  sufficient  to 
account  for  society's  failure  to  accomplish  the  chief 
end  and  purpose  of  its  existence, — the  preservation 
of  right  and  justice  among  all  of  its  members. 

In  offering  this  small  work  to  the  public,  the 
author  Is  painfully  conscious  of  the  boldness  of  his 
undertaking,  and  not  unmindful  of  the  somewhat 


X  Preface 

alarming  fact  that  a  general  acceptance  of  the  con- 
clusions which  seem  to  result  from  these  investiga- 
tions will  involve  the  total  rejection  of  some  ideas 
and  ideals  which  hitherto  the  author  himself,  in 
common  with  all  good  Americans,  has  cherished  as 
self-evident  truths  or  axioms,  to  question  which 
would  be  almost  sacrilegious.  But  the  universal  con- 
viction that  something  is  fundamentally  wrong  with 
the  present  structure  of  society,  even  In  our  own 
country,  confirmed  by  the  widespread  and  growing 
discontent  among  the  victims  of  injustice  and  those 
who  sympathize  with  them,  reveals  the  absolute 
necessity  of  uprooting  any  falsehoods,  however 
pleasing  and  long  cherished,  which  are  imperilling 
the  whole  structure  of  civilization.  In  this  hour 
of  imminent  peril,  ancient  prejudices  and  unsound 
theories  must  be  relinquished,  and  scientific  truth 
must  be  accepted  as  the  only  safe  guide,  even  though 
this  should  necessitate  a  revision  or  reconstruction 
of  hitherto  unquestioned  dogmas  of  Political 
Science.  The  structure  of  government  must  be 
repaired  and  perfected  in  conformity  to  sound 
scientific  principles,  or  it  will  fall.  Government  in 
conformity  to  prevailing  popular  ideals  is  drifting 
toward  chaos  and  anarchy. 

All  men  know  that  the  political  structure  of 
modern  society  is  wanting  in  some  essential  element 
— that  there  is  some  necessary  function  which  so- 


Preface  xi 

clety,  as  now  constituted,  does  not  perform  and  is 
wanting  in  the  power  to  perform — the  absence  of 
which  is  the  constant  cause  of  the  failure  of  every 
form  of  government.  And  all  men  now  are  asking: 
What  is  that  essential  element  which  is  wanting  in 
the  political  organism?  How  may  that  wanting 
element  be  supplied? 

Enough  and  more  than  enough  books  already 
have  been  written  and  published  which  discuss  those 
two  fateful  questions;  but  hitherto  none  has  an^ 
swered  them  truly.  If  the  following  treatise 
answers  them  truly,  then  that  answer  ought  to  be 
given  to  the  waiting  and  anxious  world.  But  if 
this  book  does  not  answer  those  questions  truly, 
then  it  never  should  be  published  at  all;  for  it  has 
no  other  purpose. 

F.  E. 
Denver,  Feb.  21,  1921. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER   I 

Political  Dogmas 1 

§  1.     Failure  of  Governments §  2.    Necessity 

for  Investigation §  3.    Present  State  of  Polit- 
ical   Science §  4.     Basis   of    Political    Society 

§  5.    Natural    Laws  of   Political   Society §  6. 

Relation   of  Government   to   Law §  7.     Law 

Precedes  and   Survives  Government §  8.    De- 
rivation of  Political  Power §  9.    Obedience  to 

Law— §  10.     Penalties    of    Disobedience §  IL 

Attainability    of    Justice §  12.     The    Present 

Crisis. 

CHAPTER  II 

Nature  of  Laws      .....     .     .     .     ,     .    25 

§13.     The   Word    "Law" §14.     Legislative 

Laws §  15.      Statutes §  16.     Proper    Do- 
main of  Statutes §  17.    Juristic  Law §  18. 

Origin    of    Juristic    Law §  19.     Validity    of 

Juristic    Law §  20.    Judges    and    Jurists 

§21.    Judicial    Precedents §22.     Competency 

of     Judges §  23.      Accidental     Selection     of 

Judges §  24.    Rationale   and    Sovereignty 

§  25.   Legislation  and  Jurisprudence §  26.    Su- 
premacy  of    Jurisprudence §  27.     Legislative 

Encroachments §  28.    Kinds  of  Encroachment 

§  29.     Personal  Sovereignty §  30.     Jural  Sov- 
ereignty   §31.    Rights   and   Sovereignty 

§  32.    Inalienable  Rights — §  33.    Autocracy. 

xiii 


xlv  Contents 

CHAPTER   III 

PAGB 

Nature  of  Government 49 

§  34.    Origin  of  Government §  35.    State,  De- 
fined  §  36.     Forms    of    Government §  37. 

Sequence  of  Forms §  38.    Monarchy §  39. 

Absolute  Monarchy §  40.    Despotic  Monarchy 

§  41.      Hereditary,    Elective,    Monarchy §  42. 

Modern     Monarchies §  43.      English     Mon- 
archy  §  44.   Other  European  Monarchies 

§  45.    Japanese  Monarchy §  46.    Monarchic 

Element  in   Republics §  47.     Monarchic   Ele- 
ment  in   America §  48.     Aristocracy §  49. 

Modern  Aristocracies §  50.    British  Aristoc- 
racy  §  5 1 .     The    English    Cabinet §  52. 

English    Legislature §  53.     English    Judiciary 

§  54.    Democracy §  55.    Ancient  Democ- 
racies   §  56.     Modern    Democracy §  57. 

Modern    Democracies §  58.     Democratic    Re- 
publics  §  59.     American   Democracy §  60. 

Limitations    of    Democracy §61.       Changes 

Tovt^ard  Democracy §  62.     Democracy  in  the 

States §  63.      State     Constitutions §  64. 

Constitutional    Anarchy §  65.       Democratiza- 
tion   of    Judiciary §  66.      Legislation    by    the 

People §  67.    The  Referendum §  68.    Ob- 
jections to  the  Referendum §  69.     Causes  of 

Constitutional  Changes §  70.    Inherent  Weak- 
ness of  Democracy §  71.     Essential  Nature  of 

Government §  72.    Governmental  Powers 

§  73.     Scientific  Government. 


Contents  xv 

CHAPTER  IV 

PAGE 

Sovereignty 93 

§  74.  Definitions §  75.  Sovereignty,  a  Rela- 
tion  §  76.       Autocratic     Sovereignty §  77. 

Sovereignty  of  Law §  78.   Popular  Sovereignty 

§  79.  In  the  United  States §  80.  Conse- 
quences of  the  Doctrine §  81.  Basis  of  Sover- 
eignty  §  82.    People  Are  Not  Society §  83. 

Nature  of  Society §  84.     Political  Society 

§  85.    Society  and  Sovereignty §  86.    Majority 

Rule §87.  Minority  Rule §88.  Mob  Rule 

§  89.     People's  Capacity  for  Sovereignty 

§  90.      Popular    Desire    for    Sovereignty §  91. 

Proletarian  Sovereignty §  92.  Justice  and  Sov- 
ereignty  §  93.     Sovereignty  the  Foe  of  Liberty 

§  94.     Sovereignty  of  Society. 

CHAPTER   V 

Public  Opinion 118 

§95.     Non-Political   Power §96.     Power   of 

Public    Opinion §  97.      Suffrage    and    Public 

Opinion §  98.      Constitutional    Safeguards,    in 

U.  S. §  99.    Revolutionary  Changes §  100. 

Sources  of   Public  Opinion §  101.      Power  of 

the  Press §  102.     Irresponsibility  of  the  Press 

§  103.     Qualifications  of  the  Press §  104. 

Incompetency  of  the  Press §  105.    Restraint  of 

the  Press §  106.  Licensing  Writers  and  Au- 
thors  §  107.     Commercialism  of  the  Press 

§  108.      Public    Mind §109.      Concretion    of 

Minds §  110.     Minds  of  the  Public §  111 

Opinions  of  the  Public §  112.    Competency  of 


xvi  Contents 

PAGE 

Minds §  113.     Expression  of  Public  Opinion 

§114.      The    Ballot §115.      Qualified 

Voters. 

CHAPTER   VI 

Political  Selection 147 

§  116.  Selection §  117.  Survival  of  the  Fit- 
test  §  118.     Scope  of  Scientific   Selection 

§  119.  Processes  of  Selection §  120.  Modi- 
fied   Natural    Selection §  121.      Principles    of 

Natural  Selection — — §  122.  Adaptation  of  Or- 
gans  §  123.      Sovereignty    and    Subordination 

§  124.     Possibility  of  Scientific  Selection 

§  125.  Subjects  for  Selection §  126.  Con- 
scription  §  127.      Necessity    for    Conscription 

§  128.      Merit    and    Favor §  129.      The 

Right  of  Merit §  130.    Right  of  Classification 

§  131.     Rights  of  Genius §  132.     Mental 

and   Physical  Merits §  133.     Practicability  of 

Scientific  Selection §  134.     Scholastic  Selection 

§  135.     Military  Selection §  136.     Civil 

Service  Selection §  137.  Survey  and  Classifi- 
cation of  Human  Resources §  138.  Inaugura- 
tion of  Scientific  Selection. 

CHAPTER   VII 

The  Selective  Organism 195 

§  139.  Self-Classification §  140.  Social  Clas- 
sification  §  141.     Initial  Legislation §  142. 

Plan  of  Organization §  143.  General  Opera- 
tion of  System §  144.     Selective  Operation. 

Recapitulation        223 


POLITICS : 

AN   ORIGINAL   INVESTIGATION 
AND    PROPOSAL 


POLITICS 

CHAPTER   I 

POLITICAL  DOGMAS 

§  1.  Failure  of  Governments.  All  forms 
of  government,  in  the  past,  have  proved  beneficial 
to  the  few  but  oppressive  to  the  many,  and  all  have 
perished.  The  most  enduring  have  been  military 
despotisms,  which  were  sustained  by  an  armed  and 
specially  favored  minority;  but  they,  too,  ultimately 
have  perished.  Mankind  always  has  desired  gov- 
ernment which  is  beneficial  to  all  and  oppressive  to 
none,  but  that  desire  never  has  been  realized.  Mod- 
ern experiments  in  popular  government  have  been 
inspired  by  that  desire,  with  the  hope  that,  by  leav- 
ing all  ultimate  power  in  the  hands  of  the  many, 
through  the  modern  device  of  representation,  the 
many  would  receive  the  full  benefits  of  government; 
but  that  hope  nowhere  is  realized,  and  these  modern 
governments  now  are  pursued  by  the  same  Nemesis 
which  has  overtaken  and  destroyed  their  more  an- 
cient predecessors.  They  have  failed  to  bring  about 
that  just  distribution  of  the  benefits  of  government 

1 


2  Politics 

which  is  the  right  as  well  as  the  desire  of  all 
peoples;  and  the  penalty  of  that  failure  is  either 
disintegration  and  revolution,  or  a  reversion  to  mil- 
itary despotism  as  the  only  means  of  suppressing 
the  rising  wrath  of  a  disappointed  and  oppressed 
people.  Disintegration  begins  with  irrational  and 
unscientific  changes  which  are  supposed  to  be  "re- 
forms," but  which  only  hasten  the  dissolution  of 
government  and  the  advent  of  disorder  and  anarchy; 
military  despotism  begins  with  the  necessity  of  em- 
ploying force  in  the  suppression  of  widespread 
public  disorder;  both  arc  sure  signs  of  a  failing 
government — for  no  people  is  disposed  to  seek  re- 
forms, or  to  revolt,  when  the  benefits  of  govern- 
ment are  justly  distributed. 

§  2.  Necessity  for  Investigation.  If  this 
universal  failure  of  governments  were  due  to  an 
inherent  incapacity  of  mankind  for  enduring  the 
necessary  restraints  of  a  just  government,  or  for 
devising  a  government  which  is  capable  of  justice, 
then  there  would  be  no  hope  of  avoiding,  in  the 
future,  a  perpetual  recurrence  of  the  disorders, 
revolutions  and  wars  which  have  afflicted  mankind 
in  the  past.  But  there  is  no  such  incapacity.  All 
peoples  have,  on  the  contrary,  ever  evinced  a  dis- 
position to  endure  with  patience  the  restraints  and 
burdens   of  government,   rather  than   bring  upon 


Political  Dogmas  3 

themselves  the  miseries  of  disorder  and  anarchy; 
while  the  development  of  jurisprudence,  in  all  en- 
lightened countries,  exhibits  the  inherent  capacity 
as  well  as  the  desire  of  mankind  for  justice.  These 
evidences  of  man's  capacity  for  government,  and 
for  justice,  refute  the  pessimism  that  would  con- 
demn the  world  to  a  hopeless  perpetuation  of  the  in- 
justice which  is  the  cause  of  all  public  disorders  and 
wars,  and  justify  the  more  optimistic  and  hopeful 
belief  that  the  universal  failure  of  governments,  past 
and  present,  is  merely  the  result  of  discoverable  and 
remediable  errors  and  defects  which  are  common 
to  all  existing  forms  and  theories  of  government. 

If  this  hopeful  belief  is  well  founded,  then  there 
exists  an  obvious  necessity  for  a  re-examination  and 
searching  investigation  of  the  prevailing  principles, 
doctrines  and  dogmas  upon  which  the  existing 
schemes  of  government  are  based,  for  the  purpose 
of  discovering  those  errors  and  defects  and  ascer- 
taining the  necessary  corrections  and  remedies. 
This  must  be  done  in  the  genuine  spirit  of  investiga- 
tion and  search  for  truth,  with  pitiless  intolerance 
of  false  doctrines,  assumptions  and  prejudices,  no 
matter  how  prevalent  and  deep-seated  in  the  minds 
of  men.  Thinking  men,  everywhere,  are  conscious 
of  the  fact  that  the  old  order  of  political  society  is 
passing,  and  that  a  new  order,  whether  better  or 
worse,  is  inevitable.     The  processes  of  disintegra- 


4  Politics 

tion  and  reconstruction  are  manifest  throughout  the 
world,  and  they  are  irresistible;  but  they  are  amena- 
ble to  guidance, — and  all  civilization  now  is  calling 
for  right  guidance.  All  men  know  that  the  old 
order  is  lost  in  a  pathless  wilderness  of  error,  and 
are  losing  faith  in  the  political  science  which  has 
been  its  guide ;  many  profess  to  know  a  better  guide ; 
but  none  yet  has  surveyed  and  marked  out  the  route 
by  which  society  can  make  its  way  to  the  region  of 
truth  and  safety. 

§  3.  Present  State  of  Political  Science. 
Any  true  science  is  a  systematic  and  orderly  ar- 
rangement of  knowledge;  and  knowledge  embraces 
only  such  facts  and  principles  as  are  known  (not 
dubitable)  by  the  standards  of  sound  reason.  Poli- 
tics is  the  science  of  the  social  and  ethical  relations 
of  men  and  communities  of  men  in  the  state  of  civil 
society  under  organized  government.  No  .other 
science  so  vitally  and  immediately  concerns  the 
peace  and  happiness  of  every  human  being.  Indeed, 
the  advancement  and  security  of  all  other  sciences, 
and  the  preservation  and  development  of  civiliza- 
tion, are  dependent  upon  the  state  of  perfection  or 
imperfection  of  political  science.  It  is,  therefore, 
of  first  importance  to  observe  the  present  state  of 
the  development  of  that  science  which  so  vitally 
concerns  the  welfare  of  all  men. 


Political  Dogmas  5 

Political  science  has  not  reached  that  stage  of 
development  where  it  properly  can  be  said  to  be  a 
systematic  and  orderly  arrangement  of  knowledge, 
— ^with  respect  to  its  principles,  as  distinguished 
from  its  facts.  Much  that  is  called  "principle" 
is  mere  belief,  theory,  or  dogmatic  assertion.  The 
science  of  Politics  never  has  entirely  rid  itself  of 
the  idealism  of  the  ancient  Greeks,  who  were 
masters  of  philosophical  speculation,  but  novices 
in  scientific  investigation.  Our  modern  politicians 
follow  Aristotle,  not  only  in  his  classification  of  the 
several  elementary  forms  of  government  (which  is 
scientific),  but  in  the  error  of  attaching  undue  im- 
portance to  the  mere  forms  of  government,  and 
ignoring  the  more  fundamental  distinction  between 
the  right  and  the  wrong  kinds  of  government, — 
namely:  (1)  government  by  autocratic  and  arbi- 
trary will,  and  (2)  government  by  enlightened  and 
scientific  reason.  Thus,  while  man  always  has  de- 
sired good  government,  science  has  failed  to  recog- 
nize and  define  the  principles  which  distinguish 
good  from  bad  government,  and  to  apprehend  the 
radical  difference  between  the  dictations  of  will  and 
the  conclusions  of  reason,  as  the  determining  fac- 
tors in  the  conduct  of  government. 

Chief  among  the  unfounded  beliefs  that  are 
masquerading  as  established  truths  and  principles 
of  political  science,   are   the   following:   That   the 


6  Politics 

powers  of  government  are  arbitrary  powers,  Inde- 
pendent of  all  principles  and  superior  to  all  law; 
That  the  persons  who  are  invested  with  the  powers 
of  government  are  authorized  to  make  laws,  and 
to  enforce  them,  in  accordance  with  their  personal 
will  or  desire;  That  all  laws  of  civil  society  are 
commands  of  human  will,  not  conclusions  of  human 
reason;  That  human  rights  are  limited  to  life  and 
liberty, — excluding  the  right  of  merit,  except  upon 
the  condition  of  fighting  for  and  winning,  by  force, 
fraud  or  favor,  the  rank  or  reward  that  belongs  to 
merit;  That  the  chief  Incentive  to  human  endeavor 
is  the  desire  for  riches,  not  the  desire  for  appro- 
bation; That  popularity,  not  merit,  is  the  true  basis 
of  selection  for  public  office;  That  public  opinion, 
not  expert  opinion,  is  the  decisive  authority  upon  all 
political  questions  —  though  not  upon  any  other 
questions;  That  there  Is  a  public  mind — a  conglom- 
erate of  a  multitude  of  human  minds — and  that 
this  imaginary  super-mind  Is  superior  in  wisdom 
and  authority  to  the  minds  of  individual  men,  how- 
ever highly  trained  and  developed,  and  that  all 
political  conduct  can  and  should  be  ruled  by  that 
super-mind;  That  the  body  politic  is  different  from 
all  other  organic  bodies.  In  that  the  several  atoms 
of  which  It  Is  composed  are  superior.  Instead  of 
subordinate,  to  the  governing  organism  of  the  body; 
That  universal  suffrage   and  popular  sovereignty 


Political  Dogmas  7 

can  satisfy  the   universal   desire   for  just  govern- 
ment. 

Upon  such  unscientific  beliefs,  theories  and  dog- 
mas our  modern  governments  are  founded;  and 
these  governments,  misguided  and  corrupted  by 
false  principles,  now  are  facing  the  perils  of  rev- 
olution and  reconstruction.  But  every  scheme  of 
revolution  and  reconstruction  which  is  offered  to  the 
distracted  world  is  based  upon  the  fundamental 
error  that  the  voice  of  numbers,  or  of  force,  must 
prevail  over  the  voice  of  Science.  This  is  the  error 
that  ever  has  retarded  the  evolution  of  social  or- 
der and  justice,  and  it  now  threatens  to  wreck  all 
civilization. 

§  4.  Basis  of  Political  Society.  Science 
is  ordered  knowledge.  The  science  of  mechanics 
is  ordered  knowledge  pertaining  to  physical  forces. 
The  science  of  politics  is  ordered  knowledge  per- 
taining to  the  moral  forces  of  political  society.  The 
basis  of  science,  in  either  case,  is  truth,  principle, 
law, — not  will,  choice,  or  preference.  Any  scientific 
political  system  must,  therefore,  be  based  upon  the 
known  truths,  principles,  and  laws  relating  to  the 
moral  forces  of  society,  regardless  of  any  arbitrary 
will,  choice,  or  preference.  But  the  existing  politi- 
cal systems  are,  in  fact,  based  upon  arbitrary  will, 
choice,   and  preference,   regardless   of  the   truths, 


8  Politics 

principles,  and  laws  relating  to  the  moral  forces 
of  society;  and  therefore  they  are  not  scientific. 
They  are  arbitrary  and  despotic.  With  science, 
fixed  principles  are  law;  with  despotism,  arbitrary 
will  is  law.  Political  society,  as  it  exists  today,, 
rejects  the  law  of  science  and  accepts  the  law  of 
despotism.  All  existing  governments  are  based 
upon  the  proposition  that  commands*  not  principles, 
are  law.  This  is  despotic,  and  contrary  to  science. 
Science  recognizes  as  law  those  rules  of  being 
and  of  conduct  which  are  inherent  in  the  nature  of 
things,  and  which  are  ascertainable  only  from  the 
inductions  and  deductions  of  right  reason.  This  is 
the  natural  law,  recognized  as  the  only  basis  of  the 
law  of  nations,  and  its  rules  are  derived  from  the 
principles  of  justice  which  inhere  in  human  nature 
and  are  inseparable  from  the  social  state.  The 
obvious  inconsistency  of  accepting  the  natural  law 
as  the  basis  of  the  society  of  nations,  and  rejecting 
it  as  the  basis  of  the  several  political  societies  which 
compose  the  society  of  nations,  is  inexplicable  except 
by  the  natural  aversion  of  autocracy  and  despotism 
to  the  restraints  of  any  higher  law  than  that  of 
their  own  arbitrary  and  uncontrolled  will.  And 
political  science  never  has  succeeded  in  freeing  itself 
from  the  impress  of  the  autocracies  and  despot- 
isms which  have  ruled  mankind  throughout  the 
ages,  and  which  have  transmitted  their  chief  char- 


Political  Dogmas  9. 

acteristics,  as  a  sort  of  inheritance,  to  our  modern 
popular  governments.  Yet  in  fact,  and  whether 
so  recognized  by  science  or  not,  the  natural  law 
necessarily  is  the  real  basis  of  all  political  systems. 

§  5.  Natural  Laws  of  Political  Society. 
Natural  law  has  been  variously  defined :  ( 1 )  as  "a 
norm  or  rule  for  the  working  of  any  force";  (2) 
as  "the  regular  method  or  sequence  by  which  cer- 
tain phenomena  or  effects  follow  certain  conditions 
or  causes";  (3)  as  "the  uniform  methods  or  rela- 
tions according  to  which  material  and  mental  forces 
act  in  producing  effects,  or  are  manifested  in  phe- 
nomena"; and  (4)  as  "those  fit  and  just  rules  of 
conduct  which  the  Creator  has  prescribed  to  man, 
as  a  dependent  and  social  being,  and  which  are  to 
be  ascertained  from  the  deductions  of  right  reason." 
The  substance  of  all  these  may  be  embodied  in  a 
single  comprehensive  definition,  as  follows :  Natural 
law  comprises  those  uniform  and  immutable  rules, 
methods,  and  sequences  by  which  material  and  men- 
tal forces  act  in  producing  effects,  and  which  are 
ascertainable  by  the  correct  operations  of  reason. 

Natural  law  governs  the  action  of  all  forces, 
mental  as  well  as  material, — which  includes  the  ac- 
tion of  political  forces.  Political  society  is  a  phe- 
nomenon which  is  produced  as  the  effect  of  certain 
causes  by   the   operation   of   natural   law.      Those 


10  Politics 

causes  are  the  nature  of  man,  and  the  necessities 
arising  from  his  condition  and  environment.  Polit- 
ical society  is  powerless  to  alter  or  suspend  the  oper- 
ation of  the  law  by  which  it  is  called  into  being,  or 
to  escape  the  inevitable  penalties  that  are  incurred 
by  every  infraction  of  that  law.  Natural  law  is 
positive  law,  enforced  by  sanctions  more  certain  and 
inexorable  than  those  of  the  so-called  "positive 
laws"  of  the  Austinian  school  of  English  writers. 
Since  the  natural  law  is  ascertained  by  the  opera- 
tions of  right  reason,  every  infraction  of  the  law 
thus  ascertained  is  contrary  to  right  reason.  It 
follows  that  any  legislative  or  other  action  by  a 
political  society  which  is  contrary  to  natural  law  is 
likewise  contrary  to  right  reason,  and  will  bring 
upon  that  society  the  inevitable  penalties  which  fol- 
low every  infraction  of  that  law. 

Natural  law,  being  ascertained  by  reason,  always 
is  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  reason  and  enlight- 
ened conscience  of  men.  But  human  nature,  as  ex- 
hibited in  all  men,  reveals  a  constant  conflict  between 
reason  and  conscience,  on  the  one  hand,  and  will, 
desire,  and  self-interest,  on  the  other  hand;  and 
the  governing  organisms  of  society,  being  composed 
of  men,  are  subject  to  the  same  conflicting  forces. 
The  necessity  for  government  arises  from  the  dis- 
position of  men  to  act  according  to  will  instead  of 
reason,  and  the  purpose  of  government  is  to  re- 


Political  Dogmas  11 

strain  men  from  such  action;  but  governments,  as 
now  conducted,  themselves  are  guilty  of  the  same 
kind  of  action  which  they  are  instituted  for  the 
purpose  of  restraining,  and  in  this  they  violate  both 
natural  law  and  right  reason.  They  have  set  the 
law  of  the  will,  desire  and  self-interest  of  those 
who  are  invested  with  political  power  above  the 
law  of  reason  and  enlightened  conscience,  as  the 
rule  of  political  conduct;  and  the  penalties  of  their  in- 
fractions of  natural  law  are  visited  upon  them  in  the 
form  of  social  unrest,  political  disturbance,  and  war. 
But  in  spite  of  the  assertion  of  the  supremacy 
of  will  over  reason — of  despotic  law  over  natural 
law — the  natural  law  nevertheless  prevails  as  the 
vital  principle  and  cohesive  force  of  all  political 
society;  otherwise  no  government  could  exist,  and 
civilization  would  have  been  impossible.  The  cor' 
pus  juris  of  every  enlightened  state  is  the  growth 
and  embodiment  of  natural  law  as  ascertained  by 
reason;  and  the  conduct  of  states,  in  both  internal 
and  foreign  affairs,  is,  in  general,  governed  by  nat- 
ural law  so  ascertained,  in  all  action  in  which  that 
law  does  not  come  into  conflict  with  the  despotic 
law  of  will,  desire  and  self-interest.  It  is  only  in 
cases  of  such  conflict  that  infractions  of  natural 
law  occur;  but  those  infractions  still  are  sufficient 
to  incur  the  penalties  that  now  are  afflicting  all 
mankind.    And  such  conflict  arises  only  in  the  exer- 


12  Politics 

cise  of  the  legislative  power  of  government,  where 
legislative  commands  infringe  those  principles  of 
absolute  rectitude  which  constitute  the  natural  law. 
Departures  from  the  sound  principles  of  justice  and 
rectitude  occur  in  the  exercise  of  the  judicial  and 
executive  powers,  but  those  departures  are  the  acci- 
dental results  of  the  moral  or  intellectual  unfitness 
or  incapacity  of  the  persons  to  whom  the  exercise 
of  those  powers  is  entrusted,  rather  than  the  neces- 
sary result  of  the  principle  of  despotic  government. 
The  exercise  of  the  governmental  function  of  judica- 
ture, in  so  far  as  it  is  not  controlled  by  arbitrary 
legislation,  is  governed  entirely  by  natural  law  and 
justice — or,  rather,  by  the  authority  of  natural  law 
— according  to  the  enlightened  reason  of  capable 
and  fit  judges;  for,  aside  from  legislation,  there  is  no 
other  authority.  Every  judicial  departure  from  the 
precepts  of  natural  law,  when  not  compelled  by 
despotic  legislation,  is  the  result  of  the  personal 
unfitness  of  judges, — which  can  be  avoided  only  by 
a  scientific  method  of  selecting  judges. 

§  6.  Relation  of  Government  to  Law. 
Since  political  society  is  called  into  being  by  the 
operation  of  natural  law,  and  is  governed  in  all 
things  by  that  law,  excepting  only  those  cases  in 
which  arbitrary  legislation  conflicts  with  natural 
law;  and  since  those  cases  of  conflict,  though  im- 


Political  Dogmas  13 

portant,  affect  but  a  relatively  small  fraction  of  the 
whole  body  of  the  law;  and,  furthermore,  since 
such  acts  of  arbitrary  legislation  are  mere  com- 
mands, not  laws  in  any  true  sense,  and  are  properly 
called  statutes,  to  distinguish  them  from  true  laws; 
— the  unavoidable  conclusions  must  follow:  (1) 
That  governments,  as  the  organisms  of  society,  are 
the  creatures,  not  the  creators,  of  law;  and  (2) 
That  governments  are  subordinate  and  amenable 
to  law.  But  it  is  argued  that  governments  cannot 
be  held  amenable  to  any  laws,  for  want  of  sanctions 
by  which  those  laws  may  be  enforced,  i.e.,  want  of 
a  power  which  can  punish  governments  for  disobe- 
dience to  law.  The  answer  is,  that  the  sanction  of 
any  law  is  a  threatened  infliction  of  evil  conse- 
quences as  a  penalty  or  punishment  for  disobedience. 
The  more  inevitable  the  penalty  is,  the  more  pos- 
itive is  the  law.  The  form  of  the  penalty,  and 
the  nature  of  the  power  that  inflicts  it,  are  im- 
material as  affecting  the  status  of  a  law  as  law.  The 
penalties  and  punishments,  or  evil  consequences, 
which  governments  must  suffer  for  their  infractions 
of  the  natural  law  of  society,  are  more  inevitable 
and  inexorable  than  any  penalties  or  punishments 
which  governments  can  inflict  upon  their  subjects. 
Governments  have  suffered  the  pains  of  insurrec- 
tion, rebellion,  revolution,  and  dissolution,  for  their 
infractions  of  the  natural  laws  of  society. 


14  Politics 

But  governments  are  not  only  the  creatures  of 
and  amenable  to  the  law;  they  are  the  instrumental- 
ities of  society  for  the  administration  and  enforce- 
ment of  law.  It  is  upon  this  conception  of  the 
relation  of  government  to  law,  and  upon  no  other, 
that  law,  government  and  jurisprudence  can  be  re- 
garded as  constituting  a  science.  Lawless  and  des- 
potic will,  choice,  desire, — these  cannot  be  the  sub- 
ject of  any  science. 

§  7.  Law  Precedes  and  Survives  Govern- 
ment. If  the  phenomena  of  political  society  and 
government  are  effects  which  are  produced  by  the 
operation  of  the  natural  laws  of  social  being  (an 
undeniable  proposition),  then  those  laws  must  ex- 
ist antecedent  to,  and  must  survive,  all  society  and 
all  government.  But,  according  to  the  Austinian 
school  of  political  science,  the  natural  laws  of  society 
are  entirely  superseded  and  overruled,  or  are  made 
effective  as  "positive"  law,  by  the  despotic  "com- 
mand" of  the  "sovereign  person  or  persons"  in  a 
political  society,  the  moment  that  a  sovereign  gov- 
ernment is  instituted.  If  Austin's  theory  is  correct, 
then  the  laws  of  any  state  are  the  mere  creatures 
of  the  government  of  that  state,  without  existence 
antecedent  to  their  creator,  and  ceasing  to  exist 
when  the  government  by  which  they  are  created 
ceases  to  exist.     We  know,  -however,  that  the  laws 


Political  Dogmas  15 

of  a  state  do  not,  in  fact,  cease  to  exist  whenever 
the  reigning  sovereign  is  deposed  or  the  existing 
form  of  government  abolished.  This  fact  is  made 
vividly  apparent  by  the  recent  experience  of  several 
distinct  and  independent  nations  of  Europe,  whose 
monarchs  have  abdicated  their  ancient  sovereignty 
and  whose  governments  have  been  completely  over- 
thrown; the  laws  of  those  nations  never  for  one 
moment  have  ceased  to  exist,  nor,  in  most  instances, 
have  the  de  facto  tribunals  of  justice  ceased  or  even 
paused  in  the  performance  of  their  functions.  The 
sovereignty  of  kings  and  governments  has  ceased, 
but  the  sovereignty  of  the  law  survives  and  is  ac- 
knowledged by  the  peoples  concerned,  after  the 
"sovereign  persons"  or  "supreme  power"  by  whose 
command  it  was  supposed  to  exist  have  lost  their 
sovereignty  and  supremacy,  and  while  the  peoples 
concerned  are  proceeding  with  the  construction  of 
new  governments,  in  obedience  to  the  natural  law 
which  compels  them  to  do  so.  But  those  peoples, 
while  obeying  natural  law  in  undertaking  to  construct 
new  governments,  are  erroneously  constructing  them 
upon  the  rotten  foundation  of  despotic  human  will, 
instead  of  the  firm  and  rational  foundation  of  the 
law  which  they  are  trying  to  obey.  The  arbitrary 
and  selfish  will,  whether  of  a  single  autocrat,  or  of 
a  privileged  aristocracy  or  of  a  bourgeoise,  or  of 


16  Politics 

a  proletariat  class,  or  of  a  majority  of  the  whole 
people,  is  nothing  but  lawless  despotism. 

§  8.  Derivation  of  Political  Power.  Po- 
litical Science,  in  i-ts  present  state  of  development, 
utterly  fails  to  recognize  natural  law  as  the  source 
from  which  political  power  or  authority  is  derived. 
The  prevailing  doctrine — that  the  expressed  will, 
or  command,  of  the  person  or  persons  who  are 
"sovereign"  is  above  and  independent  of  all  other 
law — would  seem  to  imply  that  all  political  power 
is  a  necessary  attribute  of  sovereignty,  and  is,  there- 
fore, inherent  in  the  persons  who  are  sovereign. 
Any  power  which  is  inherent  in  any  person  or  body 
of  persons  is,  of  course,  self-derived,  or  autocratic, 
power;  and  a  government  which  exercises  such 
power  is  a  true  autocracy. 

In  the  United  States,  the  ideas  of  the  source  of 
political  power  are  somewhat  confused.  According 
to  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  the  "just 
powers"  of  government  are  derived  from  "the  con- 
sent of  the  governed";  but  in  some  of  the  state 
constitutions  it  is  declared  that  "all  political  power 
is  vested  in  and  derived  from  the  people,"  and  that 
government  "is  founded  upon  their  will  only";  while 
throughout  the  entire  country  the  doctrine  prevails 
that  all  "sovereignty"  resides  in  the  people, — a  doc- 


Political  Dogmas  17 

trine  which  denies  the  sovereignty  of  either  the  Law, 
the  State,  or  the  Government. 

If  the  powers  of  a  government  are  derived  from 
the  consent  of  the  people  who  are  governed,  those 
powers  can  hardly  be  self-derived,  as  to  the  govern- 
ment; but  the  power  of  "consent,"  or  "ail  political 
power,"  or  "sovereignty,"  if  inherent  in  the  people, 
is  self-derived  as  to  them.  .If  sovereignty — which 
means  supreme  political  power — is  inherent  in  the 
people  as  apart  from  the  government,  then  such 
sovereign  pohtical  power  is  purely  self-derived, — 
which  is  autocracy ;  because  the  people,  considered 
apart  from  the  social  organism  or  government,  are 
not  organic  society,  and,  therefore,  could  not  derive 
such  power  from  the  natural  law  which  governs 
man  in  the  social  state. 

The  simple  truth  is,  that  all  existing  governments 
are  autocracies.  Self-derived  power  is  the  essence 
of  autocracy,  and  the  essential  nature  of  such  power 
is  not  altered  or  affected  by  the  number  of  persons 
invested  with  such  power.  A  self-derived  power 
and  sovereignty  which  is  claimed  and  exercised  by 
a  majority  of  the  whole  body  of  people  is  no  less 
an  autocracy  than  the  same  sort  of  power  and 
sovereignty  when  claimed  and  exercised  by  a  single 
individual.  In  this  connection,  it  should  be  observed 
that  the  word  "power"  is  employed  in  the  sense  of 
a   claimed  rightful  authority,   rather  than   that   of 


1 8  Politics 

mere  physical  force;  for,  while  a  majority  might 
pretend  to  rule  by  right  of  such  self-derived  force, 
such  pretention  could  hardly  be  maintained  by  a 
single  autocrat. 

So  universal  has  been  the  acceptance  of  Autocracy 
as  the  source  of  all  political  power  and  authority, 
that  our  language  does  not  afford  a  word  which 
signifies  the  opposite, — although  the  Greek  roots 
denoting  "law"  and  "power"  would  supply  the  word 
"NOMOCRACY,"  which  signifies  "law-derived 
power"  as  clearly  as  the  word  "autocracy,"  from 
the  same  language,  signifies  "self-derived  power." 
But  the  idea  of  law-derived  power  seems  never  to 
have  entered  into  any  political  system.  Yet,  if 
political  society  is  a  natural  and  involuntary  develop- 
ment in  obedience  to  and  compelled  by  the  natural 
law  governing  the  life  and  conduct  of  man  as  a 
social  being,  it  must  be  that  all  powers  and  all 
authority  of  political  society  are  derived  from  that 
law, — and  not  from  any  arbitrary  volition,  either 
human  or  divine.  Reason,  not  volition,  is  the  fac- 
ulty by  which  man  may  ascertain  and  know  the  laws 
of  human  action,  as  well  as  the  laws  of  material 
forces.  AH  powers  and  all  forces,  both  moral  and 
physical,  are  subject  to  the  natural  Law  by  which 
they  exist  and  act,  and,  therefore,  must  be  derived 
from  that  Law,  —  and  cannot  be  self-derived  or 
voluntary. 


Political  Dogmas  19 

§  9.  Obedience  to  Law.  With  but  a  single 
exception,  all  forces  in  nature,  both  animate  and  in- 
animate, are  absolutely  and  invariably  obedient  to 
law.  The  single  exception  is  the  moral  force  or 
power  of  volition.  Obedience  to  law  by  society, 
as  well  as  by  individual  men,  is  dependent  upon 
volition;  society,  like  the  individual,  may  will  to 
obey,  or  to  disobey,  the  law.  But  neither  society 
nor  the  individual  can  evade  or  escape  the  penalties 
of  disobedience  which  are  the  sanction  of  natural 
law.  Psychology,  however,  teaches  that  volition  is 
the  last  of  the  three  elementary  facts  of  mind,  viz., 
feeling,  knowing,  willing.  Volition  is  prompted 
either  by  feeling  or  by  knowledge.  Feeling  is  the 
consciousness  of  pleasure  or  pain,  like  or  dislike, 
desire  or  repugnance,  etc.  Knowledge  is  "a  clear 
perception  of  truth  and  duty."  Law  is  a  subject  of 
knowledge,  never  a  subject  of  feeling.  Obedience 
to  law,  therefore,  is  voluntary  action  in  accordance 
with  knowledge;  and  this  is  the  vital  principle  of  all 
justifiable  political  power  and  action,  the  key  to  the 
solution  of  the  problem  of  civilization. 

But  political  science  has  failed  to  recognize  this 
vital  principle,  and  still  clings  to  the  old  despotic 
principle  of  disobedience  to  law,  by  making  all  polit- 
ical action  accord  with  the  feeling,  sentiment,  pref- 
erence, or  desire  of  sovereign  persons.  Modern 
governments  yield  obedience,  not  to  the  law,  but 


20  Politics 

to  lawless  public  sentiment;  not  to  a  public  will 
which  is  prompted  by  knowledge  of  truth  and  duty, 
but  to  a  public  will  prompted  by  feeling,  and  vacil- 
lating between  the  selfish  interests  of  contending 
classes  of  people. 

Thus  the  issue  is  clearly  and  sharply  defined, 
between  a  lawful  and  a  lawless  volition,  or  exercise 
of  will,  as  the  moving  principle  of  political  society 
and  government.  It  is  the  fundamental  question  of 
the  source  from  which  all  justifiable  political  power 
and  authority  are  derived;  whether  from  natural 
law,  or  from  human  self-will  acting  independently 
of  law.  The  issue  is  between  law-derived  and  self- 
derived  power ;  between  Nomocracy  and  Autocracy. 

§  10.  Penalties  of  Disobedience.  Pop- 
ular discontent,  unrest,  disturbance,  insurrection, 
revolution,  war, — these  are  the  penalties  which  are 
inflicted  upon  society  for  its  disobedience  and  in- 
fractions of  the  natural  law;  and  no  political  society 
ever  has  escaped  those  penalties,  for  none  ever  has 
been,  or  is  today,  obedient  to  that  law.  The  devel- 
opment of  civilization,  and  the  advancement  and 
dissemination  of  knowledge,  have  not  sufficed  to 
remove,  or  even  to  diminish,  ancient  causes  of  pop- 
ular discontent,  but  rather  have  served  to  Intensify 
those  causes  by  revealing  them  more  vividly  to  the 
struggling  masses  of  mankind,  and  awakening  them 


Political  Dogmas  21 

to  a  keener  realization  of  the  glaring  fact  that  many 
of  the  benefits  and  blessings  of  civilization  are 
denied  to  a  very  large  proportion  of  the  really 
deserving,  while  being  lavishly  bestowed  upon  an 
undeserving  minority.  Throughout  the  ages,  the 
voice  of  the  multitude  has  cried  out  for  justice, — 
and  the  only  answer  has  been  a  perpetual  succession 
of  forms  of  government,  ranging  from  autocratic 
Monarchy  to  equally  autocratic  Democracy,  each  of 
which,  invariably,  has  enforced  selfish  and  lawless 
human  will,  and  each  of  which  has  failed  utterly 
to  realize  that  common  justice  which  is  the  right 
of  all.  In  all  ages,  and  under  all  forms  of  govern- 
ment, the  many  have  toiled  for  rewards  which  they 
never  received,  while  the  few  have  received  rewards 
for  which  they  never  toiled.  That  is  the  injustice 
against  which  the  multitude  has  cried  out  and 
rebelled,  and  for  which  the  wise  of  all  times  have 
sought  a  remedy;  but  the  remedy  never  has  been 
found,  and  social  justice,  though  attainable,  never 
has  been  attained.  This  is  the  one  stupendous  fail- 
ure of  political  science.  The  continuing  cause  of 
that  failure  is  Autocracy,  for  which  the  only  remedy 
is  Nomocracy.  The  beneficiaries  of  an  unjust  sys- 
tem are  not  responsible  for  the  injustice  of  a  system 
which  they  never  devised  and  themselves  do  not 
understand;  but  the  complaining  multitude  is  prone 


22  Politics 

to  hold  them  responsible,  and  to  seek  redress  by  the 
violent  enforcement  of  its  own  lawless  will. 

§  11.  Attainability  of  Justice.  Justice  is 
exact  conformity  to  the  laws  of  rectitude;  strict 
conformity  to  right;  obedience  to  natural  law.  An 
independent  government  can  be  held  subject  to  the 
sanctions  and  penalties  of  no  law  other  than  natural 
law;  and  the  attainment  of  justice  by  a  government 
is  possible  only  by  the  obedience  and  conformity  of 
that  government  to  the  precepts  of  natural  law.  If 
such  conformity  and  obedience  are  possible,  then 
the  attainment  of  justice  by  any  form  of  government 
which  so  conforms  and  obeys,  is  possible.  But, 
since  the  exercise  of  all  powers  and  functions  of 
government  must,  of  necessity,  be  entrusted  to 
human  agencies,  it  is  evident  that  the  capacity  of 
government  for  conformity  and  obedience  to  nat- 
ural law  must  depend  upon  whether  those  human 
agencies  are  fit,  and  capable  of  ascertaining  and 
conforming  to  the  precepts  of  that  law.  The  attain- 
ability of  justice,  therefore,  depends  upon  the  selec- 
tion of  fit  and  capable  persons  to  exercise  the  powers 
and  functions  of  government.  Such  selection  is  pos- 
sible, or  can  be  made  possible,  only  by  the  inaugura- 
tion of  a  comprehensive  and  systematic  survey  and 
classification  of  the  human  resources  of  the  state, 
by  which  the  relative  merits  and  capabilities  of  per- 


Political  Dogmas  23 

sons  may  be  scientifically  ascertained  and  made 
known,  and  only  the  fittest  and  most  capable  se- 
lected and  entrusted  with  the  exercise  of  the  several 
powers  and  functions  of  government.  This  is  the 
ultimate  problem  of  political  science;  and  the  fate 
of  civilization  hinges  upon  the  possibility  of  develop- 
ing and  inaugurating  a  practicable  and  scientific 
method  of  selection—which  is  the  subject  of  an- 
other chapter. 

§  12.  The  Present  Crisis.  Now,  when  the 
issue  of  the  world-war  is  hailed  as  the  triumph  of 
"Democracy"  over  "Autocracy";  now,  when  new 
and  strange  experiments  in  democracy  are  emerging 
from  the  ruins  of  fallen  empires,  and  even  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  greatest  of  all  so-called  "democ- 
racies" is  crumbling  under  the  disintegrating  forces 
of  unscientific  reform;  now,  when  the  authority  of 
orderly  government  everywhere  is  yielding  to  the 
influence  of  Anarchy  in  the  guise  of  Public  Opinion; 
now,  when  the  priceless  heritage  of  scientific  juris- 
prudence (priceless,  despite  its  imperfections)  is 
exposed  to  mutilation  and  destruction  by  the  mis- 
guided zeal  of  irresponsible  reformers  who  happen 
for  the  time  being  to  lead  a  supposedly  omnipotent 
majority; — even  now,  the  voice  of  the  multitude  is 
imperious  and  insistent  in  its  demand  for  justice, — 
for  that  justice  which  protects  the  stupid  from  the 


24  Politics 

astute,  as  well  as  the  weak  from  the  strong, — to 
the  end  that  those  who  toil  shall  not  suffer  want 
in  the  midst  of  abundance,  and  those  who  cannot 
toil  shall  not  be  dependent  upon  uncertain  private 
charity,  or  perish.  This  imperious  demand  cannot 
be  denied;  it  must  not  be  ignored;  neither  can  the 
voice  of  the  complaining  multitude  be  silenced  by 
any  arbitrary  power, — for  the  authority  of  govern- 
ments everywhere  is  undermined  and  paralysed  by 
the  spread  of  false  conceptions  of  "democracy," — 
and  there  no  longer  remains  in  the  world  any  power 
adequate  to  its  suppression  by  force  alone.  The 
demand  for  justice  must  be  satisfied;  and  it  can  be 
satisfied  only  by  the  actual  attainment  of  that  uni- 
versal justice  by  which  the  benefits  of  government 
and  civilization  may  be  shared  by  all  and  denied  to 
none. 


CHAPTER    II 


NATURE    OF    LAWS 


§  13.  The  Word  "Law."  Much  of  the  con- 
troversy that  has  taken  place  concerning  the  nature 
of  the  laws  of  civil  society  and  the  precise  definition 
of  the  word  "law,"  has,  without  doubt,  arisen  from 
the  fact  that  this  one  word  is  burdened  with  the 
double  duty  of  expressing  two  radically  different 
ideas.  Another  source  of  trouble  has  been  the 
persistent  tendency,  among  even  those  who  know 
better,  to  regard  the  word  "law"  as  being  derived 
from  and  limited  in  its  meaning  by  the  Latin  "lex"; 
though  our  English  word  is  of  purely  Anglo-Saxon 
origin,  and  has  no  etymological  relation  to  the  Latin 
word.  Yet,  for  the  want  of  an  additional  word  to 
express  one  of  the  two  different  ideas,  our  word 
"law"  commonly  is  employed  indiscriminately  to 
designate  either  an  act  of  a  legislature  or  a  rule  of 
jurisprudence.  The  Latin  language,  however,  has 
supplied  us  with  adjectives  which  definitely  express 
the  two  different  ideas:  the  word  "legislative,"  from 
lex  (a  rule  prescribed  by  arbitrary  authority)  to 
denote  legislative  law;  and  the  synonymous  words 

25 


26  Politics 


"juristic"  and  "jurisprudential,"  from  jus  (right, 
Justice)  to  denote  judicially  ascertained  law, — the 
rules,  maxims  and  established  principles  of  juris- 
prudence. Therefore,  when  we  use  the  word  "law" 
without  a  qualifying  adjective,  we  may  mean  either 
one  of  two  radically  different  things.  This  has 
resulted  in  endless  controversy,  at  least  in  the  Eng- 
lish-speaking world,  as  to  what  a  law  of  civil  society 
really  is. 

§  14.  Legislative  Laws.  All  edicts  and  de- 
crees of  the  ruler,  in  the  case  of  a  despotic  mon- 
archy; all  statutes  enacted  by  the  representative 
legislative  body,  in  the  case  of  a  republic;  and  all 
statutes  and  constitutions  enacted  or  adopted  by  the 
direct  votes  of  the  people,  in  the  case  of  a  democ- 
racy; all  these  are  legislative  laws.  They,  only, 
are  properly  defined  as  "rules  of  conduct  prescribed 
by  the  supreme  power  in  a  state,"  and  they  neces- 
sarily are  temporary  and  unstable  in  character,  be- 
ing subject  to  alteration  or  repeal  at  any  time,  at 
the  will  and  caprice  of  the  "sovereign  power"  that 
makes  them.  Such  legislative  laws  are  not  laws  at 
all,  in  the  sense  that  juristic  laws  are  laws;  the 
former  being  specific  rules  and  regulations  which 
are  more  or  less  arbitrarily  prescribed  and  enforced 
by  the  governing  power,  and  subject  to  change  or 
repeal  by  that  power,  regardless  of  whether  they 


Nature  of  Laws  27 

are  right  or  wrong;  while  the  latter  are  general 
and  universal  rules  deduced  from  knowledge  of 
principles  and  phenomena,  dependent  solely  upon 
their  rectitude  and  justice  for  their  force  and  valid- 
ity, and  cannot  be  changed,  altered  or  repealed 
arbitrarily, — though  erroneous  conceptions  of  such 
laws  may  occur  and  be  corrected  in  the  due  course 
of  the  development  of  the  science  of  jurisprudence. 
This  radical  difference  between  legislative  and  juris- 
tic laws  always  and  of  necessity  has  been  recognized 
in  the  actual  practice  of  judicial  tribunals;  and,  in 
those  countries  where  the  English  language  prevails, 
the  very  necessity  for  the  use  of  a  word  other  than 
the  word  "law"  to  designate  legislative  enactments 
has  led  to  the  adoption  and  constant  use  of  the 
word  "statute"  to  distinguish  the  so-called  "laws" 
which  express  the  will  of  legislators,  from  that  great 
body  of  the  common  law  which  no  legislative  power 
ever  prescribed,  and  which  constitutes  all  there  is  of 
scientific  jurisprudence, — the  real  and  permanent 
*'law  of  the  land"  in  every  civilized  country. 

§  15.  Statutes.  Since  despotic  monarchies, 
ivith  their  edicts  and  decrees,  now  may  be  regarded 
as  obsolete  throughout  the  world,  we  have  to  deal 
only  with  those  legislative  acts  which  are  either 
constitutions  or  statutes,  enacted  by  representative 
iSeliberative  bodies,  in  a  republic,  or  by  the  direct 


28  Politics 

votes  of  the  people,  in  a  democracy.  The  subject 
of  constitutions  will  be  considered  in  a  future  chap- 
ter on  the  Nature  of  Government.  A  statute,  as 
defined  by  Webster,  and  also  by  Bouvier,  is  "An 
act  of  the  legislature  of  a  state  or  country,  declar- 
ing, commanding,  or  prohibiting  something;  a  pos- 
itive law;  the  written  will  of  the  legislature  expres- 
sed with  all  the  requisite  forms  of  legislation; — 
used  in  distinction  from  common  law."  But  this 
definition  now  is  incomplete,  in  consequence  of  cer- 
tain constitutional  changes  in  several  states,  which 
have  authorized  the  initiation  and  enactment  of 
statutes  by  the  direct  action  of  the  irresponsible  vot- 
ing population  without  the  intervention  of  respon- 
sible legislative  bodies.  The  following  would  seem 
to  be  a  more  complete  and  concise  definition:  A 
statute  is  a  positive  act  of  legislation  expressing  the 
will  of  a  sovereign,  a  legislature,  or  a  people.  The 
essential  distinction  between  a  statute  and  comtnon 
law  is,  that  the  former  is  an  expression  of  will, 
while  the  latter  is  an  expression  of  right;  which  is 
the  etymological  distinction  between  legislation  and 
jurisprudence. 

§  16.  Proper  Domain  of  Statutes.  In 
accordance  with  the  distinctions  pointed  out  in  the 
preceding  section,  statutes  are  confined,  as  a  rule, 
to  the  domain  of  public  policy,   convenience,   and 


Nature  of  Laws  29 

expediency,  where  no  question  of  right  and  justice 
is  involved  further  than  is  required  by  a  decent  re- 
spect for  the  common  sense  of  right  and  justice. 
Statutes  which  invade  the  domain  of  jurisprudence 
and  attempt  to  enforce  the  legislator's  will  in  mat- 
ters of  right  and  justice,  though  exceptions  to  the 
rule,  are  sufficient  in  number  and  importance  to  be 
responsible  for  practically  all  the  injustice  which 
disturbs  the  peace  of  society. 

The  logical  and  appropriate  domain  of  legislation 
is,  to  prescribe  the  instrumentalities  and  methods 
of  procedure  for  the  proper  exercise  of  political 
powers  and  the  performance  of  public  duties;  to 
provide  for  the  public  defense  and  safety,  and  the 
prevention  and  suppression  of  crime;  and,  in  gen- 
eral, to  prescribe  and  regulate  matters  of  policy, 
convenience,  expediency,  and  procedure  in  the  con- 
duct of  public  affairs,  in  accordance  with  the  prin- 
ciples of  jurisprudence  and  in  the  interests  of  the 
liberty  and  happiness  of  the  people  as  individuals. 
All  these  things,  being  matters  of  policy  and  expedi- 
ency, rather  than  of  right  and  justice,  are  within 
the  proper  domain  of  legislative  powers;  while  mat- 
ters of  right  and  justice  are  matters  of  jurispru- 
dence, and,  as  such,  are  within  the  domain  of  judicial 
powers,  upon  which  neither  the  legislative  nor  exec- 
utive powers  of  government  may  rightfully  en- 
croach.    Policy   is  the   domain   of  legislation,   but 


30  Politics 

justice  is  the  domain  of  judicature;  and  it  is  essen- 
tial to  a  just  government,  that  policy  must  be  sub- 
ordinate to  justice.  The  fundamental  error  of 
modern  politics,  and  the  fatal  weakness  of  modern 
governments,  is  their  subjection  and  subordination 
of  justice  to  the  dictates  of  policy. 

§  17.  Juristic  Law.  The  term  "jurispru- 
dence" is  commonly  regarded  as  embracing  statutes 
as  well  as  common  law;  but  this  is  an  error,  which 
arises  from  the  fact  that  many  statutes  are  merely 
declaratory  of  rules  of  common  law  which  always 
were  the  lam,  independently  of  any  statute.  It  is 
true  that  rules  of  common  law  which  thus  are  in- 
corporated into  statutes,  are  not  by  that  circum- 
stance deprived  of  their  character  as  a  legitimate 
part  of  jurisprudence;  and  it  is  equally  true,  that 
statutes  which  prescribe  mere  matters  of  policy  and 
convenience  (as,  for  example,  a  statute  prescribing 
a  uniform  manner  of  conducting  elections  in  the 
several  counties  and  districts  of  a  state),  though 
they  thereby  become  part  of  the  legislation  of  the 
state,  do  not  become  and  cannot  properly  be  re- 
garded as  in  any  true  sense  a  part  of  the  juris- 
prudence of  the  state.  Such  statutes  do  not  con- 
stitute any  settled  rule  of  right,  nor  are  they  founded 
upon  any  scientific  principles  of  jurisprudence. 
Juristic  laws,  on  the  other  hand,  never  prescribe 


Nature  of  Laws  31 

mere  matters  of  temporary  policy,  or  of  conven- 
ience, but  always  and  necessarily  are  rules  which 
are  established  as  conclusions  arrived  at  by  the 
processes  of  reasoning;  rules  which,  if  the  conclu- 
sions are  correct,  could  not  be  different  from  what 
they  are,  and  cannot  be  changed  or  disregarded 
without  violence  to  the  laws  of  reason  and  the  sci- 
ence of  which  they  are  a  part.  Such  are  the  fam- 
iliar rules  and  maxims  of  equity,  m  the  English  and 
American  systems  of  jurisprudence,  and  such,  also, 
are  all  of  the  rules  of  the  common  law  of  every 
country  in  so  far  as  those  rules  are  sound  and 
unquestionable  in  principle. 

§  18.  Origin  of  Juristic  Law.  All  juristic 
laws  originate,  as  the  term  itself  implies,  in  the 
principles  of  right  and  justice,  principles  which  con- 
stitute the  true  science  of  jurisprudence.  By  the 
phrase  "right  and  justice"  we  mean  that  which  is 
right  in  the  sense  of  being  just  and  true;  and,  to 
avoid  the  seeming  tautology,  we  may  in  this  dis- 
cussion employ  the  single  word  "right" — ^but  always 
in  that  sense.  The  principles  of  right  are  the  basis, 
the  life,  and  the  soul  of  jurisprudence.  Those  prin- 
ciples are  apparent  to  and  comprehensible  by  rea- 
soning beings  only;  and  by  reason,  alone,  can  those 
principles  be  made  to  guide  and  control  the  affairs 
and  conduct  of  men.     By  the  sublime   faculty  of 


32  Politics 

reason,  alone,  man  is  enabled  to  regulate  his  conduct 
in  accordance  with  the  principles  of  right.  By  the 
processes  of  correct  reasoning  men  discover,  become 
conscious  of,  rules  of  right,  and  they  learn  by  experi- 
ence and  observation  that  their  peace  and  happiness 
as  social  beings  depend  upon  their  conforming  to 
those  rules  in  social  relations  and  conduct.  These 
rules  of  right  are  the  juristic  laws  of  society;  orig- 
inating in  rational  inferences  drawn  from  experience 
in  the  light  of  the  principles  of  right. 

^19.  Validity  of  Juristic  Law.  Since 
juristic  laws  are  ascertained  by  reason,  it  must  fol- 
low that  a  rule  thus  ascertained  cannot  be  a  valid 
rule,  or  a  true  law,  unless  the  inferences  and  con- 
clusions of  reason,  by  which  they  are  ascertained, 
are  correct,  and  without  error.  We  know  that  the 
minds  and  reasoning  powers  of  men  differ  widely, 
and  that  even  highly  trained  and  efficient  minds 
often  draw  widely  different  inferences  and  conclu- 
sions from  the  same  circumstances  and  principles. 
But  we  know,  also,  that  in  the  final  comparison  and 
analysis  of  those  differing  inferences  and  conclu- 
sions, all  competent  minds  finally  reach  and  agree 
in  the  same  inferences  and  conclusions,  upon  any 
subject  of  investigation  which  lies  within  the  domain 
of  knowledge  and  science;  and  it  is  this  final  agree- 
ment of  all  competent  minds  which  gives  validity 


Nature  of  Laws  33 

to  a  juristic  law.  Any  supposed  "law"  which  has 
not  been  confirmed  by  that  agreement  of  competent 
minds,  or  which  is  affirmed  by  some  and  rejected 
by  other  equally  competent  minds,  may  be  given 
effect  as  law  in  any  independent  jurisdiction  where 
it  is  affirmed,  but  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  legit- 
imate part  of  any  scientific  system  of  jurisprudence 
until  it  has  received  the  common  assent  of  all  com- 
petent jurists. 

§  20.  Judges  and  Jurists.  Science  is  or- 
dered and  systematized  knowledge.  Obviously,  the 
only  minds  that  are  competent  to  form  correct  and 
authoritative  conclusions  upon  the  problems  of  any 
particular  science  are  those  which  are  equipped  with 
adequate  knowledge  of  that  science;  v/hich  is  as 
true  in  respect  to  Jurisprudence  as  in  respect  to  any 
other  science.  Jurists  are  those  men  who  have  ac- 
quired a  comprehensive  knowledge  and  understand- 
ing of  the  science  of  Jurisprudence ;  while  judges  are 
those  jurists  who  are  invested  with  authority  to 
ascertain  and  apply  the  law  in  the  investigation  and 
decision  of  specific  litigated  controversies.  Upon 
judges,  therefore,  rests  the  duty  of  definitely  ascer- 
taining and  applying  the  juristic  laws  of  society  (as 
well  as  that  of  determining  the  validity  of  statutes, 
and  enforcing  them)  by  authoritative  decisions. 
But  juristic  laws  sometimes  are,  in  fact,  ascertained 


34  Politics 

and  established  by  the  reasoning  of  jurists  who  are 
not  judges;  and  the  reasoning  of  such  jurists,  when 
conclusive,  is  recognized  and  followed  as  authorita- 
tive by  the  judges,  in  their  decisions.  Thus  it  is 
evident  that  the  rationale  of  law  is  the  real  authority 
upon  which  it  rests.  The  decisions  of  judges,  in 
courts  of  last  resort,  are  final  only  as  to  the  liti- 
gants in  the  case  decided,  and  the  rules  of  law 
announced  in  such  decisions  are  binding  upon  the 
inferior  courts  in  the  same  jurisdiction;  but  they 
are  not  binding  or  conclusive  upon  succeeding 
judges  of  the  same  high  court,  nor  upon  judges  in 
other  independent  jurisdictions,  any  farther  than 
they  are  supported  by  the  final  authority  of 
rationale. 

§  21.  Judicial  Precedents.  The  statement 
just  made  does  not  harmonize  perfectly  with  the 
well-known  rule  of  stare  decisis,  which  is  recognized 
and  rather  firmly  established  in  Enghsh  and  Amer- 
ican jurisprudence;  but  which,  as  usually  applied, 
itself  is  in  irreconcilable  conflict  with  the  principles 
of  right  upon  which  scientific  jurisprudence  is 
founded.  The  principle  of  right,  and  the  very 
nature  of  justice,  inexorably  require  that  no  rule 
ever  is  settled,  and  entitled  to  be  accepted  as  a 
valid  rule  of  law,  until  it  is  rightly  settled.  The 
rule  of  stare  decisis  is  based  upon  the  principle  that 


Nature  of  Laws  35" 

a  rule  of  law  which  once  has  been  judicially  estab- 
lished, and  in  reliance  upon  which  private  rights 
and  duties  have  been  acquired  and  assumed,  should 
not  be  disturbed  or  overruled  in  future  decisions, 
even  though  the  rule  is  unsound  in  principle,  if 
greater  injustice  might  result  from  so  doing  than 
probably  will  ensue  from  adhering  to  such  rule. 
Whatever  merit  there  might  be  in  a  strict  and  cau- 
tious application  of  the  rule,  many  courts  of  last 
resort  have  extended  its  application  until  the  rule  of 
stare  decisis  has  become  a  serious  impediment  to  the 
growth  and  development  of  jurisprudence  as  a  pure 
science.  It  is  a  reproach  to  the  judiciary,  that  courts 
of  last  resort  are  in  the  habit  of  departing  so  far 
beyond  the  reason  of  the  rule  of  stare  decisis  as  to 
avail  themselves  of  that  rule  as  an  avenue  of  escape 
from  the  labor  of  judicial  investigation  and  analysis, 
by  supinely  following  their  own  former  decisions, 
or  those  of  other  jurisdictions,  merely  as  precedents, 
without  taking  the  trouble  to  inquire  whether  those 
precedents  were  well  considered  and  sound  in  prin- 
ciple. The  effect  of  this  unreasoning  adherence  to 
precedent  is  to  paralyse  and  stay  the  natural  proc- 
ess of  the  evolution  and  gradual  perfection  of  Juris- 
prudence as  a  living  science. 

§  22.  Competency   of  Judges.     We   have 
said  that  the  only  minds  that  are  competent  to  form 


36  Politics 

correct  and  authoritative  conclusions  upon  the  prob- 
lems of  any  particular  science  are  those  minds  which 
are  equipped  with  adequate  knowledge  of  that  par- 
ticular science.  It  is  a  truism,  to  say  that  the  highest 
development  and  perfection  of  the  science  of  Juris- 
prudence can  be  attained  only  by  vesting  judicial 
powers  in  those  jurists  only  who  are  the  most  com- 
petent and  the  best  fitted  for  the  exercise  of  judicial 
functions.  But  it  seldom,  if  ever,  happens  that  the 
ablest  jurists  are  the  ones  actually  selected  for  the 
highest  judicial  offices;  and  the  fault  complained  of 
in  the  preceding  section,  as  well  as  others  not  yet 
mentioned,  and  the  general  inefficiency  that  exists 
in  all  offices  of  government,  are  attributable  to 
prevailing  unscientific  methods  of  selection  and  elec- 
tion of  the  persons  to  whom  the  exercise  of  judi- 
cial, legislative,  and  administrative  functions  is  en- 
trusted; a  subject  of  vital  and  far-reaching  impor- 
tance, which  will  be  discussed  at  length  in  another 
chapter. 

§  23.  Accidental  Selection  of  Judges. 
The  degree  of  scientific  perfection  to  which  Juris- 
prudence has  been  developed  is  truly  surprising, 
when  we  reflect  upon  the  absence  of  conditions 
which  might  be  expected  to  insure  the  survival  of 
the  fittest  among  aspirants  to  the  judicial  office.    In 


Nature  of  Laws  37 

all  times,  and  in  every  country,  the  judicial  office 
invariably  has  been  obtained  only  by  accident, — the 
accident  of  birth,  or  the  accident  of  arbitrary  selec- 
tion,— never  as  the  logical  consequence  of  superior 
merit  scientifically  ascertained.  But  the  unavoidable 
necessity  of  resorting  to  the  principles  of  natural 
justice  and  right,  for  the  solution  of  judicial  prob- 
lems, constantly  has  led  to  the  discovery  and  formu- 
lation of  those  rules  of  conduct  and  rules  of  decision 
which  are  indispensable  to  the  administration  of 
justice,  and  which,  being  capable  of  universal  appli- 
cation, naturally  and  gradually  have  become  co- 
ordinated into  a  scientific  system.  How  much  more 
perfect  and  complete  that  science  now  would  be,  if 
its  development  and  administration  always  had  been 
committed  to  those  only  who  were  the  best  qualified 
and  fitted  for  that  great  work,  only  can  be  imagined. 
For  its  present  state  of  development,  we  are  in- 
debted to  those  really  great  jurists  who,  by  good 
fortune  and  chance,  were  given  the  opportunity  to 
impress  the  work  of  their  genius  upon  the  juris- 
prudence of  their  respective  countries.  But  how 
great  has  been  the  loss  to  civilization  from  the  fact 
(which  cannot  be  doubted)  that  judicial  power 
often  has  been  and  now  frequently  is  vested  in 
incompetent  hands,  and  withheld  from  those  who 
were,  or  are,  the  most  competent? 


2079^^8 


38  Politics 

§  24.  Rationale  and  Sovereignty.  The 
one  inherent  and  fundamental  difference  that  dis- 
tinguishes juristic  from  legislative  law  is,  that  the 
validity  of  the  former  depends  upon  its  rationale, 
while  the  validity  of  the  latter  depends  upon  despotic 
authority.  The  judicial  function  is  to  inquire  into 
and  decide  ( 1 )  what  are  the  facts — the  truth — of 
the  matter  in  question,  and  (2)  what  is  the  law  of 
the  matter.  The  legislative  function  is  to  declare 
the  sovereign  will  of  the  legislator  and  prescribe  the 
ways  and  means  of  carrying  out  that  will.  The 
judicial  inquiry  terminates  in  a  judgment,  for  which 
stated  reasons  are  given.  The  legislative  delibera- 
tion terminates  in  a  statute,  a  command,  for  which 
no  reason  is  required  or  given.  Courts  of  justice 
recognize  as  authority,  not  only  their  own  prior  de- 
cisions, but  also  the  rationale  of  the  decisions  of 
foreign  courts;  but  legislatures  are  bound  neither  by 
their  own  prior  acts  nor  those  of  any  foreign  legis- 
lature. Juristic  law  is  based  upon  reason  only; 
legislation  is  based  upon  sovereignty  only. 

§  25.  Legislation  and  Jurisprudence.  It 
has  now  become  evident  that  Legislation  and  Juris- 
prudence have  separate  and  distinct  places  and  func- 
tions in  the  organism  of  society;  each  occupying  an 
exclusive  domain  upon  which  the  other  ought  not  to 
encroach.     Legislation  occupies  the  domain  of  pol- 


Nature  of  Laws  39 

icy  and  expediency;  while  Jurisprudence  occupies  the 
domain  of  right  and  justice.  Policy  and  expediency 
are  uncertain,  and  necessarily  are  subject  to  altera- 
tion according  to  the  requirements  of  changing  con- 
ditions and  circumstances;  while  right  and  justice 
are  certain,  fixed  and  unalterable  principles  which 
always  are  applicable  to  all  conditions  and  all  cir- 
cumstances. The  statutes  of  legislation  express  the 
temporary  will,  choice,  preference  or  discretion  of 
the  legislator;  the  rules  of  jurisprudence  express  the 
permanent  conclusions  of  the  jurist,  unaffected  by 
any  personal  will  or  preference. 

§  26.  Supremacy  of  Jurisprudence.  Since 
legislation  is  a  matter  of  temporary  and  alterable 
policy,  whereas  jurisprudence  is  a  matter  of  fixed 
and  unalterable  principle;  and  since  policy  can  and 
should  be  made  to  conform  to  principle,  whereas 
principle  cannot  and  should  not  be  made  to  conform 
to  policy;  it  necessarily  follows,  that  legislation, 
which  deals  only  with  policy,  can  and  should  be 
made  to  conform  to  jurisprudence,  v/hich  deals  only 
with  principle;  and  that  jurisprudence  cannot  and 
should  not  be  made  to  conform  to  legislation.  This 
conclusion  is  unassailable  and  undeniable;  yet  it  is 
contrary  to  the  theory  and  practice  of  every  civilized 
state,  and  appears  never  to  have  been  even  thought 
of  by  politicians  and  statesmen.     But  modern  civ- 


40  Politics 

ilization  now  is  on  trial,  upon  the  serious  indictment 
that  it  has  failed  utterly  in  political  and  social 
justice. 

Since  that  universal  failure  of  justice  must  be 
attributable  to  some  fundamental  error  or  errors,  it 
Is  reasonable  to  inquire  whether  that  error,  or  one 
of  those  errors,  be  not  the  universal  failure  to  rec- 
ognize and  observe  the  fundamental  principle  that 
legislation  may  not  prevail  over,  but  must  conform 
to,  the  unalterable  principles  of  Jurisprudence. 

§  27.  Legislative  Encroachments.  It  is  a 
significant  fact  t-hat,  while  legislatures  uniformly 
assume  a  sovereign  right  to  modify  or  abolish,  at 
their  will,  any  of  the  rules  of  jurisprudence,  they  in 
fact  seldom  exercise  that  sovereign  prerogative.  It 
is  a  fact  that  the  instances  of  legislative  encroach- 
ment upon  the  domain  of  jurisprudence  are  rare,  as 
compared  with  the  multitude  of  acts  which  are 
within  the  proper  domain  of  legislation.  But  this 
seeming  forbearance  has  been  unconscious  and  un- 
premeditated; an  instinctive  recognition  of  some 
imperceptible,  yet  real,  boundary  line  between  the 
spheres  of  legislation  and  jurisprudence.  Never- 
theless, these  encroachments  have  been  sufficiently 
frequent  and  serious  to  justify  an  inquiry  as  to 
whether  they  are  not  responsible  for  much  of  the 


Nature  of  Laws  41 

injustice  and  inequality  of  opportunity  which  now 
imperils  the  peace  and  order  of  society. 

§  28.  Kinds  of  Encroachment.  Instances 
are  not  wanting,  in  the  published  reports  of  judicial 
decisions,  where  judges  have  been  constrained  to 
apologize  for  an  unjust  judgment  which  some  act  of 
legislation  has  compelled  them  to  render,  and  to 
complain,  sometimes  with  bitterness,  at  the  com- 
pulsion which  makes  them  the  unwilling  instruments 
of  injustice.  But  such  legislative  acts,  though  the 
cause  of  injustice  in  specific  cases,  usually  are  cor- 
rected by  subsequent  legislation,  in  response  to  ju- 
dicial criticism  or  popular  condemnation,  and  there- 
fore such  acts  are  of  minor  importance  as  compared 
with  another  and  more  serious  class  of  legislative 
encroachments  upon  the  domain  of  jurisprudence. 
Those  legislative  acts  which  are  the  most  unjust  and 
injurious  to  that  all  too  numerous  class  of  people 
who  toil  and  suffer  in  hopeless  poverty,  by  indirectly 
taxing  persons  instead  of  property,  and  otherwise 
facilitating  the  accumulation  of  wealth  in  the  hands 
of  a  fortunate  or  more  greedy  class,  escape  popular 
condemnation  because  their  operation  and  ultimate 
effects  are  not  understood  by  the  people  in  general, 
nor  even  by  many  of  the  most  intelligent.  But  a 
discussion  of  specific  legislation  of  this  class  is  not 
within  the  limits  and  purpose  of  this  treatise.     We 


42  Politics 

are  concerned  now  with  the  fundamental  principles, 
or  errors,  which  are  responsible  for  arbitrary  and 
despotic  legislation. 

Deeply  imbedded  in  modern  jurisprudence,  and 
polluting  the  streams  of  justice,  are  elements  which 
are  totally  foreign  to  that  science,  and  which  have 
descended  to  us  from  more  barbarous  times,  when 
force  was  the  highest  law,  and  conquerors  and  des- 
pots were  legislators.  Some  of  the  foreign  elements 
now  are  commonly  regarded  as  part  of  the  common 
law,  and  some  even  are  perpetuated  in  the  written 
constitutions  of  American  states. 

§  29.  Personal  Sovereignty.  All  existing 
systems  of  jurisprudence  are  permeated  and  dis- 
torted by  the  fundamental  error  of  personal  sover- 
eignty. The  idea  of  a  personal  sovereignty  and  of 
royal  prerogatives,  superior  to  and  independent  of 
any  higher  law  or  principle,  often  expressed  by  the 
familiar  maxim:  "The  king  can  do  no  wrong,"  has 
not  been  rejected  in  the  constitutions  of  modern  re- 
publics; on  the  contrary,  in  so-called  "democratic" 
countries,  the  strangely  persistent  effort  is  made  to 
preserve  the  idea  of  personal  sovereignty,  by  the 
expedient  of  substituting  the  "state"  or  the  "people" 
as  a  sort  of  successor,  or  viceroy,  to  an  imaginary 
king. 

It  was  this  unwarranted  assumption,  that  a  per- 


Nature  of  Laws  43 

sonal  sovereign  is  essential  to  and  inseparable  from 
any  organic  political  society  (in  other  words,  that 
there  necessarily  must  be  some  "sovereign  person 
or  persons"  as  an  indispensable  element  of  a  state), 
that  impelled  John  Austin  to  produce  his  labored 
argument  to  establish  and  maintain  the  untenable 
proposition  that  all  real  laws  of  civil  society  neces- 
sarily are  "commands."  In  no  other  way  was  it 
possible  to  reconcile  the  idea  of  civil  law  with  the 
idea  that  the  legislative  power  in  a  state  is  inde- 
pendent of  and  superior  to  natural  law  and  the  prin- 
ciples of  justice. 

The  truth  is,  that  personal  sovereignty  is  not 
essential  to  or  inseparable  from  political  society. 
The  truth  is,  that  personal  sovereignty  is  utterly  irre- 
concilable with  scientific  jurisprudence;  and  that  a 
state  of  social  justice,  for  which  the  whole  world 
now  is  clamoring,  will  be  impossible  and  unattain- 
able, so  long  as  the  sovereignty  of  men  (whether 
kings,  parliaments,  or  majorities)  is  superior  to  the 
sovereignty  of  law. 

§  30.  Jural  Sovereignty.  The  legislative 
power  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  a  sovereign  power, 
if  it  is  subordinate  to  jural  principles  and  may  not 
alter  or  annul  jurisprudential  laws  at  the  legislator's 
will.  A  government  which  holds  itself  subject  and 
subordinate    to    the    principles    of    Jurisprudence, 


44  Politics 

thereby  acknowledges  the  sovereignty  of  those  prin- 
ciples, and  becomes  the  embodiment  of  political  sci- 
ence and  justice,  instead  of  an  instrument  to  enforce 
the  will  and  serve  the  selfish  interests  of  a  tyrannical 
king  or  an  equally  tyrannical  majority. 

It  is  a  significant  fact  that,  in  all  forms  of  gov- 
ernment, while  the  persons  who  are  invested  with 
the  legislative  power  uniformly  claim  and  exercise 
the  right  and  power  of  unlimited  personal  sover- 
eignty, those  who  are  invested  with  the  judicial 
power  constantly  recognize  the  absolute  sovereignty 
of  the  jural  or  juristic  law,  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  over- 
ridden by  legislation;  the  judgments  of  judges  be- 
ing, with  remarkable  uniformity,  and  with  scarcely 
any  noteworthy  exceptions,  entirely  impersonal. 
Judges  uniformly  hold  themselves  subordinate  to 
law.  This  fact  is  a  complete  and  final  answer  to 
the  objection  that,  if  all  branches  of  government  are 
made  subject  and  subordinate  to  jural  and  juristic 
law,  the  judiciary  inevitably  will  become  the  supreme 
and  controlling  branch  of  government — a  suprem- 
acy which  hitherto  has  been  conceded  to  the  legis- 
lative branch  only.  Such,  without  doubt,  will  be  the 
result;  but  the  records  of  the  judiciary  of  all  coun- 
tries (especially  in  the  United  States,  where  the  Su- 
preme Court  for  more  than  a  century  has  held  and 
exercised  the  power  of  annulling  unconstitutional 
legislation)  demonstrate  the  wisdom  and  the  safety 


Nature  of  Laws  45 

of  entrusting  such  supremacy  to  the  judiciary,  rather 
than  to  the  legislature. 

§  31.  Rights  and  Sovereignty.  The  idea 
or  principle  of  unlimited  personal  sovereignty  (the 
sovereignty  of  men),  which  is  adopted  to  its  full- 
est extent  by  modern  popular  governments,  excludes 
the  possibility  of  "inalienable"  rights.  All  human 
rights,  including  those  of  "life,  liberty,  and  the  pur- 
suit of  happiness,"  are  held  subject  to  the  legislative 
will  of  that  indefinite  and  indeterminate  body  of 
persons  called  the  people;  and  that  legislative  will 
may  be  expressed  not  only  in  written  constitutions 
and  statutes,  but  in  any  other  manner  which  the  peo- 
ple may  choose  to  adopt.  This  monstrous  princi- 
ple, which  is  accepted  almost  universally  as  the 
essential  basis  of  popular  government,  and  which 
seems  to  be  involved  in  the  idea  that  governments 
derive  their  just  powers  "from  the  consent  of  the 
governed,"  is  the  foundation  upon  which  Interna- 
tionalism (in  the  forms  of  Bolshevism,  Communism, 
and  Radical  Socialism)  builds  its  systems  of  class 
conflict  and  proletariat  rule;  arguing,  with  perfect 
logic,  that:  (1)  The  people  are  sovereign;  (2)  The 
majority  of  the  people  may  rightfully  exercise  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people;  (3)  The  proletariat  is 
a  majority  of  the  people;  (4)  Therefore,  the  pro- 
letariat is  sovereign. 


46  Politics 

This  means  that  the  proletariat  has  the  sovereign 
right  to  exercise  absolute  and  irresponsible  domin- 
ion over  the  lives,  liberties  and  conduct  of  all  per- 
sons and  all  societies. 

The  sufficient  and  only  answer  to  the  syllogism  of 
proletariat  sovereignty,  is  the  absolute  denial  of 
the  false  premises,  and  the  assertion  of  these  vital 
truths : 

( 1 )  That  the  law  of  truth  and  right  is  sover- 
eign; 

(2)  That  the  exercise  of  the  sovereignty  of  law 
belongs  to  the  governing  organism  of  Society, — not 
to  the  people  as  constituent  elements  of  society,  nor 
to  any  class  of  people,  nor  to  any  person  or  persons 
whomsoever; 

(3)  That  any  infringement  of  human  rights  by 
legislative  will,  under  any  pretext  of  sovereignty, 
either  by  a  king,  a  legislature,  or  by  the  people  them- 
selves, is  lawless  despotism  and  unjustifiable  tyranny. 

§  32.  Inalienable  Rights.  Since  Jurispru- 
dence is  the  science  of  jural  law — which  means  the 
law  of  right — and  necessarily  is  the  sole  and  su- 
preme authority  in  all  matters  of  civil  or  political 
right,  the  inference  would  seem  to  follow  that  all 
legislative  encroachments  upon  Jurisprudence  are 
encroachments  upon  matters  of  right.  These  mat- 
ters of  right  include  all  the  rights  of  man.     If  none 


Nature  of  Laws  47 

of  these  rights  may  be  infringed  or  encroached 
upon,  it  must  be  because  all  human  rights  are  in- 
alienable,— employing  the  word  as  signifying  rights 
which  no  government  may  justly  take  away  or 
invade. 

§  33.  Autocracy.  Thus  far  our  inquiry 
seems  to  lead  to  and  justify  the  following  conclu- 
sions :  That  the  chief  end  of  any  just  government  is 
the  preservation  and  protection  of  human  rights; 
that  human  rights  can  be  preserved  and  protected 
only  by  a  government  which  is  constituted  and  con- 
ducted in  conformity  to  the  principles  of  scientific 
Jurisprudence;  that  Jurisprudence  is  a  science,  the 
laws  of  which  cannot  be  ascertained  by  any  auto- 
cratic sovereign  will,  but  are  ascertainable  only  by 
the  same  scientific  processes  of  reason  that  are  em- 
ployed in  any  other  science;  that  the  injustice  which 
defeats  the  preservation  and  protection  of  human 
rights  is,  and  ever  has  been,  caused  by  autocratic 
personal  sovereignty,  the  principle  of  Autocracy, 
which  forever  interferes  with  the  proper  functions 
of  Jurisprudence  by  the  enforcement  of  a  selfish  and 
uncontrolled  human  will,  and  which  assumes  a  sov- 
ereign right  to  make  "laws"  which  conflict  with  the 
unalterable  laws  of  Jurisprudence;  and  that  the 
cause  of  the  failure  of  every  form  of  government 


48  Politics 

to  attain  the  ends  of  justice  is,  and  ever  has  been, 
the  fatal  principle  of  despotic  and  autocratic  sov- 
ereignty, which  is  inimical  to  and  irreconcilable  with 
the  principles  of  Jurisprudence. 


CHAPTER   III 

NATURE    OF   GOVERNMENT 

§  34.  Origin  op  Government.  Speculation 
concerning  the  incipient  stages  of  society  and  gov- 
ernment in  primitive  times  is  of  little  or  no  value  in 
an  investigation  of  the  problems  of  modern  politics. 
It  is  sufficient  for  the  purposes  of  this  chapter,  to 
observe  that  man  is  by  nature  a  social  being;  that 
human  society  cannot  exist  without  organization; 
that  a  governing  organism  is  necessary  to  the  exist- 
ence of  organized  society;  and  that  such  governing 
organism  of  society  is  government:.  The  origin  of 
government,  therefore,  is  in  necessity.  The  laws 
of  self-preservation,  competition  for  existence  and 
survival,  the  laws  of  natural  selection, — these  nat- 
ural laws,  and  the  intolerable  condition  of  human 
life  under  these  laws  without  the  mutual  protection 
and  restraint  of  organized  society  and  government, 
all  combine  to  compel  men  to  associate  and  organize 
in  society.  If  all  men  were  by  nature  unselfish, 
altruistic,  and  just,  there  would  be,  apparently,  no 
actual  necessity  for  a  restraining  government;  but, 
on  the  contrary,  man  is  by  nature  selfish,  unjust  and 

49 


50  Politics 

merciless  in  seeking  his  own  Individual  preservation 
and  happiness,  in  spite  of  all  the  artificial  restraints 
of  society.  Every  person  desires  liberty  for  him- 
self and  restraint  for  all  others.  This  universal  de- 
sire for  liberty  and  for  protection  from  the  liberty 
of  others,  is  the  motive  which  impels  men  to  assume 
the  burdens  and  submit  to  the  restraints  of  gov- 
ernment. 

§  3S.  State,  Defined.  A  state  is  a  political 
society  which  is,  either  wholly  or  partially,  abso- 
lutely independent  of  and  free  from  control  by  any 
other  political  society.  Within  this  definition,  the 
United  States  of  America  is  a  state  which  is  wholly 
and  absolutely  independent  of  and  free  from  con- 
trol by  any  other  state;  while  each  of  the  several 
states  of  the  Union  is  a  state  which  is  partially,  and 
to  a  limited  extent  only,  absolutely  independent  of 
and  free  from  control  by  the  United  States  or  any 
other  state.  Other  examples  of  dependent  and  in- 
dependent states  might  be  mentioned,  but  the  dis- 
tinction between  them  is  of  little  or  no  importance 
in  an  inquiry  into  the  nature  of  government. 

%  36.  Forms  of  Government.  All  political 
writers,  with  remarkable  unanimity,  accept  and  fol- 
low Aristotle's  classification  of  the  good  and  bad 
forms  of  governm.ent;  the  good  being  Monarchy, 


Nature  of  Government  51 

Aristocracy,  and  Commonwealth, — the  correspond- 
ing bad  or  depraved  form  of  each  being  Tyranny, 
Oligarchy,  and  Democracy.  All  writers,  however, 
seem  to  have  ignored  the  vital  and  fundamental  dis- 
tinction between  substance  and  form,  by  failing  to 
note  the  substantial  distinction  between  scientific  and 
arbitrary  government.  But  this  failure  may  be  ac- 
counted for  by  the  fact  that  a  scientific  government 
never  existed,  while  all  known  forms  of  government 
that  ever  existed  and  that  now  exist  were  and  are 
Autocracies,  enforcing  the  lawless  will  of  the  per- 
sons who  exercise  its  powers. 

Aristotle,  however,  did  not  fail  to  recognize  the 
desirability  of  conforming  government  to  law;  ob- 
serving that  the  best  governments  are  those  which 
leave  as  much  as  possible  to  the  laws,  and  as  little 
as  possible  to  the  will  of  the  governing  persons; 
and  pointing  out,  also,  that  the  best  type  of  Democ- 
racy is  one  whose  citizens  have  little  time  for  poli- 
tics, and  consequently  interfere  little  with  the  opera- 
tion of  the  laws. 

§  37.  Sequence  of  Forms.  Despite  the  ten- 
dency of  the  present  time  toward  the  obliteration 
of  monarchy  from  the  civilized  world,  the  fact  re- 
mains that  monarchy  has  been  the  usual  and  appar- 
ently the  normal  form  of  government,  to  which  all 
other  forms  have  exhibited  a  constant  tendency  to 


52  Politics 

revert.  History  abounds  in  the  repetition  of  mili- 
tary domination  arising  from  public  disorder  and 
anarchy;  of  monarchy  enthroning  itself  upon  mili- 
tary domination;  of  the  degeneration  of  monarchy 
into  tyranny;  of  either  a  popular  or  an  aristocratic 
revolt  against  tyranny,  overthrowing  monarchy  and 
setting  up  a  democracy  or  an  aristocracy;  of  the 
degeneration  of  democracy  or  aristocracy  into 
anarchy  or  oligarchy;  of  public  disorder  and  the 
struggle  of  armed  forces  for  supremacy, — resulting 
in  the  military  domination  of  the  stronger  force, 
thus  beginning  again  the  same  circle  of  events. 

While  recognizing  the  substance  of  government 
as  of  more  importance  than  its  form,  it  nevertheless 
seems  necessary  to  examine  more  closely  the  several 
elementary  forms,  in  a  search  for  the  causes  of  the 
failure  of  each  form  of  government,  in  the  past,  and 
the  comparative  adaptability  of  each  to  the  scien- 
tific requirements  of  social  justice,  and  the  peace 
and  order  of  society. 

§  38.  Monarchy.  The  simplest  as  well  as 
the  most  primitive  form  of  government  is  that  of 
one  dominant  person  in  a  community,  whose  leader- 
ship is  aclcnowledged  by  all  his  fellows  because  none 
dares  to  defy  him.  It  has  its  analogies  among  all 
gregarious  species  of  the  lower  animals.  The  most 
powerful  and  courageous  individual  leads  the  herd, 


Nature  of  Government  53 

the  flock,  or  the  band.  Among  mankind,  the  primi- 
tive tendency  toward  monarchy  commonly  is  ex- 
hibited by  children.  Wherever  a  gang  of  boys  is 
found  habitually  together,  the  most  enterprising,  im- 
perious and  daring  among  them  is  sure  to  be  their 
acknowledged  leader.  Among  adults,  even,  espe- 
cially in  small  and  remote  rural  communities,  a  local 
bully  is  very  likely  to  become  the  virtual  ruler,  be- 
cause the  other  members  of  the  community  deem  it 
wiser  to  submit  to  his  will  than  to  provoke  his  wrath. 
In  earlier  times,  when  comparatively  small  commu- 
nities were  independent  states,  and  were  free  to 
make  war  upon  each  other,  the  ruler  of  a  strong 
community  was  able  to  subjugate  his  weaker  neigh- 
bors and  add  them  to  his  dominions,  making  him- 
self monarch  over  all.  This  Is  the  principle  and 
the  common  genesis  of  monarchical  government: 
it  is  the  will  of  one  man  Imposed  upon  others 
by  force. 

§  39.  Absolute  Monarchy.  It  may  be 
theoretically  possible  (and  it  may  have  actually  hap- 
pened at  times)  that  an  absolute  monarchy  can  orig- 
inate in  the  free  and  voluntary  choice  of  the  people 
who  are  to  be  governed  by  it;  but  the  historical  fact 
is  that  such  monarchies  are  born  of  war  and  are 
maintained  by  military  force  alone.  History  does 
record  instances,   however,   of   absolute   monarchs 


54  Politics 

whose  rule  was  so  benevolent  and  just  as  to  merit 
and  receive  the  voluntary  obedience  of  a  contented 
and  happy  people  without  the  necessity  of  military 
force.  Such,  according  to  Gibbon,  was  the  happy 
condition  of  the  Roman  world  during  the  reigns  of 
the  Antonines;  who,  though  invested  with  the  im- 
perial power  by  the  suffrage  of  the  army  alone,  were 
really  sustained  by  the  free  consent  of  a  loyal  and 
grateful  people;  an  illustration  of  the  important 
facts,  that  the  principle  rather  than  the  form  of  a 
government  is  important,  and  that  the  people  of  a 
country  are  disposed  to  peace,  order  and  loyalty, 
even  when  governed  by  absolute  monarchy,  so  long 
as  they  are  wisely  and  justly  governed. 

§  40.  Despotic  Monarchy.  An  absolute 
monarchy  is  not  necessarily  despotic,  in  the  sense  of 
ruling  without  regard  to  the  laws  of  the  people  over 
whom  the  monarch  rules.  While  a  despotic  mon- 
archy always  is  absolute,  it  does  not  follow  that  an 
absolute  monarchy  always  is  despotic.  A  monarchy 
is  absolute  when  there  is  no  constitutional  limita- 
tion upon  the  power  of  the  monarch,  and  he  is  in- 
vested with  authority  and  power  to  disregard  or  to 
conform  to  the  laws  of  society,  at  his  own  will  and 
discretion,  in  the  conduct  of  his  government.  If 
an  absolute  monarch  rules  without  regard  to  law 
and  justice,  he  is  a  despot;  but  if  he  chooses  to  sub- 


Nature  of  Government  SS 

ordinate  his  own  will  to  the  principles  of  law  and 
justice,  in  the  exercise  of  his  power,  he  is  none  the 
less  an  absolute  monarch,  but  he  is  not  a  despot.  He 
may  unite  in  his  own  person,  if  he  will,  all  the  gov- 
ernmental functions  of  legislation,  judicature,  and 
administration,  and  yet  not  exercise  any  of  those 
functions  despotically. 

Despotism  is  an  absolute  and  tyrannical  control 
over  others,  whether  that  control  is  exercised  by  a 
monarchy  or  by  any  other  form  of  government.  It 
follows,  therefore,  that  despotism  is  not  necessarily 
confined  to  despotic  monarchy,  but  a  despotic  aris- 
tocracy, and  a  despotic  democracy,  are  equally  pos- 
sible. 

§  41.  Hereditary,  Elective,  Monarchy. 
Where  the  supreme  power  of  the  state  is  vested  in 
one  man,  the  government  is  a  monarchy;  and  the 
monarchical  character  of  such  government  is  not 
altered  or  affected  by  either  the  term  of  office  of  the 
monarch  or  the  established  mode  of  determining 
who  shall  be  his  successor.  The  sole  criterion  of 
monarchy  is  the  fact  that  the  supreme  power  is 
vested  in  a  single  ruler.  The  common,  though  by 
no  means  universal,  custom  of  hereditary  succession 
is  responsible  for  the  popular  but  erroneous  notion 
that  heredity  is  an  essential  characteristic  of  mon- 
archy.    True   monarchies,   on  the   contrary,   often 


S6  Politics 

have  been  elective;  as  in  the  case  of  the  Roman 
emperors  during  the  early  history  of  the  Empire. 

In  the  case  of  elective  monarchies,  we  recall  no 
instance  in  history  where  the  term  of  duration  of 
the  ruler's  power  was  limited  to  any  period  short 
of  the  duration  of  his  life;  but  if  the  supreme  power 
were  vested  in  one  ruler  for  any  determined  period 
less  than  the  duration  of  his  life,  he  would  be  none 
the  less  a  monarch  during  that  period,  and  such  a 
government  would  be  a  continuous  monarchy  dur- 
ing the  successive  reigns  of  such  elected  monarchs, 
however  brief  the  terms  to  which  the  power  of  each 
might  be  limited.  This  principle  is  illustrated  and 
proved  by  many  known  instances  of  regency  during 
the  minority  of  an  infant  heir  to  the  throne;  in 
which  case  the  regent  is  the  monarch  for  a  definite 
and  limited  period,  namely,  during  the  period  of  the 
royal  heir's  minority;  during  which  the  regent  is  the 
monarch,  though  not  the  king. 

§  42.  Modern  Monarchies.  Since  the  fall 
of  monarchy  in  Russia,  it  is  doubtful  whether  true 
monarchy,  as  to  all  functions  of  government,  exists 
in  any  of  the  more  enlightened  countries  anywhere 
in  the  world.  It  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  suprem- 
acy is  the  sole  and  final  test  of  monarchy;  that  a 
king  or  an  emperor  is  not  necessarily  a  monarch 
unless  his  constitutional  power  is  supreme,  in  some 


Nature  of  Government  57 

or  all  of  the  governmental  functions  of  legislation, 
judicature,  or  administration.  If  the  titular  king  or 
emperor  is  without  constitutional  power  to  control, 
compel,  or  annul  legislation;  or  to  control  and  re- 
verse judicial  determinations;  or  to  declare  war; 
or  to  make  treaties;  then  he  is  not  a  monarch  in  any 
sense  of  the  word,  and  the  government  of  which  he 
is  the  titular  head  is  not  a  monarchy.  Applying  this 
criterion  to  governments  of  the  present  day,  we  shall 
discover  the  fact  that  some  of  the  so  called  mon- 
archical constitutions  vest  no  supreme  power  what- 
ever in  one  man,  and  must,  therefore,  be  classed 
among  the  more  or  less  democratic  or  aristocratic 
governments;  while  the  constitutions  of  some  mod- 
ern republics  may  contain  the  element  of  monarchy 
as  to  certain  supreme  powers. 

§  43.  English  Monarchy.  Under  the  Brit- 
ish constitution,  which  rests  upon  Inviolable  custom 
and  usage,  the  king  no  longer  has  any  share  in  the 
exercise  of  the  legislative  power,  that  supreme 
power  being  vested  entirely  in  the  parliament.  The 
royal  power  to  veto  an  act  of  the  parliament  never 
has  been  exercised  since  the  reign  of  Queen  Anne — 
and  therefore  no  longer  exists.  The  king  has  no 
power  whatever  over  judicial  determinations.  In 
the  exercise  of  the  executive  and  administrative  func- 
tions of  government,  the  king  has  no  supreme  power 


58  Politics 

whatever.  He  neither  can  declare  war  nor  conclude 
treaties  with  foreign  powers.  The  English  cabinet 
is  called  the  "government,"  and  is  responsible,  not 
to  the  king,  but  to  the  House  of  Commons — the 
latter  being  the  sole  depository  of  all  supreme 
power.  No  supreme  power  is  vested  in  the  king, 
and,  therefore,  although  he  is  the  titular  head  of  the 
empire,  as  "king  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  and 
emperor  of  India,"  he  is  not  in  any  true  sense  a 
monarch,  nor  is  the  government  of  the  United  King- 
dom in  any  sense  a  monarchy. 

§  44.  Other  European  Monarchies.  The 
governments  of  Italy,  Spain,  Holland,  Denmark, 
and  Sweden,  all  are  hereditary  but  limited  mon- 
archies, in  which  the  king  is  supreme  in  the  exer- 
cise of  the  executive  powers,  including  the  supreme 
command  of  the  army,  the  treaty-making  power, 
and  the  power  to  declare  war.  In  all  these  countries 
the  king  participates  in  the  exercise  of  the  legisla- 
tive power,  but  his  supremacy  is  shared  with  bicam- 
eral legislatures  in  which  the  aristocratic  element 
is  said  to  predominate.  All  these  governments 
properly  may  be  classed  as  limited  monarchies,  in 
which  some  of  the  supreme  governmental  powers 
are  vested  in  a  single  ruler. 

§  45.  Japanese  Monarchy.  Japan  (until 
comparatively  recent  times  an  absolute  monarchy, 


Nature  of  Government  59 

with  the  characteristics  of  Oriental  despotism),  now 
is  a  limited  monarchy  of  the  European  type,  unit- 
ing some  of  the  elements  of  aristocracy  and  democ- 
racy with  those  of  monarchy — under  the  national 
constitution  which  was  promulgated  in  1889.  The 
supreme  executive  power  remains  vested  in  the  em- 
peror as  sole  ruler  and  commander-in-chief  of  the 
army  and  navy;  but,  under  the  constitution,  the  legis- 
lative power  now  is  shared  between  the  emperor 
and  the  Imperial  Diet,  the  latter  consisting  of  a 
House  of  Peers  and  a  House  of  Representatives, 
corresponding  to  the  two  houses  of  the  British  par- 
liament. The  judiciary  now  seems  to  be  independent 
of  both  the  executive  and  legislative  powers. 

§  46.  Monarchic  Element  in  Republics. 
In  any  form  of  government,  by  whatever  name  it 
may  be  known,  any  supreme  and  undivided  power 
which  is  vested  in  a  single  ruler  is,  to  the  extent  of 
such  power,  monarchal.  With  the  exception  of 
Great  Britain,  and  the  possible  exception  of  France 
(in  which  countries  the  element  of  monarchy  seems 
to  be  absent  from  their  respective  constitutions),  it 
may  be  said  that  the  constitution  of  every  modern 
state, — whether  it  be  called  a  monarchy,  a  repub- 
lic, a  commonwealth,  or  a  democracy, — in  reality  is 
a  composite  of  monarchy,  aristocracy,  and  democ- 
racy.    It  is  a  singular  fact,  but  nevertheless  a  fact, 


60  Politics 

that  in  many  of  the  so-called  popular  governments 
of  the  present  day  the  chief  executive  possesses  more 
true  monarchal  power  than  is  vested  in  some  of  the 
hereditary  kings  of  the  Old  World;  while  in  some 
of  the  so-called  monarchical  governments  there  is 
a  larger  element  of  democracy  than  can  be  found  in 
those  governments  which  call  themselves  "democ- 
racies." 

§  47.  Monarchic  Element  in  America. 
The  United  States,  and  the  several  states  of  the 
Union,  may  be  taken  as  fairly  typical  of  modern 
popular  governments  everywhere,  excepting  those  of 
France  and  Switzerland.  The  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  vests  the  supreme  executive  power 
in  one  man — the  president.  That  is  supreme  and 
undivided  power  reposed  in  a  single  chief  ruler, 
which  is  monarchy;  but  it  is  elective  monarchy,  for 
a  fixed  period  of  four  years,  and  it  is  limited  mon- 
archy, being  limited  to  executive  power  only.  This, 
however,  is  not  the  only  element  of  monarchy  in  the 
American  constitution.  The  president  has  a  lim- 
ited, but  supreme,  control  over  the  legislative  branch 
of  the  government,  through  his  power  to  veto  any 
legislation  passed  by  a  majority  of  each  house  of 
the  congress,  his  veto  being  effective  to  defeat  any 
legislation  for  which  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  both 
houses  cannot  be  obtained.     Furthermore,  the  threat 


Nature  of  Government  61 

to  veto  certain  bills  may  be  used  effectively  to  secure 
or  defeat  the  passage  of  other  bills  for  or  against 
which  a  majority  of  both  houses  might  not  other- 
wise be  induced  to  vote.  That,  also,  is  monarchal 
power.  Another,  is  that  of  the  supreme  command 
of  the  army  and  navy;  another,  the  pardoning 
power,  which  is  vested  in  the  president  alone;  and 
still  another  supreme  and  undivided  power  is  the 
sole  power  to  negotiate  treaties  with  foreign  pow- 
ers,— though  here  the  Senate  is  invested  with  a  veto 
power  against  the  executive,  by  the  requirement  that 
the  concurrence  of  "two-thirds  of  the  senators  pres- 
ent" shall  be  necessary  to  render  a  treaty  effective. 
Thus  it  is  clear  that,  so  far  as  concerns  the  execu- 
tive power,  the  government  of  the  United  States 
must  be  classed  as  an  elective  limited  monarchy. 
Likewise,  the  governments  of  the  several  states  of 
the  Union  must  be  so  classified,  because  of  the  one- 
man  power  vested  in  the  governor  by  the  respective 
state  constitutions. 

§  48.  Aristocracy.  The  second  of  the  three 
elementary  forms  of  government  is  aristocracy.  In 
the  original  and  true  sense  of  the  word,  it  means 
government  by  the  best;  a  government,  the  powers 
of  which  are  vested  in  and  exercised  by  the  best  men 
in  the  state, — those  who  are  the  ablest,  the  most 
worthy,  and  the  best  qualified  for  the  performance 


62  Politics 

of  the  functions  of  government.  This  is  the  ideal 
aristocracy  of  merit.  In  point  of  fact,  however,  an 
aristocracy  of  merit  is  an  ideal  which  never  yet  has 
been  realized  in  practice,  as  a  form  of  government; 
though  the  principle  of  selection  and  advancement 
according  to  merit  has  been  applied,  with  gratifying 
results,  to  certain  classes  of  subordinate  govern- 
mental offices  and  employments,  and  to  such  an  ex- 
tent as  to  indicate  that  aristocracy  of  merit  is  an 
ideal  form  of  government  which  is  capable  of 
realization. 

But  the  term  "aristocracy,"  as  an  element  of  gov- 
ernment, has  come  to  signify,  by  common  usage,  a 
form  of  government  in  which  the  supreme  power  of 
the  state  is  vested  in  a  privileged  order  or  class  of 
persons  who,  by  birth,  fortune,  favor,  or  their  own 
enterprise,  have  acquired  superior  distinction  and 
influence.  By  this  common  usage,  the  word  "aris- 
tocracy" has  acquired  a  meaning  which  scarcely  can 
be  distinguished  from  oligarchy  (government  by  the 
few)  and  plutocracy  (government  by  the  rich)  ;  a 
meaning  quite  different  from  the  original  and  proper 
signification  of  the  word.  Oligarchy  and  plutoc- 
racy, indeed,  are  Aristotle's  depraved  forms,  or  per- 
versions, of  aristocracy. 

§  49.  Modern  Aristocracies.    Aristocracy, 
in  the  sense  of  government  by  the  best,  and  also  in 


Nature  of  Government  63 

the  bad  sense  of  oligarchy  or  plutocracy,  is  dis- 
cernible in  the  constitutions  of  nearly  all  modern 
governments;  but  only  to  a  limited  extent,  and  in 
respect  to  certain  functions.  Only  in  the  judicial 
function  of  government  do  we  find  the  element  of 
true  aristocracy  (government  by  the  best)  really 
dominant  in  all  of  the  more  enlightened  modern 
states;  though  the  subordinate  agencies  for  the  ex- 
ercise of  executive  functions  are  selected  largely 
upon  the  principle  of  excellence  and  merit.  As  to 
the  judiciary,  the  impossibility  of  an  intelligent 
exercise  of  the  judicial  function  by  untrained  agen- 
cies necessitates  the  selection  of  persons  who  possess 
some  special  qualifications  and  technical  knowledge, 
in  some  degree  entitling  them  to  be  regarded  as  the 
"best."  The  same  consideration  operates,  but  in 
less  degree,  to  induce  the  selection  of  the  "best" 
agencies  for  the  performance  of  the  executive  and 
administrative  functions.  But  in  the  constitution  of 
legislative  bodies,  which  ought  to  be  characterized 
by  a  very  high  degree  of  wisdom  and  virtue,  there 
is  a  total  absence  of  true  aristocracy,  as  an  element 
of  the  legislative  power  of  any  government  now  in 
existence.  Modern  legislatures  are  constituted  upon 
the  principles  of  the  depraved  and  perverted  forms 
of  aristocracy,  i.e.,  oligarchy  and  plutocracy,  min- 
gled with  the  equally  depraved  element  of 
democracy. 


64  Politics 

§  50.  British  Aristocracy.  We  have  ob- 
served that,  of  the  three  primary  and  elemental 
forms  of  government,  the  element  of  monarchy  is 
entirely  absent  from  the  present  English  constitu- 
tion. It  must,  therefore,  be  composed  of  one  or 
both  of  the  remaining  elements, — aristocracy  and 
democracy. 

Because  of  the  unique  and  original  character  of 
British  political  institutions,  and  the  fact  that  the 
constitutions  of  all  modern  governments  embody 
some  features  which  were  developed  first  in  Eng- 
land, it  seems  necessary  to  examine  and  analyze  with 
some  care  the  essential  features  of  the  English  sys- 
tem, in  order  to  obtain  a  clearer  understanding  of 
the  real  nature  of  modern  governments  in  general, 
especially  with  reference  to  the  element  of  aris- 
tocracy. 

§  51.  The  English  Cabinet.  The  supreme 
executive  power  of  the  British  government  is  lodged 
in  a  cabinet, — not  in  the  king  or  any  other  single 
individual.  This  cabinet  is  a  body  of  ministers  of 
state,  consisting  of  the  prime  minister,  or  premier, 
and  such  other  statesmen  as  he  chooses  to  call  to 
his  assistance.  The  premier,  though  ostensibly  ap- 
pointed by  the  king,  can  be  none  other  than  the 
recognized  leader  of  the  dominant  party  in  the 
House  of  Commons, — the  king  having  no  choice  or 


Nature  of  Government  65 

discretion  in  the  matter  of  who  shall  be  appointed. 
This  has  become  the  settled  constitutional  practice. 
The  cabinet,  thus  formed,  is  responsible  to  and  de- 
pendent upon  the  will  of  the  House  of  Commons; 
which,  in  turn,  is  dependent  upon  the  will  of  its 
constituencies  as  expressed  at  the  general  elections. 
A  governing  body  so  constituted  is  in  every  essen- 
tial an  aristocracy;  and,  furthermore  (the  member- 
ship of  that  body  being  restricted  to  those  states- 
men who  are  the  recognized  leaders  of  the  dominant 
political  party),  it  may  be  said  to  be  an  aristocracy 
in  the  original  and  true  sense  of  the  word, — the  best, 
or  fittest;  and  the  character  and  ability  usually  dis- 
played by  English  cabinets  would  seem  to  justly 
entitle  them  to  be  so  classed.  It  appears,  there- 
fore, that  the  supreme  executive  power  of  the  Brit- 
ish government  is  an  aristocracy  of  merit,  as  distin- 
guished from  oligarchic  and  plutocratic  aristocracy. 

§  52.  English  Legislature.  The  supreme 
legislative  power  of  the  British  government  is 
lodged  in  a  parliament,  which  consists  of  two  sepa- 
rate legislative  bodies,  called,  respectively,  the 
House  of  Lords  and  the  House  of  Commons;  the 
original  on  which  bicameral  legislatures  throughout 
the  world  have  been  modeled. 

The  House  of  Lords  is  a  pure  oligarchy,  in  the 
full  sense  of  Aristotle's  definition  of  that  "depraved" 


66  Politics 

form  of  aristocracy,  and  in  the  full  modern  sense 
of  the  word;  being  composed  largely  of  a  specially 
privileged  class,  or  order,  of  hereditary  nobility. 

Of  the  House  of  Commons,  more  is  to  be  said. 
It  embodies  all  that  is  discoverable  of  the  so-called 
^'democracy"  of  the  British  political  system.  De- 
mocracy, which  implies  ultimate  supreme  power  m 
the  whole  people,  is  not  found  among  the  constit- 
uent elements  of  the  House  of  Commons, — unless, 
indeed,  the  elective  franchise  has  been  so  extended 
by  very  recent  legislation  as  to  grant  universal 
suffrage  irrespective  of  rank,  property,  or  income, 
and  equality  in  the  number  of  votes  an  elector  may 
cast. 

§  53.  English  Judiciary.  The  English  ju- 
diciary, as  now  constituted,  is  a  true  aristocracy  of 
merit,  in  fact  as  well  as  in  theory.  Not  only  the 
supreme  judicial  power,  but  practically  all  judicial 
power,  is  vested  in  jurists  who  are  selected  and  ap- 
pointed by  the  responsible  executive  (the  cabinet) 
from  among  those  whose  character  and  attainments 
best  qualify  them  for  the  judicial  office.  Being 
secure  in  their  tenure  of  office,  and  removable  by 
impeachment  only,  the  judges  are  independent  of 
partisan  power  and  influence,  and  unaffected  by 
popular  passions  and  prejudices. 

Thus  it  is  apparent  that  the  British  form  of  gov- 


Nature  of  Government  67 

ernment  is  an  aristocracy:  in  its  executive  and  ju- 
dicial powers  it  is  aristocracy  in  the  original  sense 
of  government  by  the  best;  in  its  legislative  power, 
it  is  oligarchy,  as  to  the  Lords,  and  (until  recently) 
plutocracy  as  to  the  Commons; — and  in  all  powers 
it  is  autocracy.  The  element  of  monarchy  is  ab- 
sent; and  if  democracy  now  is  become  a  dominant 
element — then  a  revolutionary  change  in  the  con- 
stitution has  occurred. 

§  54.  Democracy.  According  to  Aristotle, 
Democracy  is  the  depraved  form,  or  the  perversion, 
of  Commonwealth  (more  correctly.  Commonweal) 'y 
a  Comjnonweaith  being  any  government,  whatever 
its  form,  the  sole  object  of  which  is  the  common 
good  or  happiness  of  all  of  its  people.  The  Democ- 
racy of  Aristotle  was  a  government  the  powers  of 
which  not  only  were  vested  in  the  people  but  were 
actually  exercised  by  the  people  themselves.  But 
in  modern  usage  the  word  "democracy"  may  mean 
anything  that  is  good,  or  anything  that  is  bad,  in 
the  relations  between  people  and  government, 
according  to  the  views  of  the  person  who  employs 
the  word. 

It  should  be  observed,  however,  that  Aristotle's 
Commonweal  is  not  a  form  of  government;  it  is, 
rather,  an  ideal  the  attainment  of  which  ought  to  be 
the  purpose   of  every   form   of   government, — the 


68  Politics 

common  good  and  happiness  of  all.  His  concep- 
tion of  Democracy  as  a  depraved  and  futile  mode  of 
attempting  the  accomplishment  of  that  purpose  is 
the  true  conception. 

Throughout  the  world  today  the  hopes  and  the 
fears  of  mankind  are  centered  upon  Democracy; 
but  every  people,  and  every  class,  indeed  almost 
every  individual,  has  a  different  conception  of  the 
meaning  of  that  portentous  word.  To  some,  it 
means  a  form  of  government;  to  others,  it  means 
formal  anarchy.  To  some,  it  means  organized 
society;  to  others,  it  means  the  dissolution  of  or- 
ganized society.  To  some,  it  means  the  whole  peo- 
ple; to  others,  it  means  the  most  numerous  among 
the  several  classes  of  people.  To  some,  it  means 
a  lawful  body  politic;  to  others,  it  means  a  lawless 
mob  or  rabble.  To  some,  it  means  civil  power;  to 
others,  it  means  savage  force.  To  some,  it  means 
rational  expression  of  a  conscious  public  will  or  pur- 
pose; to  others,  it  means  irrational  expression  of 
aggregate  private  ignorance  and  indifference,  with- 
out any  conscious  will  or  purpose.  To  some.  De- 
mocracy means  law  and  order;  to  others,  it  means 
license  and  disorder.  To  some.  It  means  equality 
and  justice;  to  others,  it  means  the  inequality  of 
brute  force  and  the  injustice  of  autocratic  will.  To 
some,  it  means  responsible  sovereignty;  to  others,  it 
means  irresponsible  anarchy.     To  some.  Democracy 


Nature  of  Government  69 

means  the  aggregate  wisdom  of  the  whole  body  of 
the  people;  to  others,  it  means  a  conglomeration  of 
the  individual  folly  and  incapacity  of  the  most  unin- 
telligent, yet  most  numerous,  of  the  individuals  who 
compose  the  whole  body  of  the  people.  But,  in  all 
these  conflicting  and  irreconcilable  conceptions  of 
Democracy,  and  common  to  all  of  them,  is  the  idea 
of  political  power  possessed  in  common  by  all  of  the 
individual  members  of  a  political  society;  and  that 
power  always  is  conceived  of  as  self-derived  or 
autocratic  power. 

§  55.  Ancient  Democracies.  Among  the 
ancient  Greeks,  government  was,  in  reality,  little 
more  than  city  government.  The  Greek  "states" 
were  cities,  with  limited  territorial  possessions 
ruled  by  the  cities.  It  was  possible  for  practically 
all  citizens  to  participate  in  person  in  the  public 
deliberations  and  the  conduct  of  state  affairs,  much 
after  the  fashion  of  a  New  England  town  meeting. 
There  was  no  great  extent  of  territorial  dominion, 
like  those  of  modern  states,  containing  widely  scat- 
tered citizen  populations  to  whom  participation  in 
governmental  affairs  would  be  possible  only  by 
means  of  representatives;  and  the  device  of  repre- 
sentation never  was  thought  of  in  Greek  democra- 
cies. Democracy,  therefore,  in  the  original  Greek 
meaning  of  the  word,  was  the  direct  exercise  of  the 


70  Politics 

supreme  power  of  the  state  by  the  whole  body  of  its 
citizens.  Nor  did  the  class  known  as  "citizens"  in- 
clude the  entire  adult  male  population,  as  in  most  of 
our  modern  so-called  democracies;  for  a  very  con- 
siderable portion  of  the  population  were  slaves,  and 
were  not  numbered  among  the  "people"  in  the  Greek 
democracies. 

%  56.  Modern  Democracy.  In  the  modern 
use  of  the  word  "democracy"  its  meaning  has  been 
extended  to  embrace  any  form  of  government,  or 
that  power  or  function  of  any  form  of  government, 
which  is  subject  to  the  supreme  control  of  the  whole 
body  of  the  people  by  means  of  a  general  election, 
or  plebiscite.  In  this  sense,  any  exercise  of  supreme 
power  by  the  whole  body  of  the  people,  when  the 
right  of  suffrage  is  extended  to  ull  or  a  major  por- 
tion of  the  people,  is  properly  called  Democracy; 
but  when  the  suffrage  is  limited  to  a  special  or  fa- 
vored class  who  compose  less  than  a  majority  of  the 
population,  the  power  of  such  class  may  be  Oli- 
garchy, or  Plutocracy,  but  it  is  not  Democracy.  Nor 
is  the  word  "democracy,"  in  the  sense  of  a  form 
of  government,  applicable  to  local  or  subordinate 
governments,  such  as  those  of  cities,  towns,  coun- 
ties, or  other  municipalities  less  than  an  independent 
state.  It  applies  only  to  the  exercise  of  supreme 
power — the  power  to  exercise,  or  to  control  the  ex- 


Nature  of  Government  71 

ercise  of,  some  or  all  of  the  supreme  powers  of 
government.  The  power  to  select  and  elect  either 
the  executive,  the  legislative,  or  the  judicial  officers 
of  the  state,  unquestionably  involves  a  measure  of 
control  over  the  exercise  of  the  powers  and  functions 
of  those  offices;  that  measure  of  control  being  de- 
pendent upon  the  frequency  of  such  elections. 

§  57.  Modern  Democracies.  During  and 
since  the  world-war  it  became  a  widespread  habit  to 
loosely  characterize  as  "the  democracies  of  the 
world"  not  only  Great  Britain,  France  and  the 
United  States,  but  also  such  countries  as  Italy,  Bel- 
gium, and  other  states  of  Europe,  and  to  character- 
ize as  "autocracies"  those  governments  only  which 
exhibited  the  characteristics  of  despotic  monarchy. 

It  should  be  remembered,  however,  that  Autoc- 
racy is  not  a  form  of  government,  but  is  a  vice  which 
afflicts  all  existing  forms  of  government,  not  except- 
ing the  so-called  "democracies."  Of  the  govern- 
ments which  have  survived  the  war,  those  only  can 
be  classed  properly  as  democracies,  in  the  modern 
usage  of  that  term,  whose  supreme  powers  are  con- 
trolled in  some  degree  by  a  practically  universal 
right  of  suffrage  vested  in  the  people.  Great  Brit- 
ain, as  we  have  seen,  is  not  entitled  to  be  classed  as 
one  of  the  "democracies"  of  the  modern  world; 
although  some  of  the  British  colonial  dependencies, 


72  Politics 

if  they  were  independent  states,  would  be  the  purest 
.  democracies  in  the  world.  Pure  Democracy — i.e., 
direct  exercise  of  governmental  powers  by  the  peo- 
ple— is  not  found  in  any  wholly  independent  modern 
state;  but  in  several  of  the  partially  independent 
states  of  the  United  States  pure  Democracy  has 
been  introduced  of  late,  in  the  form  of  direct  exer- 
cise of  the  legislative  power  by  the  people.  In  all 
other  cases,  modern  democracies  are  representative, 
not  pure  Democracy. 

§  58.  Democratic  Republics.  States  in 
which  the  supreme  power  is  exercised  by  represen- 
tatives who  are  elected,  either  by  the  whole  body  of 
the  people  or  a  class  or  classes  of  the  people  to 
whom  the  elective  franchise  is  restricted,  are  prop- 
erly called  republics.  If  the  whole  or  a  major  por- 
tion of  the  people  enjoy  the  franchise,  and  therefore 
are  represented,  the  state  is  a  democratic  republic, 
and  may  be  classed  among  modern  democracies. 
But  if  only  a  select  and  privileged  minority  of  the 
people  is  enfranchised  and  represented,  then  the  state 
is  an  aristocratic  republic,  and  must  be  classed  either 
as  a  true  Aristocracy,  or  an  Oligarchy,  or  a  Plu- 
tocracy. 

§  59.  American  Democracy.  The  fofm  of 
government  which  was  established  by  the  Constitu- 


Nature  of  Government  73 

tion  of  the  United  States  was  clearly  intended  to  be 
a  Federal  Republic,  formed  by  the  "union"  of  sev- 
eral theretofore  independent  republics.  The  pre- 
amble of  the  Constitution  declares  that  it  is  estab- 
lished "to  form  a  more  perfect  union,"  and  else- 
where in  that  great  document  the  United  States  is 
designated  repeatedly  as  "this  Union";  while  the 
fourth  section  of  Article  IV  declares  that  "The 
United  States  shall  guarantee  to  every  state  in  this 
Union  a  republican  form  of  government."  A  repub- 
lican form  of  government  is  one  in  which  the 
supreme  or  sovereign  power  is  vested  entirely  in 
representatives  who  are  elected  by  the  people.  Elec- 
tion by  the  people  is  Democracy,  and  the  investment 
of  all  supreme  power  in  representatives  so  elected  is 
Representative  Democracy.  Most  commonly,  how- 
ever, the  Federal  government  is  described  as  being  a 
Democratic  Republic — which  is  the  same  as  repre- 
sentative Democracy. 

Since  the  elective  franchise  is  practically  uni- 
versal, not  being  restricted  to  any  favored  class  of 
persons  upon  a  basis  of  either  merit  or  privilege, 
the  United  States  is  correctly  described  as  a  demo- 
cratic, as  distinguished  from  an  aristocratic,  repub- 
lic. This,  however,  though  it  is  common  boast  of 
Americans,  is  very  far  from  being  the  chief  merit 
of  the  Constitution;  for  important  elements  other 
than  Democracy  are  embraced  in  and  impart  the 


74  Politics 

vital  and  enduring  qualities  to  the  American  Con- 
stitution. 

§  60.  Limitations  of  Democracy.  The  rep- 
resentative democracy  established  by  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States  is  also  a  limited  democracy. 
The  Constitution,  as  originally  framed  and  adopted, 
limited  the  political  power  of  the  people  to  the 
single  function  of  electing  the  members  of  the  House 
of  Representatives.  The  members  of  the  Senate 
were  chosen  by  the  legislatures  of  the  several  states, 
not  by  the  people.  The  president  and  the  vice- 
president  were  chosen  by  a  select  body  of  persons 
called  "electors,"  who  were  to  be  appointed  by  the 
several  states  "in  such  manner  as  the  legislature" 
of  each  state  might  direct;  and  in  case  the  electors 
should  fail  to  make  a  choice  of  a  president  or  of  a 
vice-president,  then  the  House  of  Representatives 
would  elect  the  president,  or  the  Senate  would  elect 
the  vice-president,  as  the  case  might  be.  In  no  event 
were  the  people  to  have  any  direct  voice  in  the 
selection  and  election  of  either  a  president,  a  vice- 
president,  or  members  of  the  Senate.  Nor  were  the 
people  given  any  power  or  control  whatever  over 
the  judicial  power;  the  power  to  select  and  appoint 
all  judges  being  vested  in  the  president,  to  be  exer- 
cised "by  and  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the 
senate."     Thus  the  only  trace  of  Democracy  in  the 


Nature  of  Government  75 

Constitution  of  the  United  States,  as  originally 
adopted  and  ratified,  and  as  it  remained  for  more 
than  one  hundred  and  twenty  years,  was  the  power 
in  the  people  to  elect  the  members  of  one  House, 
only,  of  the  national  legislature.  Moreover,  the 
Constitution  itself,  although  promulgated  in  the 
name  of  "the  people  of  the  United  States,"  was 
framed,  adopted,  and  ratified  by  representative 
bodies,  not  by  the  people. 

§  61.  Changes  Toward  Democracy.  There 
has  been  no  written  change  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  United  States  in  the  direction  of  Democracy,  as 
affecting  the  mode  of  electing  a  president  or  a  vice- 
president.  The  president  still  is  elected  by  the 
states.  The  several  states  are  authorized  to  "ap- 
point" the  number  of  electors  to  which  each  is  en- 
titled, "in  such  manner  as  the  legislature  thereof 
may  direct."  By  the  twelfth  amendment,  which  was 
adopted  in  1803,  the  Constitution  still  requires  that 
the  "electors" — not  the  people — "shall  vote  by  bal- 
lot for  president  and  vice-president,"  and  that  if  no 
person  shall  have  "a  majority  of  the  whole  number 
of  electors  appointed,"  then  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives, voting  by  states,  shall  "choose"  the  presi- 
dent, or  the  Senate  shall  "choose"  the  vice-president, 
as  the  case  may  be.  The  fourteenth  amendment 
(adopted  in    1868)    does,   however,   provide    that 


76  Politics 

"when  the  right  to  vote  at  any  election  for  the 
choice  of  electors  for  president  and  vice-president 
.  .  .  is  denied"  to  male  citizens  twenty-one  years 
of  age,  or  in  any  way  abridged  except  for  crime,  by 
any  state,  then  "the  basis  of  representation  therein 
shall  be  reduced"  proportionately;  but  this  amend- 
ment, far  from  recognizing  a  right  in  the  people 
to  have  a  direct  voice  in  the  election  of  a  president, 
does  not  recognize  even  their  supposed  right  to  vote 
for  electors.  That  right  is  left  to  the  discretion 
of  the  legislatures  of  the  several  states — all  of 
whom,  however,  have  provided  for  the  election  of 
presidential  electors  by  popular  vote.  By  long  es- 
tablished custom,  the  electoral  college  now  has  be- 
come a  mere  form  or  vehicle  through  which  the 
choice  of  a  majority  of  the  people  who  actually  vote 
is  given  effect  in  the  election  of  a  president;  the 
"electors"  being  totally  deprived  of  the  power  and 
discretion  which  the  framers  of  the  original  Con- 
stitution intended  that  they  should  have.  This  cus- 
tom and  usage,  established  by  the  several  states, 
affords  the  only  basis  for  the  assertion  that  the 
executive  power  of  the  Federal  government  is  ex- 
ercised by  a  representative  elected  by  the  people, 
and  therefore  is  a  Democratic  power.  It  may  be 
remarked  that,  in  the  exercise  of  his  power,  the 
president,  during  his  tenure  of  office,  is  a  monarch; 
he  need  not,  often  does  not,  represent  and  express 


Nature  of  Government  77 

the  wishes  or  opinions  of  a  majority  of  the  people. 
The  president,  not  the  people,  is  the  sole  and  su- 
preme executive  power  of  the  government. 

The  advance  of  Democracy  in  the  legislative 
power  is  more  remarkable.  As  a  result  of  persist- 
ent agitation  during  recent  years,  a  radical  and 
fundamental  change  in  the  Constitution  was  effected 
by  the  amendment  which  provides  for  the  election 
of  senators  by  the  people,  instead  of  by  the  legisla- 
tures, of  the  several  states.  Thus  the  political  power 
of  the  people,  which  originally  was  limited  to  the 
election  of  members  of  the  House  of  Representa- 
tives, has  been  extended  until  the  supreme  executive 
and  legislative  powers  of  government  are  subjected 
to  the  direct  control  of  the  people  through  the  bal- 
lot. The  judicial  power,  alone,  retains  its  original 
character;  but  powerful  influences  now  are  seeking 
to  destroy  the  independence  of  the  judiciary,  by 
further  constitutional  changes  looking  to  the  election 
of  both  the  supreme  and  the  inferior  judges  by 
popular  ballot. 

§  62.  Democracy  in  the  States.  The 
several  states  of  the  Union  always  have  been  more 
democratic  than  the  Federal  government.  The  fact 
that  state  constitutions  are  adopted  and  amended  by 
popular  vote;  the  frequency  of  elections,  resulting 
from   short   terms   of   office;    the   tendency   among 


78  Politics 

candidates  for  office  to  seek  popular  favor  by  advo- 
cating the  absolute  subjection  of  the  government  to 
the  direct  control  of  the  people;  the  common  and 
almost  universal  disposition  to  construe  the  doctrine 
of  the  consent  of  the  governed  to  the  paradoxical 
meaning  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  governed; — all 
of  these  factors  have  co-operated  to  undermine  the 
authority  of  constitutions  and  of  governments,  and 
to  impair  popular  respect  for  law,  by  making  all 
government  and  all  law  the  mere  creatures  of  public 
fancy,  to  be  accepted  or  discarded  according  to 
changing  fashions,  regardless  of  fundamental  and 
scientific  principles.  This  fundamental  weakness  of 
democracy — its  contempt  for  all  authority  and  all 
law  which  it  may  create  or  destroy  at  pleasure — 
always  has  been  manifested  in  the  political  develop- 
ment of  the  several  states,  and  Us  growth  during 
recent  years  has  become  truly  alarming,  in  its  effect 
upon  both  the  Federal  and  state  governments. 

§  63.  State  Constitutions.  The  written 
constitutions  of  some  of  the  states  contain  extraor- 
dinary and  extravagant  statements  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  democracy;  one  of  them,  at  least,  not  con- 
tent with  the  declaration  that  governments  "derive 
their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the  gov- 
erned," declares:  "That  all  political  power  is  vested 
in  and  derived  from  the  people;  that  all  govern- 


Nature  of  Government  79 

ment,  of  right,  originates  from  the  people,  is 
founded  upon  their  will  only,  and  is  instituted  solely 
for  the  good  of  the  whole."  This  remarkable 
declaration  makes  a  sharp  distinction  between  "gov- 
ernment" and  "the  people"  as  two  separate  insti- 
tutions; but,  if  all  political  power  is  vested  in  the 
people,  it  must  follow  that  no  political  power 
is  vested  in  the  government;  and,  since  govern- 
ment is  a  purely  political  institution,  incapable  of 
having  any  power  other  than  political,  it  would 
follow  that  all  government  is  powerless, — which  is 
pure  anarchy.  The  further  statement  that  all  gov- 
ernment originates  from  the  people  and  is  "founded 
upon  their  will  only,"  implies  that  no  government 
is  or  can  be  founded  upon  fundamental  principles  of 
justice  and  human  rights.  This  is  the  depraved  and 
lawless  democracy  of  Bolshevism,  which  teaches 
public  insubordination  to  all  government,  all  law, 
and  all  principle,  other  than  the  arbitrary  will  of 
the  Soviet,  making  scientific  and  orderly  government 
impossible. 

§  64.  Constitutional  Anarchy.  While 
undoubtedly  it  is  true  that  a  great  majority  of  the 
people  who  vote  for  the  adoption  of  such  consti- 
tutions are  innocent  of  any  revolutionary  or  anar- 
chistic intentions;  and  while  it  is  probable  that  even  a 


80  Politics 

majority  of  the  members  of  conventions  that  frame 
and  submit  such  constitutions,  and  perhaps,  even 
the  authors  of  clauses  such  as  the  one  quoted  in  the 
preceding  section,  are  actuated  by  loyal  and  humane 
motives  without  comprehending  the  deep  significance 
of  such  seemingly  harmless  and  high-sounding 
phrases;  yet  such  declarations,  incorporated  in 
solemn  written  constitutions  of  states,  are  far  from 
harmless.  They  are  seized  upon  alike  by  innocent 
but  fanatical  reformers,  and  by  the  more  sinister  and 
criminal  enemies  of  law  and  social  order,  as  author- 
itative declarations  of  the  fundamental  principles  of 
Democracy;  and  are  cited  as  authority  for  doctrines 
and  measures  which  make  for  the  disintegration  of 
society  and  the  destruction  of  civilization.  The  in- 
disputable wrongs  and  injustice  of  modern  society, 
and  the  failure  of  all  governments  to  right  those 
wrongs,  are  pointed  out  to  the  improvised  classes 
who  constitute  a  large  majority  of  the  people,  and 
they  are  invited  to  exercise  the  constitutional  power 
vested  in  them  to  take  into  their  own  hands  the 
direct  exercise  of  all  governmental  power  for  their 
own  benefit.  Law  is  derided  as  another  name  for 
injustice,  and  the  will  of  the  most  numerous  class 
is  appealed  to  as  the  sovereign  and  constitutional 
authority,  to  which  all  other  government,  law,  and 
justice,  are  subordinate. 


Nature  of  Government  81 

§  6S.  Democratization  of  Judiciary.  The 
earliest  extensions  of  Democracy  in  state  constitu- 
tions were  directed  against  the  independence  of  the 
judiciary.  At  the  time  of  the  adoption  of  the 
Federal  constitution,  the  English  doctrine  of  the 
independence  of  judges  was  held  sacred  in  this 
country;  state  as  well  as  federal  judges  being  ap- 
pointed by  the  executive,  or  by  the  legislature,  either 
for  long  or  unlimited  terms  of  office.  By  1890  the 
constitutions  of  twenty-three  states  provided  for  the 
election  of  supreme  judges  by  the  people,  for  terms 
varying  from  two  years,  (in  Vermont),  to  twenty- 
one  years,  (in  Pennsylvania)  ;  while  in  fifteen  states 
the  judges  still  were  appointed  by  executive  or  legis- 
lative authority,  —  the  tenure  of  office  being  un- 
limited in  five  of  the  latter  states.  At  the  present 
time  (1919)  the  judges  of  the  courts  of  last  resort 
are  elected  by  the  people  in  nearly  all  of  the  states 
of  the  Union. 

§  66.  Legislation  by  People.  By  far  the 
most  radical  of  all  constitutional  changes  in  the 
direction  of  Democracy,  (one  which  amounts  to  an 
absolute  departure  by  several  of  the  states  from  the 
"republican  form  of  government"  which  the  Federal 
constitution  requires  every  state  to  maintain),  is 
the  constitutional  amendment,  now  in  effect  in  sev- 
eral  of  the   states,   which   authorizes   the   original 


82  Politics 

enactment  of  legislation  by  the  voluntary  action  of 
private  individuals,  acting  in  their  several  individual 
capacities,  without  being  authorized  to  represent 
other  individuals,  and  without  responsibility  to  any 
other  persons  or  body  of  persons.  This  is  different 
from  the  pure  Democracy  of  the  ancient  Greeks,  in 
which  the  entire  citizenship  acted  collectively,  as  a 
deliberative  body  in  which  every  citizen  had  the 
privilege  of  participating  and  therefore  was  bound 
by  the  acts  of  the  whole  body.  Democracy,  as  a 
form  of  government,  in  both  the  ancient  and  the 
modern  sense,  is  an  organic  body,  which  can  only 
act  collectively,  either  by  the  direct  participation  of 
the  entire  membership  or  by  a  smaller  body  of 
representatives  of  the  entire  membership.  By  the 
so-called  "Initiative,"  recently  adopted  and  prac- 
ticed in  several  of  the  American  states,  any  private 
individual  may  write  a  proposed  "law"  and,  if  he 
can  induce  a  specified  number  of  qualified  voters  to 
sign  a  petition  for  the  purpose,  he  can  compel  the 
submission  of  it  for  ratification  or  rejection  by  the 
voters  of  the  state  at  a  general  election.  Experience 
already  has  proven  that  few  voters,  of  even  the  most 
intelligent  classes,  ever  take  the  trouble  even  to 
read  the  full  text  of  proposed  acts  thus  submitted, 
but  the  average  citizen  votes  "for"  or  "against" 
such  acts  without  exercising  any  deliberation  or 
judgment.     The  average  voter,  not  being  responsi- 


Nature  of  Government  83 

ble  or  liable  to  be  called  to  account  for  his  action, 
feels  no  responsibility,  and  acts  with  careless  indif- 
ference. The  result  of  such  irresponsible  voting 
depends  upon  mere  chance;  it  does  not  express  the 
will  of  the  people,  nor  any  conscious  desire  or  pur- 
pose on  their  part.  It  does,  however,  afford  a 
coveted  opportunity  to  the  sinister  elements  of 
society  to  undermine  the  authority  of  law  and  gov- 
ernment, by  means  of  specious  reforms  and  other 
measures  designed  to  benefit  certain  classes  of  per- 
sons to  the  detriment  of  all  other  classes.  The 
"Initiative"  is  not  confined  to  ordinary  legislation, 
but  in  some  states,  is  applied  to  amendments  of  and 
additions  to  the  state  constitution. 

§  67.  The  Referendum.  The  "Initiative 
and  Referendum"  commonly  are  regarded  as  cog- 
nate or  similar  things;  but  they  are  radically  differ- 
ent. The  "Initiative"  is  an  anomaly,  and  is  utterly 
irreconcilable  with  the  fundamental  principle  of 
organic  political  society.  The  Referendum,  on  the 
contrary,  long  has  been  adopted  in  principle  and 
applied  in  practice  in  modern  representative  democ- 
racies, especially  in  Switzerland,  where  acts  of  legis- 
lative bodies  may  be  referred  to  the  people  for  rati- 
fication or  rejection  at  a  general  election.  In  the 
United  States  it  always  has  been  applied  to  the 
adoption  and  amendment  of  state  constitutions.   But 


84  Politics 

the  referendum  never  is,  and  necessarily  cannot  be, 
original  legislation  by  the  people,  whether  applied 
to  constitutions  or  to  ordinary  statutes.  In  the  case 
of  a  state  constitution,  and  also  in  the  case  of  an 
ordinary  statute,  a  representative  deliberative  body, 
elected  by  and  responsible  to  the  people,  first  frames 
the  proposed  constitution,  amendment,  or  act,  sub- 
jecting every  part  of  it  to  the  scrutiny  of  select  com- 
mittees, and  adopts  or  passes  it  only  after  successive 
readings  and  after  full  and  free  debate,  discussion 
and  mature  consideration  and  submits  it  for  ratifica- 
tion or  rejection  at  a  general  election.  This  proced- 
ure is  essentially  different  from  the  origination  of 
such  measures  by  unauthorized  and  irresponsible 
private  individuals  and  submitting  them  to  be  voted 
upon  by  the  people  without  the  advice  or  recom- 
mendation of  any  authorized  body  capable  of  orderly 
deliberation.  Not  even  a  representative  legislature 
ventures  to  vote  upon  the  passage  of  a  bill  until  after 
it  has  received  the  advice  and  recommendation  of  a 
committee  which  has  had  it  under  special  considera- 
tion; much  less  should  the  people  venture  to  vote  on 
such  measures  without  the  advice  and  recommenda- 
tion of  any  deliberative  body  authorized  to  represent 
them. 

§  68.  Objections  to  the  Referendum.   In 
the  United  States,  the  Referendum,  as  well  as  the 


Nature  of  Government  85 

Initiative,  is  open  to  the  objection  that,  being  a  direct 
exercise  of  a  legislative  power  by  the  people  them- 
selves, it  is  a  departure  from  a  republican  form  of 
government,  and  therefore  a  violation  of  the  Fed- 
eral Constitution.  This  constitutional  objection  has 
been  submitted  to  the  supreme  court  of  the  United 
States  for  its  decision;  but  that  august  tribunal  has 
held  that  the  question  presented  was  a  political  ques- 
tion which  the  congress,  alone,  was  competent  to 
determine,  and  not  a  judicial  question  within  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  supreme  court, — and  therefore 
declined  to  decide  the  question  presented.  The 
congress  has,  thus  far,  manifested  no  disposition  to 
decide  the  question.  It  would  seem  that  the  official 
oath  to  support  and  defend  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  is  not  binding,  when  a  violation  of 
that  constitution  is  political. 

The  Referendum  is  also  open  to  the  general  ob- 
jection to  pure  Democracy;  that  it  rarely,  if  ever, 
expresses  the  will  or  judgment  of  a  majority  of  the 
people.  The  "people"  are  merely  so  many  individ- 
uals, a  great  majority  of  whom  are  occupied  with 
their  own  private  concerns  and  pursuits,  and  are 
disposed  to  shirk  the  performance  of  public  duties, 
as  irksome  and  of  minor  personal  interest  to  them- 
selves. If  they  vote  at  all,  it  is  a  perfunctory  per- 
formance of  a  duty,  with  little  or  no  sense  of  per- 
sonal interest  or  responsibility.     They  simply  will 


86  Politics 

not,  or  cannot,  read  and  consider  the  merits  of  long 
and  technically  worded  legislative  acts  for  or  against 
which  they  are  expected  to  vote,  and  not  one  in 
twenty  of  those  who  vote  has  formed  any  rational 
opinion  or  expresses  by  his  vote  any  will  or  judg- 
ment whatever.  If,  for  example,  all  of  those  who 
vote  intelligently  should  vote  against  a  particular 
referred  measure;  a  large  majority,  nevertheless,  of 
the  total  vote  is  as  likely  to  be  for  that  measure  as 
against  it.    The  public  will,  in  legislation.  Is  a  myth. 

§  69.  Causes  of  Constitutional  Changes. 
The  underlying  causes  of  these  radical  constitutional 
changes  in  American  governments  are  economic,  not 
political.  The  one  great,  overshadowing  fact  that 
all  classes  of  people  know,  and  think  about,  and  talk 
about,  is  the  continued  poverty  of  the  industrious 
and  deserving  majority  of  the  people  of  the  richest 
nation  in  the  world,  while  the  steadily  increasing 
national  wealth  accumulates  in  the  hands  of  a 
minority  whose  labor  never  created  it.  As  if  by 
an  inexorable  economic  law  of  gravitation,  the  ma- 
terial wealth  of  a  nation,  which  is  created  almost 
entirely  by  the  laboring  poor,  is  most  strongly  at- 
tracted by  and  added  to  the  largest  accumulations  of 
that  wealth.  The  possessors  of  great  wealth  often 
continue  to  grow  richer  without  effort  on  their  part, 


Nature  of  Government  87 

and,  sometimes,  in  spite  of  their  efforts  to  diminish 
their  wealth. 

This  economic  tendency  is  constantly  attributed 
to  political  causes;  and  statesmen  and  economists, 
alike,  have  sought  to  correct  it  by  political  reforms, 
all  of  which  have  failed.  The  confessed  failure  of 
the  chosen  representatives  of  the  people  to  discover 
and  apply  a  remedy  left,  as  the  only  political  alter- 
native, the  apparent  necessity  of  empowering  the 
people  themselves,  the  complaining  majority,  to  seek 
and  apply  any  remedy  they  saw  fit,  through  the 
Initiative  and  Referendum.  Thus  the  extension  of 
Democracy  in  the  United  States,  and  indeed,  every- 
where, is  nothing  more  than  an  attempt  to  silence 
popular  complaint  of  economic  injustice  by  extend- 
ing political  power  and  responsibility  to  the  whole  of 
the  people  who  complain.  The  utter  futility  and 
hopelessness  of  I'his  expedient  is  demonstrated  by 
the  fact  that  the  evils  complained  of  have  increased, 
rather  than  diminished,  with  the  exercise  of  in- 
creased political  power  by  the  people.  The  exten- 
sion of  such  power  to  the  whole  body  of  the  people 
is  a  confession  of  incapacity  and  failure  on  the  part 
of  representatives  who  have  been  entrusted  with 
the  proper  exercise  of  the  powers  of  government, 
and  results  only  in  demonstrating  the  total  incapacity 
of  the  general  public  to  deal  with  the  problems  of 
government.     Those  problems  are  scientific  prob- 


88  Politics 

lems;  scientific  agencies  and  methods,  and  no  other, 
are  competent  to  deal  with  them. 

§  70.  Inherent  Weakness  of  Democracy. 
Democracy,  as  if  conscious  of  its  own  incapacity, 
always  has  exhibited  its  contempt  for  governments 
and  laws  of  its  own  making.  The  pure  democracies 
of  ancient  times,  without  exception,  were  turbulent 
and  short-lived.  No  form  of  government  can  long 
endure  without  popular  respect  for  its  authority  and 
obedience  to  its  laws.  The  government  of  the 
United  States  has  endured  more  than  one  hundred 
and  thirty  years  because  it  was  not  a  democracy;  it 
was  and  is  a  republic.  Its  authority  is  respected, 
while  that  of  the  more  democratic  states  often  is 
despised.  This  disrespect  for  law  and  authority  is 
the  logical  consequence  of  the  idea  that  the  people 
are  not  only  the  source  of  all  political  power  and 
authority  but  actually  possess  it,  the  government 
being  their  obedient  servant;  the  idea  that  the  gov- 
ernment must  obey  the  people,  instead  of  haying 
authority  over  them.  And  this  idea,  by  distinguish- 
ing between  people  and  the  government,  as  two 
separate  and  distinct  bodies,  means  that  the  people 
in  severalty  and  as  individuals  are  not  subject  to  the 
authority  of  government — which  is  anarchy;  for,  if 
the  people  collectively  and  as  an  organic  society  is 
meant,   the   proposition   becomes    an   absurdity:   a 


Nature  of  Government  89 

people  does  not  and  cannot  exist  as  a  collective 
organic  body,  or  unit,  otherwise  than  in  the  form 
of  a  government.  Therefore,  if  the  people  collec- 
tively is  meant  by  the  proposition  that  all  political 
power  is  vested  in  the  people  and  not  in  the  govern- 
ment, it  is  equivalent  to  the  absurd  proposition  that 
all  pojidcal  power  is  vested  in  the  government,  and 
not  in  the  government.  But  either  anarchy,  or  this 
same  self-contradicting  proposition,  is  the  funda- 
mental basis  of  all  Democracy.  It  explains  why 
Democracy  always  is  the  disorganizing  and  disin- 
tegrating force  of  societjj  and  why  every  increase 
of  the  democratic  element  in  a  government  involves 
a  corresponding  decrease  of  the  power  and  author- 
ity of  that  government.  The  growth  of  Democracy 
is  the  approaching  dissolution  of  the  State.  This 
statement  may  shock  the  sensibilities  of  some  Ameri- 
cans, but  it  is  the  truth.  Science,  not  Democracy, 
is  the  hope  of  society  and  civilization. 

§  71.  Essential  Nature  of  Government. 
From  the  foregoing  review  of  the  several  primary 
forms  of  government,  both  in  theory  and  in  prac- 
tical application,  the  essential  nature  of  civil  govern- 
ment, in  any  form,  should  become  apparent.  As 
manifested  in  the  existing  governments  of  our  own 
time,  the  several  primary  forms  of  government  now 
exist  only  as  three  elements  some  or  all  of  which 


90  Politics 

enter  into  the  complex  structure  of  all  modern 
governments.  These  elements  now  are  discoverable 
only  in  the  investment  and  distribution  of  the  several 
governmental  powers  —  legislative,  judicial,  and 
executive — and  they  may  be  described  and  defined 
as  follows : 

(1)  Monarchy:  Power  vested  in  a  single  in- 
dividual. 

(2)  Aristocracy:  Power  vested  in  a  select  body 
of  individuals,  however  selected. 

(3)  Democracy:  Power  vested  in  any  number  of 
individuals  who  constitute  a  majority  of  the  total 
number  of  citizens  whose  votes  are  cast  and  counted 
upon  any  given  question  or  measure  submitted  to 
them  at  a  general  election. 

It  is  evident  that  all  of  the  primary  elements  of 
any  form  of  government  are  elements  of  power. 
The  unavoidable  inference  is,  that  any  government 
is,  in  its  essential  nature,  the  repository  of  the 
powers  of  a  political  society,  or  state. 

§  72.  Governmental  Powers.  Government 
is  the  repository  of  the  powers  of  a  political  society. 
A  society  is  a  collective  body  of  persons;  and  a  poli- 
tical society  is  a  collective  body  of  persons  united 
(whether  voluntarily  or  involuntarily)  as  an  organic 
whole,  and  wielding  the  power  of  the  whole  through 
the  instrumentality  of  governing  organs, — govern- 


Nature  of  Government  91 

ment.  Government  is,  therefore,  not  only  the  re- 
pository of  political  powers;  it  is  the  governing 
organism  of  political  society.  An  organic  society 
without  such  organism — political  society  without  a 
government — is  inconceivable.  All  political  powers, 
then,  are  governmental  powers, — powers  which  per- 
tain to  government  only,  and  not  to  the  body  of 
citizens  considered  severally  and  apart  from  the 
government. 

Now,  turning  again  to  the  three  primary  elements 
of  power  which  are  found  in  the  constitutions  of 
modern  governments,  we  find  that  the  elements  of 
Monarchy  (power  in  one  person)  and  Aristocracy 
(power  in  a  select  body  of  persons)  both  are  the 
investment  of  power  in  the  governing  organism 
itself;  while  the  element  of  Democracy  is  the  invest- 
ment of  power  in  the  body  of  citizens  considered 
severally  and  apart  from  the  governing  organism. 
Democracy,  therefore,  is  not  a  governmental  power, 
but  is  a  withholding  or  withdrawal  of  power  from 
the  government;  and,  to  the  extent  that  it  exists, 
democracy  is  the  dissolution  of  political  society  and 
government. 

§  73.  Scientific  Government.  The  con- 
clusions already  reached  would  seem  to  require  the 
elimination  of  Democracy  from  civilized  govern- 
ments, but  they  do  not  require  a  return  to  the  old 


92  Politics 

forms  of  Monarchy  or  Aristocracy;  though  both 
those  old  forms  are  found  as  dominant  elements  in 
nearly  all  modern  governments,  and  Aristocracy,  in 
its  true  and  original  sense  of  "government  by  the 
best"  is  the  vital  and  indispensable  element  in  every 
civilized  and  enlightened  government.  No  form  of 
government  could  long  endure,  in  which  none  of  its 
powers  were  reposed  in  good  men  who  are  well 
qualified  to  exercise  them;  but  any  form  of  govern- 
ment would  endure  forever,  if  the  exercise  of  all 
of  its  powers  was  always  entrusted  to  the  best  and 
fittest  men  in  the  state.  Such  a  government,  if  it 
existed,  would  have  to  be  classified,  technically,  as 
an  Aristocracy  of  Merit;  but  it  would  be  the  only 
truly  scientific  government  that  is  conceivable. 

Scientific  Government  is  possible,  and  it  is  neces- 
sary. It  is  possible  only  upon  the  condition  that  all 
political  and  governmental  powers  shall  be  en- 
trusted to  those  persons,  only,  who  are  best  fitted 
and  qualified  to  exercise  them.  This  condition  can 
be  fulfilled  only  by  inaugurating  a  governmental 
system  of  human  surveys  which  will  operate  con- 
tinuously and  automatically  to  search  out  the  best 
and  ablest  among  men  and  call  them  to  the  service 
of  the  state.  The  problems  of  such  a  system  will  be 
the  subject  of  a  future  chapter. 


CHAPTER   IV 


SOVEREIGNTY 


§  74.  Definitions.  The  quality  or  attribute 
of  Sovereignty  generally  is  supposed  to  be  inherent 
in  and  inseparable  from  every  independent  political 
society;  but  there  is  much  uncertainty  as  to  what  is 
Sovereignty,  and  also  as  to  where,  in  what  part  or 
agency  of  society  the  Sovereignty  is  seated.  Origin- 
ally, in  monarchies,  sovereignty  was  attributed  to 
kings;  but  in  modern  constitutional  governments  it 
is  attributed,  sometimes  to  the  entire  mechanism  of 
government,  sometimes  to  the  supreme  legislative 
body  alone,  and  sometimes  to  the  whole  body  of  the 
people.  In  the  United  States,  the  highest  author- 
ities often  have  declared  that  "the  real  sovereignty 
is  in  the  people;"  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance, 
therefore,  that  we  should  have  a  definite  and  precise 
idea  of  what  we  mean  by  "sovereignty,"  and  of  its 
proper  place  in  the  general  scheme  of  civilized 
society.  Webster  defines  the  noun  "sovereign"  as 
meaning  "one  who  exercises  supreme  control;"  and 
the  adjective  "sovereign"  as  "supreme  in  power; 
superior  to  all  others;  highest  in  power;  chief;  in- 

93 


94  Politics 

dependent  of,  and  unlimited  by,  any  other;  possess- 
ing, or  entitled  to,  original  authority  or  jurisdiction." 
The  same  authority  defines  "Sovereignty"  as  "the 
exercise  of,  or  right  to  exercise,  supreme  power; 
dominion;  sway."  From  these  definitions  it  is  clear 
that  sovereignty  is  supreme,  independent,  and  un- 
controlled power.  The  sovereignty  of  a  political 
society  is  that  ultimate  power  and  authority  to  which 
all  constituent  parts  of  that  society  are  subject,  and 
which  itself  is  subject  to  no  other  power.  Two 
elements,  therefore,  are  essential  to  the  existence  of 
sovereignty:  (1)  supreme,  independent  and  uncon- 
trolled power,  and  (2)  subjects  who  are  controlled 
by  that  power. 

§  75.  Sovereignty,  a  Relation.  Sover- 
eignty is  a  relative  term,  implying  a  relation  between 
things,  not  a  thing  itself.  Thus,  a  state  may  be  said 
to  be  sovereign,  when  it  is  independent  and  not  sub- 
ject to  the  power  of  any  other  state.  Likewise, 
an  established  government,  or  any  particular  branch 
or  power  of  a  government,  or  any  person  or  body 
of  persons  within  and  part  of  a  state,  may  be  said 
to  be  sovereign,  when  such  government,  or  branch 
or  power  of  government,  or  person  or  body  of 
persons,  is  Independent  and  not  subject  to  any  other 
power  or  authority  within  that  state. 

We   are  not  now  concerned  with   the   relations 


Sovereignty  95 

among  sovereign  states,  but  have  here  to  deal  with 
the  problems  of  sovereignty  within  the  state.  What 
is  the  nature  of  this  sovereignty?  Is  it  necessarily 
in  the  nature  of  autocratic  power,  directed  by  some 
arbitrary  human  will?  Or  may  it  be  in  the  nature 
of  the  authority  of  scientific  principles?  If  sov- 
ereignty is  autocratic  power,  is  it  necessary  or  indis- 
pensable as  an  element  of  political  society?  Is  such 
autocratic  power  inseparable  from  the  instrumen- 
talities of  government? — or  may  it  reside  in  the 
people,  and  not  in  the  government?  If  the  scientific 
principles  of  law  can  be  sovereign — if  sovereignty 
of  law  is  possible — are  these  principles  to  be  ascer- 
tained and  declared  by  the  people  (the  majority), 
or  by  the  proper  instrumentalities  of  government? 
If  sovereignty,  or  any  less  power,  is  possessed  by 
the  people  instead  of  by  the  government  of  a  state, 
is  such  power  then  political? — or  is  it  then  anti- 
political;  a  barbaric,  savage,  non-social  and  non- 
political  power?  These  and  other  questions  require 
careful  consideration. 

§  76.  Autocratic  Sovereignty.  The  idea 
of  sovereignty  always  has  been  associated  with  the 
autocratic  power  of  kings,  and  entirely  disassociated 
from  the  principles  of  ethics  and  jurisprudence.  It 
seems  to  be  a  cardinal  doctrine  of  political  science, 
in  all  countries  and  under  all  forms  of  government, 


96  Politics 

that  somewhere  in  every  political  society  there  must 
be  a  sovereign  person  or  sovereign  body  of  -persons 
whose  uncontrolled  and  uncontrollable  will  is  the 
supreme  law  of  that  society,  which  must  prevail 
over  any  other  law.  This  is  the  principle  of  Autoc- 
racy; which  seems  to  cling  to  political  science,  while 
it  is  rejected  by  all  other  sciences,  and  which  repre- 
sents at  once  the  power  and  the  weakness  of  all 
existing  governments.  The  only  sovereignty  that 
seems  ever  to  have  been  conceived  of  is  a  personal 
sovereignty,  which  demands  allegiance  and  loyalty 
to  persons  and  obedience  to  human  will,  instead  of 
fealty  to  principle  and  obedience  to  law. 

§  77.  Sovereignty  of  Law.  While  sov- 
ereignty is,  in  theory,  entirely  autocratic,  it  is  not 
entirely  so  in  practice;  especially  in  states  which, 
like  England,  do  not  accept  the  doctrine  of  complete 
popular  sovereignty.  The  present  diffusion  of 
knowledge,  and  the  world-wide  publicity  given  to 
governmental  conduct,  tend  to  breed  a  wholesome 
respect  for  the  opinions  and  criticism  of  thoughtful 
and  discriminating  minds  everywhere,  in  consequence 
of  which  a  "sovereign  body  of  persons"  such  as  the 
English  parliament,  steadily  is  becoming  less  auto- 
cratic and  more  subservient  to  the  higher  sovereignty 
of  ethics  and  scientific  jurisprudence.  Responsible 
governments  which  are  invested  with  unquestioned 


Sovereignty  97 

sovereignty  are  constrained  to  abandon  all  claim 
to  a  personal  sovereignty  which  may  impose  their 
own  arbitrary  and  autocratic  will  upon  their  subjects, 
and  to  exercise  only  the  sovereignty  of  the  law, 
conforming  their  conduct  to  the  requirements  of 
principle  and  science.  This  is  a  wholesome  and 
hopeful  tendency  toward  scientific,  and  away  from 
autocratic,  government.  It  is  a  growing  recognition 
of  the  sovereignty  of  law. 

But  this  hopeful  tendency  is  reversed  in  those 
states  in  which  a  depraved  Democracy  and  Popular 
Sovereignty  prevail;  where  so-called  majorities  im- 
pose their  autocratic  will  upon  the  whole  people, 
regardless  of  science  or  law,  for  the  benefit  of  some 
classes  of  the  people  and  to  the  detriment  of  other 
classes;  unrestrained  by  any  respect  for  the  opinions 
and  criticism  of  thoughtful  and  discriminating  minds 
anywhere. 

§  78.  Popular  Sovereignty.  The  original 
and  simple  sovereignty  of  despotic  kings  belongs 
to  other  ages  and  earlier  states  of  civilization.  If 
true  sovereignty  survives  or  ought  to  exist  at  all 
in  the  complex  constitutional  governments  which  are 
required  by  modern  civilization,  it  must  be  as  an 
attribute  of  either  the  government  or  the  people. 
Assuming,  for  the  present,  that  sovereignty  is  essen- 
tial to  every  political  society,  it  admits  of  the  same 


98  Politics 

classification  as  that  given  to  the  elementary  forms 
of  government,  namely,  sovereignty  in  one  person; 
sovereignty  in  the  few  (minority)  ;  and  sovereignty 
in  the  many  (the  majority).  By  popular  sover- 
eignty, we  mean  that  the  many  which,  in  practice, 
means  any  majority  of  the  whole  body  of  the  people 
of  a  state,  are  endowed  with  sovereignty,  to  which 
even  the  government  of  that  state  is  subject  and 
subordinate.  The  doctrine  of  popular  sovereignty 
often  has  been  asserted  as  a  fundamental  principle 
of  government  in  the  United  States,  and  is  dog- 
matically asserted,  and  accepted  as  of  course,  in 
many  other  countries;  and  this  same  doctrine,  or 
dogma,  also  is  the  basis  of  all  socialistic  theories, 
and  even  of  Anarchy.  The  Bolsheviki,  in  Russia, 
and  elsewhere,  are  formidable  because  they  are  logi- 
cally asserting  and  applying  the  doctrine  that,  in 
every  country,  the  real  sovereignty  is  in  the  people, 
not  in  the  government. 

§  79.  In  the  United  States.  The  late  Mr. 
Justice  Bradley,  of  the  supreme  court  of  the  United 
States,  in  a  short,  but  formal,  treatise  on  "Govern- 
ment," stated  the  doctrine  of  popular  sovereignty  in 
the  following  language :  "Government,  it  is  proper 
to  add,  is  not  the  same  thing  as  sovereignty.  By 
sovereignty  is  meant  the  ultimate  power  of  the  state, 
to  which  all  final  appeals  are  made.     By  govern- 


Sovereignty  99 

ment  is  meant  the  ordinary  depositaries  of  the  civil 
power.  In  the  United  States  it  is  a  received  axiom 
that  the  sovereignty  resides  in  the  people  at  large. 
But  the  people  are  not  the  government."  (Am. 
Supp.  to  Enc.  Brit,  9th  ed.,  vol.  3,  p.  245).  This 
is  a  clear  and  explicit  declaration  of  the  prevailing 
American  idea  that  sovereignty  belongs  to  the  people 
at  large,  and  does  not  belong  to  the  government. 
It  assumes  that  the  people  at  large  can  be,  and  are, 
a  concrete  body,  capable  of  united  action  as  a  civil- 
ized society,  and  exercising  sovereignty  over  the 
governing  organism  through  which  alone  any  society 
can  be  and  act  as  such.  It  denies  the  right  and  the 
power  of  a  political  society,  (which  is  the  "people 
at  large"  living  in  a  state  of  society),  to  control  the 
individual  members  of  that  society.  In  other  words, 
popular  sovereignty  means  that  the  people  as  separ- 
ate individuals  are  sovereign  over  the  people  as  a 
concrete  society;  that  the  body  politic  is  not  sov- 
ereign over  its  parts;  that  the  whole  is  not  greater 
than  any  of  its  parts,  but  the  sum  of  the  several 
parts  is  greater  than  the  whole.  It  is  an  amazing 
absurdity. 

§  80.  Consequences  of  the  Doctrine. 
The  dogma  of  popular  sovereignty  might  be  ignored 
as  a  harmless  absurdity,  useful  only  to  demagogues 
as  a  bauble  with  which  to  flatter  and  cajole  the 


100  Politics 

voting  population,  if  it  were,  indeed,  harmless.  It 
heretofore  has  passed  unchallenged  because  it  has 
been  a  rather  pleasing  delusion,  without  sufficient 
practical  importance  to  require  serious  attention. 
But  now,  from  this  seemingly  harmless  and  pleasing 
idea  that  the  people  all  are  sovereigns,  has  sprung 
a  world-wide  movement  to  actually  assert  and  exer- 
cise that  supposed  sovereignty, — a  movement  which 
is  defying  all  government  and  all  authority,  and 
which  threatens  to  overwhelm  civilization.  This 
portentous  movement  assumes,  as  a  truth  and  a 
reality,  the  doctrine  that  sovereignty  belongs  to  the 
people,  and  not  to  the  governments  of  the  world; 
and  then  reasons,  quite  logically,  as  follows:  If 
sovereignty  belongs  to  the  people,  then  it  belongs 
to  the  proletariat,  who,  being  the  most  numerous 
class,  in  reality  are  the  people;  the  proletariat,  being 
sovereign,  have  the  right  to  dispense  with  and 
abolish  governments,  and  administer  their  own 
sovereign  will,  either  directly,  or  through  commit- 
tees or  "commissaries"  of  their  own  choosing;  that, 
being  sovereign,  the  proletariat  can  do  no  wrong, 
are  bound  by  no  law  other  than  their  own  will,  and 
there  can  be  no  law  but  by  their  sovereign  will;  and 
that  wherever  the  proletariat  are  superior  in  num- 
bers, there,  also,  they  are  sovereign,  and,  being 
sovereign,  are  subject  to  no  government  and  bound 
by  no  laws  but  their  own  sovereign  will.     There  is 


Sovereignty  101 

no  valid  answer  to  this  reasoning,  other  than  a 
denial  and  repudiation  of  the  false  premise  upon 
which  it  is  based, — ^popular  sovereignty.  But  a 
doctrine  which  has  received  wide  acceptance  among 
persons  high  in  authority  may  not,  however  baseless 
it  may  seem,  be  flatly  denied  and  rejected  without 
subjecting  it  to  a  searching  analysis  and  conclusive 
reasoning. 

§  81.  Basis  of  Sovereignty.  Sovereignty 
is  a  social  relation;  it  is  a  relation  which  can  exist 
only  in  a  political  society.  That  relation  is  one  of 
authority  and  subjection  to  authority.  There  can 
be  no  sovereign  without  subjects.  Where  there  is 
no  political  society  there  can  be  no  political  author- 
ity. If  we  could  imagine  a  purely  non-political  state 
of  society,  every  person  in  that  society  would  be 
absolutely  free  from  any  restraint  or  control  by 
others,  and  would  exercise  no  restraint  or  control 
over  others.  The  Instant  that  any  person,  by  any 
means  whatever,  established  any  authority,  restraint 
or  control  over  other  persons,  that  Instant,  as  to  all 
of  the  persons  concerned,  their  state  of  society 
would  cease  to  be  non-political — and  would  become 
political.  If  the  person  exercising  such  authority 
were  himself  subject  to  no  other  authority,  he  would 
be  a  sovereign  person,  and  the  relation  of  sovereign 
and  subjects  would  then  exist  between  himself  and 


102  Politics 

those  who  were  subject  to  his  authority.  Sover- 
eignty, then,  is  a  purely  political  relation,  having  no 
other  basis  than  that  of  authority,  exercised  by  some 
and  obeyed  by  others,  a  relation  which  cannot  exist 
where  political  society  does  not  exist.  How,  then, 
can  it  be  possible  for  all  of  the  members  of  a  politi- 
cal society  to  be  endowed  with  sovereignty;  in  which 
case  none  of  those  "sovereigns"  possibly  could  be 
subjects  of  such  sovereignty?  Such  a  state  of  society 
necessarily  would  be  wholly  non-political  and  in- 
organic,— like  an  army  of  generals,  with  none  to 
receive  and  obey  commands. 

The  conclusions  seem  unavoidable,  that,  if  popu- 
lar sovereignty — sovereignty  of  the  people  at  large 
— were  an  actual  fact,  and  not  a  mere  myth,  in  any 
country,  there  could  be  no  government  or  author- 
ity of  any  kind  in  that  country;  for  the  obvious 
reason  that  sovereigns  are  not  subjects,  and,  there- 
fore, there  could  be  no  subjects  to  be  governed 
and  to  obey  authority.  Popular  sovereignty,  being 
the  denial  of  popular  subjection  to  authority,  in- 
volves the  dissolution  of  the  social  state,  and  is 
impossible. 

§  82.  People  Are  Not  Society.  Approach- 
ing the  subject  of  sovereignty  from  another  angle; 
let  us  ascertain  clearly  the  difference  between  a 
society  and  the  people  who  compose  it,  and  the  dif- 


Sovereignty  103 

ference  between  a  government  and  the  people  who 
are  governed  by  it.  The  idea  of  popular  sovereignty 
necessarily  admits  that  the  people  of  a  state  are 
not  the  government  of  that  state ;  for  if  the  people 
and  government  were  identical,   such  a  distinction 
between  them  would  be  impossible.     It  would  be 
saying  that  the  same  thing,  when  designated  by  one 
name,  is  sovereign,  and  is  not  sovereign  when  desig- 
nated by  another  name, — a  self-contradicting  propo- 
sition.    It  is  absolutely  true  that  the  people  of  a 
state  are  not  the  government  of  that  state;  and  it 
is  true,  likewise,  that  the  people  of  whom  a  society 
is  composed  are  not  that  society.     The  difference 
between  people  and  government,  and  between  people 
and  society,  is  precisely  the  difference  that  always 
exists  between  any  form  or  structure  and  the  sub- 
stance or  materia'l  out  of  which  a  form  or  structure 
is  made.    A  block  of  marble  is  not  a  statue;  nor  is 
a  quantity  of  lumber  a  house.     When  a  statue  is 
carved  from  a  block  of  marble,  the  marble  in  that 
statue  still  is  nothing  but  marble,  it  is  not  the  statue ; 
the  form  given  to  the  marble  is  the  statue.     Like- 
wise, when  a  house  is  built  of  wood,  the  wood  in 
that  house  is  not  the  house,  it  still  is  nothing  but 
wood;  the  form,  the  structure  which  is  built  of  that 
wood,  is  the  house.     So,  when  a  number  of  men  are 
combined  or  associated  in  one  society,  the  men  who 


104  Politics 

compose   that   society   still   are   men,   and   nothing 
more;  they  are  not  the  society. 

§  83.  Nature  of  Society.  Society  is  a 
form,  a  structure,  a  fabric,  a  state  of  being.  Society 
is  not  the  human  material  of  which  it  is  composed, 
nor  is  that  material  a  society.  Society  is  the  form 
and  state  of  being  in  which  the  human  material 
composing  it  is  arranged  and  combined.  In  any 
society,  its  component  parts  have  assumed  certain 
relations  to  each  other  and  to  the  society,  and  it 
is  the  form  and  nature  of  those  relations,  not  the 
component  parts  themselves,  that  constitutes  the 
society.  The  various  kinds  of  society  are  determined 
by  the  form  of  each, — the  relations  assumed  and 
the  objects  sought  to  be  attained.  There  are  many 
kinds,  such  as  fraternal,  religious,  scientific,  indus- 
trial, and  political  societies.  In  every  kind,  the 
society  is  a  separate  entity,  distinct  and  apart  from 
its  component  parts,  or  members;  the  personal 
identity  and  individuality  of  the  several  members 
are  not  merged  and  lost  in  the  single  entity  of  the 
society, — for  one  man  may  be  a  member  of  many 
different  societies, — in  each  of  which  he  assumes  a 
distinct  set  of  relations. 

§  84.  Political  Society.    Political  societies 
are  different  from  other  societies  in  the  form  and 


Sovereignty  105 

extent  of  the  relations  assumed  by  or  imposed  upon 
their  members.  The  several  members  also  may  be 
members  of  other  societies,  both  political  and  non- 
political, — with  the  single  exception  that  no  person 
can  be  a  member  (or  subject)  of  more  than  one  ex- 
clusively independent  and  sovereign  state  at  one  time^ 
Political  societies  also  differ  from  other  societies  in 
having  geographical  position  and  control,  embrac- 
ing in  their  membership  or  under  their  control  all 
people  who  reside  within  certain  defined  territorial 
limits.  But  the  people  within  those  territorial  limits 
are  not  the  society;  they  may  be  and  usually  are, 
members  of  several  political  societies,  each  of  which 
is  a  distinct  entity  as  a  body  politic,  though  com- 
posed of  the  same  people.  Thus  the  people  who 
compose  the  single  body  politic  called  the  United 
States  of  America  are  the  same  people  who  com- 
pose the  several  distinct  bodies  politic  called  States, 
into  which  the  United  States  is  divided.  The  United 
States,  and  also  each  of  the  several  states,  is  a 
political  society.  The  several  counties,  cities,  and 
other  municipalities  throughout  the  United  States, 
all  are  separate  and  distinct  political  societies,  each 
of  which  is  a  corporate  entity,  separate  and  apart 
from  the  human  material  of  which  all  of  these  so- 
cieties are  formed.  Each  of  these  societies  is  a 
form  and  a  structure, — not  the  mere  mass  of  the 


106  Politics 

materials  out  of  which  the  form  and  structure  is 
fashioned. 

§  85.  Society  and  Sovereignty.  A  political 
society  is  called  sovereign  when,  or  in  so  far  as, 
it  is  independent  of  any  other  political  society.  If 
it  be  really  sovereign,  its  sovereignty  must,  neces- 
sarily, belong  to  that  entire  society, — not  to  some 
particular  part  of  it,  and  certainly  not  to  the  mass 
of  the  materials  out  of  which  it  is  formed.  If,  as 
we  have  seen,  the  people  of  a  society  are  not  the 
society,  then  the  sovereignty  which  belongs  to  a  sov- 
ereign political  society,  or  state,  does  not  belong 
to  the  people.  The  people  are  merely  so  many 
individual  men  and  women,  and  nothing  else.  But 
sovereignty  is  the  supreme  authority  and  power  of 
a  political  society;  and  such  soc'iety,  being  an  or- 
ganic body,  cannot  have  or  exercise  authority  and 
power  otherwise  than  through  and  by  its  own  or- 
gans or  organism.  Without  such  organism  it  would 
be  without  function,  and  could  not  exist.  The  or- 
ganism through  which  the  authority  and  power  of 
society  find  expression,  is  called  government;  which 
is,  in  fact,  society  itself  in  the  performance  of  its 
functions.  If,  therefore,  any  political  society  is 
sovereign,  its  sovereignty  can  be  exercised  only  by 
and  through  its  governing  organism, — the  govern- 
ment.    No  other  agency,  not  even  the  entire  body 


Sovereignty  107 

of  the  people,  is  endowed  with  any  of  the  functions 
or  powers  of  society.  When  the  people  exercise 
any  such  powers  and  functions,  their  acts  are  not 
the  acts  of  society,  but  the  acts  of  individuals  in  a 
non-social  and  non-political  state.  Such  individual 
action  by  the  people,  if  carried  to  its  logical  conclu- 
sion, would  mean  the  dissolution  of  society  and  the 
end  of  civilization. 

§  86.  Majority  Rule.  Approaching  the 
subject  of  popular  sovereignty  from  still  another 
angle,  let  us  now  inquire  into  the  manner  in  which 
the  people  at  large  necessarily  must  exercise  the 
power  of  sovereignty,  assuming  that  they  possess 
it;  and  whether  their  exercise  of  such  power  would 
represent  the  whole  people,  or  only  a  portion  of 
them.  The  theory  of  popular  sovereignty  is  that 
the  real  sovereignty  of  a  sovereign  state  is  vested  in 
the  people  at  large,  the  whole  people,  all  of  the 
people  of  that  state,  and  not  in  any  determined  or 
determinable  portion  of  the  people.  If  the  popular 
sovereignty  can  be  construed  to  mean  sovereignty 
in  some,  but  not  all,  of  the  people,  who  are  the 
sovereign  persons  in  the  state,  then  it  is  applicable 
to  the  established  organism  of  government,  in  which 
case  popular  sovereignty  simply  means  sovereignty 
of  the  government,  which  is  the  people  in  the  form 
and  capacity  of  organic  society, — the  only  sense  in 


108  Politics 

which  popular  sovereignty  ever  did  or  ever  can 
actually  exist.  But  the  term  is  not  employed  in  that 
sense,  else  there  would  be  no  question  to  discuss. 
As  commonly  used  and  understood,  the  terms  "pop- 
ular sovereignty"  and  "sovereignty  of  the  people" 
mean  the  exercise  of  sovereign  power  by  any  major- 
ity in  number  of  the  voting  population.  It  is  ma- 
jority rule  extended  to  absolute  sovereignty;  the 
dogma  of  popular  sovereignty  is  nothing  more  nor 
less  than  sovereignty  of  majorities,  if  exercised  in 
an  orderly  manner,  or  sovereignty  of  mobs,  if  exer- 
cised without  the  formalities  of  plebiscite  or  election. 

§  87.  Minority  Rule.  If  the  actual  exer- 
cise of  sovereignty  by  the  entire  body  of  the  people 
at  large  can  be  regarded  as  possible,  it  certainly 
never  has  been  accomplished  as  a  fact.  It  is  doubt- 
ful if  all  of  the  citizens  or  qualified  voters  of  any 
state  ever  participated  in  any  specific  political  act, 
either  at  a  general  election  or  in  any  other  manner. 
Certainly  no  sovereign  act,  such  as  the  adoption  of 
a  constitution,  or  the  enactment  of  ordinary  legis- 
lation, ever  was  performed  by  the  unanimous  action 
of  the  people  at  large,  but  only  by  a  majority  of  the 
number  who  participate, — ^which  sometimes  is  far 
short  of  a  majority  of  all  citizens.  Thus  the  sup- 
posed sovereignty  of  the  people  actually  is  exercised 
generally  by  a  minority.    In  such  instances  popular 


Sovereignty  109 

sovereignty  becomes  minority  sovereignty.  So,  it 
appears  that,  in  actual  practice,  the  phrase  "the 
people"  is  vague  and  indefinite,  meaning  sometimes 
a  majority,  sometimes  less  than  a  majority,  and 
always  less  than  all  the  people. 

§  88.  Mob  Rule.  Every  mob  which  casts 
aside  the  restraints  of  law,  and  defies  the  authority 
of  government,  believes  itself  and  proclaims  itself 
to  be  "the  people."  The  most  violent  and  criminal 
mobs  are  the  most  vociferous  in  claiming  to  be  "the 
people."  The  most  depraved  elements  of  society 
always  are  firmly  convinced  that  they  are  "the  peo- 
ple," and  that  the  constituted  authorities  of  govern- 
ment and  law  are  enemies  and  oppressors  of  the 
people.  These  depraved  elements  always  are 
keenly  aware  of  the  manifest  imperfection  and  in- 
justice that  pervade  all  existing  forms  of  society, 
and  are  first  to  rally  to  the  support  of  leaders  who 
seek  to  reform  society  by  forcibly  overthrowing 
existing  forms  of  government.  All  advocates  of 
forcible  revolution  by  the  mob  base  their  argument 
( 1 )  upon  the  assumption  that  the  mob  is  the  people, 
and  (2)  upon  the  proposition  that  the  people  are 
sovereign,  and,  as  sovereigns,  have  the  right  to 
make  and  unmake  governments  and  laws  at  their 
will.  The  argument  is  a  strong  one,  and  the  only 
answer  to  it,  under  existing  conditions  of  society,  is 


110  Politics 

(1)  that  mobs  are  not  the  people;  (2)  that  govern- 
ments, not  the  people,  are  sovereign;  and  (3)  that 
the  people  as  a  mob  have  not  the  right  to  make  and 
unmake  governments  and  laws  at  their  will.  But 
the  final  and  only  satisfying  answer  must  be  an 
answer  that  never  yet  has  been  given,  namely:  The 
injustice  that  pervades  all  existing  forms  of  society 
must  and  shall  be  removed  by  the  peaceful  and 
orderly  processes  of  scientific  government. 

§  89.  People's  Capacity  for  Sovereignty. 
Government  is  a  science.  All  functions  of  govern- 
ment, whether  legislative,  judicial,  or  administra- 
tive, are  scientific  functions,  and  should  be  per- 
formed scientifically;  precisely  as  any  other  business 
or  industry  must  be  conducted  scientifically,  if  it  is  to 
be  successful.  If  there  must  be  any  sovereign  con- 
trol over  the  exercise  of  the  functions  of  govern- 
ment, that  control  ought  to  be  scientific, — not  arbit- 
rary, whimsical,  or  despotic.  The  conduct  of  civil 
government  is  a  human  enterprise,  not  essentially 
different  from  all  other  human  enterprises  which 
require  knowledge,  discretion,  integrity,  and  tech- 
nical skill  for  their  successful  prosecution  and  the 
attainment  of  the  ends  for  which  they  are  under- 
taken. In  all  human  enterprises — with  the  sole 
exception  of  civil  government — popular  beliefs, 
opinions,  and  prejudices  count  for  nothing  in  deter- 


Sovereignty  111 

mining  any  facts,  methods,  principles,  or  policies 
affecting  any  enterprise.  In  all  sciences,  arts,  and 
industries,  save  that  of  government,  the  most  effi- 
cient and  trustworthy  persons  are  sought  for  each 
special  service,  and  to  them  are  committed  the  prob- 
lems which  require  their  expert  skill  and  knowledge 
in  their  several  specialties.  If  the  opinion,  knowl- 
edge or  judgment  of  the  people  at  large  were  of  any 
value  in  determining  vital  problems  and  policies  in 
the  conduct  of  educational,  scientific,  financial,  indus- 
trial, or  commercial  enterprises,  those  concerned  in 
the  respective  enterprise  would  be  certain  to  avail 
themselves  of  that  public  wisdom  in  the  solution  of 
problems  that  baffle  specially  trained  scientific  ex- 
perts. But  the  obvious  incapacity  of  the  people  at 
large  for  dealing  with  technical  and  scientific  mat- 
ters is  fully  recognized  as  to  all  sciences  and  arts, 
save  that  of  government.  If,  however,  the  people 
in  general  lack  capacity  for  all  else,  how  can  they 
be  supposed  to  have  sufficient  capacity  for  the  intel- 
ligent exercise  of  sovereign  control  over  the  func- 
tions of  government?  The  vital  and  intricate  prob- 
lems of  jurisprudence,  legislation,  and  administra- 
tion of  government,  are  of  far  greater  importance 
than  those  of  any  other  field  of  human  action; 
affecting  the  life,  the  liberty,  and  the  happiness  of 
every  human  being;  yet  those  vital  problems,  and 
the  very  existence   of  human  government  and  of 


112  Politics 

civilization,  are  being  subjected  to  the  supreme  and 
sovereign  control  of  a  force  which  is  utterly  in- 
capacited  for  any  of  the  lesser  enterprises  that  en- 
gage the  attention  of  men. 

§  90.  Popular  Desire  for  Sovereignty. 
All  men  desire  liberty,  and  the  secure  possession 
and  enjoyment  of  the  fruits  of  their  legitimate  en- 
deavor; many  men  desire  more  than  this;  but  few- 
men  desire  the  possession  and  responsibility  of  polit- 
ical power.  In  other  words,  all  men  desire  all  that 
is  rightfully  theirs;  many  desire  more  than  is  right- 
fully theirs ;  but  few  desire  to  participate  in  matters 
of  purely  public  concern.  The  public  concern,  the 
concern  of  society  and  government,  is,  or  ought  to 
be,  to  see  to  it  that  all  men  have  all  rights  and 
possessions  that  are  justly  theirs,  and  that  none 
have  more.  But,  while  nearly  all  men  are  wholly 
devoted  to  their  individual  and  personal  concerns 
and  interests,  only  a  comparatively  few  are  disposed 
to  rise  above  their  private  interests  and  devote  their 
energies  to  the  concerns  and  interests  of  the  public 
welfare.  Political  affairs  and  disturbances,  when 
forced  upon  the  attention  of  the  average  man,  are 
regarded  by  him  as  an  unwelcome  interference  with 
his  ordinary  pursuits.  The  people  at  large  would 
concern  themselves  but  little  with  the  affairs  of 
government,  if  they  could  feel  assured  that  those 


Sovereignty  113 

affairs  were  in  competent  and  trustworthy  hands 
and  that  all  persons  were  secure  in  their  rights  and 
possessions.  All  the  distrust  and  disturbance  in 
society  is  caused  by  the  well-known  fact  that  society 
has  failed  in  its  duty  to  see  to  it  that  all  men  have 
all  that  is  justly  theirs,  and  none  more.  The  people 
know  that  most  of  them  have  less  than  is  rightfully 
theirs,  while  many  others  have  more;  they  know 
that  the  bounties  of  nature  and  the  blessings  of 
civilization  are  not  fairly  distributed  according  to 
principles  of  justice,  but  are  largely  monopolized 
by  unrestrained  greed  and  cunning.  When  the 
people  complain  of  this,  they  are  given  Democracy, 
and  when  they  continue  to  complain,  they  are  given 
Sovereignty.  What  the  people  really  desire  is  social 
and  economic  justice;  they  desire  neither  democracy 
nor  sovereignty.  They  desire  just  government. 
This  desire  never  can  be  fulfilled  until  the  exercise 
of  the  functions  of  government  is  entrusted  to  those 
only  who  are  competent  and  trustworthy, — not  to 
mouthing  demagogues  who  obtain  votes  by  prating 
about  Democracy  and  Popular  Sovereignty.  Both 
of  those  panaceas  having  failed  to  bring  about  that 
social  and  economic  justice  which  is  the  real  desire 
of  the  people,  a  new  panacea  is  now  offered  to  the 
people  of  all  nations  in  the  form  of  Bolshevism. 

§  91.  Proletarian  Sovereignty.     In  sharp 


114  Politics 

distinction  from  the  theory  of  popular  sovereignty, 
which  regards  sovereignty  as  pertaining  to  the 
whole  people,  including  the  high  as  well  as  the 
lowly,  we  now  behold  a  new  brand  of  sovereignty 
commanding  the  attention  of  the  political  world, — 
that  of  the  proletariat.  Proletarian  Sovereignty^ 
represented  by  the  Bolsheviki  of  Russia,  and  their 
so-called  soviet  governments  there  and  elsewhere, 
makes  no  hypocritical  pretense  of  an  impossible 
sovereignty  of  the  whole  people,  but  boldly  and 
openly  proclaims  an  absolute  and  autocratic  right 
of  sovereignty  in  that  class  of  the  people  which  it 
styles  the  proletariat.  The  word  "proletariat" 
means,  according  to  lexicographers,  "the  class  of 
common  people;  the  lowest  class;  the  community"; 
— but  the  apostles  of  Bolshevism,  by  insisting  upon 
a  distinction  between  the  "proletariat"  and  all  prop- 
erty-holding classes,  such  as  the  "bourgeoisie"  and 
the  "capitalistic"  classes,  clearly  mean,  by  "the  pro- 
letariat," the  impoverished  and  hitherto  down- 
trodden multitude.  This  one  class,  always  the 
most  numerous,  is  suddenly  elevated  from  servility 
to  sovereignty.  It  is  a  grim  caricature  of  justice; 
meaning  retribution  and  destruction,  rather  than 
justice  and  restoration. 

§  92.  Justice    and    Sovereignty.      Justice 
is  the  subordination  of  human  will  to  juristic  prin- 


Sovereignty  115 

ciples;  sovereignty  is  the  subordination  of  juristic 
principles  to  human  will.  Justice  is  the  domination 
of  reason  over  force;  sovereignty  is  the  domination 
of  force  over  reason.  Justice  is  the  supremacy  of 
human  reason;  sovereignty  is  the  supremacy  of 
human  will.  Justice  is  the  equal  right  of  all,  to  the 
exclusion  of  none;  sovereignty  is  the  superior  right 
of  some,  to  the  exclusion  of  others.  Justice  is  the 
rule  of  right;  sovereignty  is  the  rule  of  might. 
Justice  is  unalterable  principle;  sovereignty  is  fickle 
despotism.  The  idea  of  human  sovereignty  is, 
therefore,  irreconcilable  with  the  idea  of  disinter- 
ested justice. 

§  93.  Sovereignty  the  Foe  op  Liberty. 
Justice  and  liberty  are  inseparable.  Neither  can 
exist  without  the  other.  As  sovereignty  is  irrecon- 
cilable with  justice,  it  also  is  inimical  to  liberty. 
Though  the  mere  claim  of  a  right  of  sovereignty, 
without  actual  exercise  of  sovereignty,  may  not  in- 
terfere with  justice  or  liberty,  the  imposition  of  a 
sovereign  will  upon  a  subject  people  always  is  an 
infringement  of  the  principles  of  both  justice  and 
liberty.  The  sovereignty  of  men,  whether  that  of 
kings,  people,  or  classes,  is  essentially  despotic.  Our 
modern  popular  sovereignty  exhibits  the  same  dis- 
regard of  human  liberty  that  characterized  the 
ancient  sovereignty  of  despotic  kings.     It  is  even 


116  Politics 

more  irresponsible,  less  rational,  and  therefore 
more  perilous,  not  only  to  liberty,  but  also  to  the 
peace  and  order  of  civilized  society,  than  the  sov- 
ereignty of  any  despotic  king;  because  the  king 
could  be  called  to  account  and  deposed  for  his  abuse 
of  sovereign  power,  while  the  people  cannot  be. 

§  94.  Sovereignty  of  Society.  The  only 
sovereignty  which  is  consistent  with  the  sound  prin- 
ciples of  just  and  scientific  government,  is  that  of 
society  itself,  personified  by  the  governing  organ- 
ism, or  government,  in  and  by  which  alone  society 
is  in  being  as  a  living  and  potent  body  politic. 
Government  is  society  in  action;  it  is  the  whole 
people  as  members  of  society.  There  is  not,  never 
was,  nor  ever  can  be  any  sovereignty  save  that  of 
government.  While  government  is  both  society  and 
people  as  one  organic  whole,  the  entire  people 
severally  are  neither  society  nor  government.  They 
are,  severally,  subjects  of  a  sovereign  society  or 
government, — not  the  sovereigns  of  a  subject  so- 
ciety or  government.  The  time  has  come  when 
people  must  be  made  to  understand  this  truth. 
They  must  be  taught,  also,  that  if  society  needs  re- 
forming, the  reform  can  be  effected  only  through 
the  existing  organism  of  society, —  never  by  dis- 
rupting or  destroying  that  organism,  A  king  may 
be  deposed,  or  a  president  impeached  and  removed 


Sovereignty  117 

from  office,  and  a  legislature  or  judiciary  may  be 
reformed, — all  through  the  organism  of  the  body 
politic,  and  without  disrupting  or  destroying  it. 
The  faults  of  society  and  government  are  the  results 
of  ignorance  and  incapacity  rather  than  design,  on 
the  part  of  those  to  whom  the  offices  of  government 
are  intrusted;  and  the  obvious  reform  needed  is  a 
rational  mode  of  selecting  wise  and  capable  men 
for  those  offices,  by  whom  the  sovereignty  and 
power  of  government  may  be  rightly  maintained 
and  exercised. 


CHAPTER    V 


PUBLIC   OPINION 


§  95.  Non-Political  Power.  In  the  United 
States,  and,  apparently,  in  other  countries,  the  polit- 
ical power  steadily  is  becoming  less  potent,  because 
of  its  submissiveness  to  another  power  which  is  not 
political, — a  power  called  "public  opinion."  Polit- 
ical powers  are  the  organic  powers  of  political  so- 
ciety; powers  which  are  inherent  in  the  governing 
organism — the  government — of  political  society. 
In  other  words,  political  powers  are  powers  of 
Government,  powers  of  organic  society.  All  other 
human  powers  are  pov/ers  of  inorganic  society. 
The  powers  of  inorganic  society  are  the  natural 
powers  of  individual  men  to  do  both  good  and  evil; 
powers  of  liberty,  and  powers  of  crime. 

The  office  of  the  powers  of  organic  society  is  to 
restrain  and  control  the  powers  of  inorganic  society. 
The  power  of  public  opinion  is  a  power  of  inorganic 
society,  it  being  without  and  apart  from  the  con- 
stituted social  organism.  Therefore,  the  submis- 
sion of  government  to  the  power  of  public  opinion 

118 


Public  OpinioNj  119 

is  the  surrender  by  organic  society  of  its  power  to 
restrain  and  control  the  powers  of  inorganic  society. 
It  is  the  surrender  of  society  to  its  individual  mem- 
bers; the  subjection  of  civil  to  anarchic  power. 

§  96.  Power  of  Public  Opinion.  It  is  the 
favorite  boast  of  politicians  in  general,  and  of  the 
entire  press,  in  the  United  States,  that  all  depart- 
ments of  government,  both  state  and  federal,  are 
mere  instruments  and  vehicles  for  the  expression 
and  carrying  out  of  the  mandates  of  public  opinion. 
And  it  is  an  undeniable  fact  that  all  functions  of 
government  in  the  several  states,  and  all  functions 
of  the  federal  government  excepting  only  the  judic- 
iary, now  are  completely  dominated  by  whatever  is 
conceived  to  be  the  prevailing  public  opinion.  The 
reason  for  this  state  of  affairs  is  obvious.  Prac- 
tically ail  powers  of  government  are  exercised  by 
officers  who  are  elected  for  short  terms  by  the  direct 
votes  of  the  people.  All  elective  offices  are  filled, 
quite  naturally,  by  that  class  of  men,  only,  who  are 
willing  to  seek  office  by  courting  popularity  among 
their  constituencies,  and  whose  only  hope  of  con- 
tinuance in  office  or  advancement  to  higher  office 
is  by  continuing  in  favor  with  their  constituencies. 
With  such  men  the  demand  of  passing  popular 
sentiment  are  more  binding  than  the  dictates  of 
conscience  and  patriotic  duty. 


120  Politics 

§  97.  Suffrage  and  Public  Opinion.  The 
power  of  public  opinion  always  is  proportionate  to 
the  extension  or  restriction  of  the  right  of  suffrage 
among  the  people.  In  governments  where  popular 
suffrage  does  not  exist,  public  opinion  has  little  in- 
fluence on  and  no  power  whatever  over  the  conduct 
of  government.  But  in  governments  where  a  prac- 
tically universal  suffrage  prevails,  and  the  supreme 
offices  of  government  all  are  elective,  public  opinion 
is  omnipotent  and  government  its  slave;  and  such 
governments,  being  impotent,  are  contemptible,  and 
their  authority  is  held  in  contempt  by  the  same 
people  whose  caprice  can  control  them.  It  is  or- 
ganized anarchy. 

§  98.  Constitutional  Safeguards,  in  U.  S. 
The  present  omnipotence  of  public  opinion  in  the 
United  States  is  a  departure — a  complete  revolu- 
tion, in  fact — from  the  kind  of  government  that 
the  framers  of  the  Constitution  intended  to  estab- 
lish and  did  establish.  While  it  was  intended  to 
establish  a  Republic,  every  possible  precaution  and 
safeguard,  consistent  with  that  intention,  was  taken 
to  minimize  the  influence  of  public  opinion  and 
sentiment  upon  the  several  functionaries  of  govern- 
ment. Only  one  of  the  two  houses  of  Congress, 
the  House  of  Representatives,  was  made  elective 
by  the  people;  all  other  branches  of  the  govern- 


Public  Opiniok  121 

ment, — the  executive,  the  judiciary,  and  the  most 
powerful  chamber  of  the  legislative,  the  Senate, 
were  intended  to  be  independent  of  popular  in- 
fluences, and  to  that  end  the  people  were  to  have 
no  direct  voice  in  the  selection  of  a  president,  or  of 
judges,  or  of  senators.  The  avowed  and  often 
repeated  reasons  for  these  precautions  were,  that 
public  sentiment  and  opinion  always  are  unstable 
and  unsafe,  always  irresponsible,  often  irrational, 
and  usually  are  incited  and  created  by  irresponsible 
agitators,  sometimes  with  sinister  motives,  who 
easily  can  mislead  the  public  by  specious  and  plaus- 
ible arguments;  and  that  the  true  interest  of  society 
demands  the  exercise  of  the  highest  wisdom  and 
unbiased  judgment  of  the  responsible  functionaries 
of  government,  uninfluenced  by  considerations  of 
popularity.  The  framers  of  the  Constitution 
clearly  foresaw,  what  we  now  know  by  actual  ex- 
perience, that  the  fear  of  defeat  at  the  next  election 
often  will  cause  elective  officers  to  commit  them- 
selves to  a  course  of  official  conduct,  or  actually 
to  pursue  a  course  of  conduct,  which  is  contrary  to 
their  own  conscientious  judgment,  and  which  they 
believe  to  be  detrimental  to  the  true  interests  even 
of  their  own  constituents. 

§  99.  Revolutionary  Changes.    Ever  since 
the   adoption   of   the   original   Constitution   of   the 


122  Politics 

United  States,  in  1787,  certain  extra-political  forces 
have  been  operating  to  undermine  the  independence 
of  all  governmental  functionaries  and  to  render 
them  more  subservient  to  popular  control.  The 
first  constitutional  change  in  that  direction,  effected 
in  1804,  related  to  the  election  of  the  president,  and 
required  the  electoral  votes  of  each  of  the  states 
to  be  cast  and  counted  as  a  unit,  one  vote  for  each 
state,  instead  of  counting  the  independent  votes  of 
the  several  electors,  as  originally  provided.  Fol- 
lowing this  change  in  the  Constitution,  it  soon  was 
extended  by  universal  custom  so  as  to  deprive  the 
members  of  the  electoral  college  of  whatever  dis- 
cretion they  originally  were  intended  to  have  in 
electing  a  president;  with  the  result  that,  in  practical 
effect,  presidents  thereafter  were  and  now  are 
elected  directly  by  the  people  of  the  several  states, 
making  them  no  less  subservient  to  public  opinion 
than  are  any  other  officers  who  are  elected  by  direct 
popular  suffrage  and  are  answerable  to  the  people 
only.  A  more  recent  change  in  the  Constitution 
has  destroyed  the  independence  of  the  Senate,  mak- 
ing the  members  of  that  body,  also,  dependent  upon 
the  popular  suffrage  for  election,  and  consequently 
subservient  to  public  opinion  in  the  performance  of 
their  duties.  These  revolutionary  changes  have 
been  made  in  obedience  to  a  supposed  mandate  of 
public  opinion;  and  the  same  forces  and  influences 


Public  Opinion  123 

that  created  that  supposed  public  opinion  now  are 
clamoring  for  a  still  more  vital  change  which  will 
completely  destroy  the  independence  of  the  Federal 
judiciary  by  making  all  judical  offices  elective  by 
popular  vote.  When  this  last  change  is  accom- 
plished, (as  surely  it  will  be,  if  there  is  not  a  general 
restoration  of  sanity),  the  revolution  will  be  com- 
plete, and  the  Federal  government  will  be  reduced 
to  the  same  low  level  of  impotency,  incompetency, 
and  corruption,  as  that  occupied  by  many  of  the 
state  governments. 

§  100.  Sources  of  Public  Opinion.  This 
omnipotent  Public  Opinion  is  not  a  spontaneous 
emanation  from  the  minds  of  the  people  generally; 
it  originates  in  and  emanates  from  the  minds  of  a 
comparatively  small  number  of  persons  who  are 
able  to  engage  the  attention  of  the  general  public 
and  instill  their  peculiar  ideas  into  the  minds  of 
people  generally.  In  earlier  times,  when  illiteracy 
was  more  general  and  newspapers  rare,  a  few  pop- 
ular orators  were  the  favored  few  who  enjoyed  a 
complete  monopoly  of  the  business  of  manufactur- 
ing public  opinion.  But,  at  this  day  that  monopoly 
has  fallen  into  the  hands  of  a  comparatively  few 
proprietors  and  editors  of  newspapers,  and  other 
printed  periodicals  which  are  widely  circulated  and 
generally  read. 


124  Politics 

§  101.  Power  of  the  Press.  Public  opin- 
ion, so  far  as  it  has  any  effect  upon  the  conduct  of 
those  who  are  charged  with  the  exercise  of  govern- 
mental functions,  is  the  supposed  opinion  of  that 
portion  of  the  pubHc  who,  through  the  elective  fran- 
chise, have  the  power  to  select  those  persons  who 
are  to  exercise  governmental  functions.  The  final 
expression  of  this  supposed  opinion  is  made  by  such 
portion  of  the  whole  body  of  electors  as  happens  to 
constitute  a  majority  (or,  in  some  cases,  a  mere 
plurality,)  of  the  whole  number  of  electors  who 
participate  and  cast  their  votes  in  an  election.  This 
majority,  or  plurality,  may  be,  and  usually  Is,  a 
minority  of  the  total  number  of  qualified  electors, 
and  a  very  small  minority  of  the  entire  adult  pop- 
ulation; but  whatever  small  proportion  of  the 
"public"  they  may  be,  their  decision  or  choice  is 
deemed  to  express  the  "public  opinion"  upon  the 
questions  voted  upon  at  the  election.  But,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  (supposing  every  voter  to  be  ca- 
pable of  reading,  thinking  and  forming  Independent 
opinions  of  his  own)  every  voter  Is  dependent  upon 
newspapers  and  other  printed  matter  for  the  in- 
formation that  is  necessary  In  order  to  enable  him 
to  form  rational  opinions  of  public  men  and  upon 
state  affairs,  and  the  opinions  of  nearly  every  one 
naturally  conform  to  those  expressed  In  the  news- 
papers and  other  periodicals  that  are  read  by  him. 


Public  Opinion  125 

The  press  has  become,  to  every  man  who  reads,  his 
only  accepted  source  of  information  as  to  men  and 
affairs  beyond  the  limits  of  his  own  personal  ac- 
quaintance and  observation.  Whoever  controls  that 
source  of  information  has  the  tremendous  power 
of  giving  and  withholding  such  information  as  he 
pleases  to  give  or  withhold,  or  of  imparting  it  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  create  the  impressions  and 
opinions  that  he  desires  to  create  among  his  readers. 
The  average  man  receives  the  impressions  and  re- 
flects the  opinions  that  he  finds  in  the  particular 
periodical  that  he  habitually  reads;  and  those  im- 
pressions and  opinions  are  the  ones  that  the  owner 
or  manager  of  that  particular  periodical  desires  to 
create.  In  every  civilized  country  today,  a  com- 
paratively few  great  daily  newspapers  reach  and 
are  read  by  the  great  mass  of  the  reading  public. 
Whatever  is  the  predominant  opinion  among  these 
newspapers  is  accepted  as  public  opinion  by  all 
public  officials  who  hold  their  offices  by  the  grace 
of  popular  votes;  and  public  officials  yield  obedience 
to  this  newspaper  public  opinion  because  their  repu- 
tations and  their  hope  of  continuing  in  public  life 
depend  upon  the  favor  of  those  newspapers  whose 
opinions  are  "public"  opinions. 

In  the  United  States,  and  perhaps  In  some  other 
so-called  "democracies"  of  the  present  day,  the 
press, — not  public  opinion, —  is  truly  omnipotent. 


126  Politics 

The  press  Is  the  supreme  power,  to  which  the  con- 
stituted governments  are  subordinate  and  subservi- 
ent. It  would  be  no  exaggeration  of  facts  to  para- 
phrase certain  popular  maxims  of  American  pol- 
itics by  saying:  "In  this  country  the  real  sovereignty 
is  in  the  newspapers,"  and  "This  is  a  government 
of  the  people  by  the  newspapers  for  the  news- 
papers." 

§  102.  Irresponsibility  of  the  Press.  By 
what  right  and  by  what  authority  do  the  individuals 
who  control  the  press  assume  and  exercise  supreme 
power  by  dominating  the  established  government? 
Who  invested  them  with  this  super-governmental 
power?  They  profess  to  be  the  "interpreters  of 
public  opinion."  It  is  to  the  publisher's  interest 
to  affect  the  modest  role  of  a  mere  interpreter  of 
the  opinions  and  wishes  of  the  people,  and  to  per- 
sist in  the  shallow  affectations  of  being  the  "organ," 
the  "mouthpiece,"  or  the  "spokesman"  of  the 
people.  Augustus  Caesar  wielded  absolute  and 
autocratic  power  by  modestly  affecting  to  be  the 
humble  instrument  of  a  senate  which  was  in  reality 
his  slave;  and  in  modern  politics  he  has  had  more 
than  one  imitator  who  has  usurped  and  exercised 
absolute  power  while  making  loud  professions  of 
being  merely  the  humble  servant  and  spokesman 
of  the  people.     But  Augustus   was   invested  with 


Public  Opinion  127 

power  by  an  army  that  was  obedient  to  his  will, 
and  his  modern  imitators  have  been  invested  with 
constitutional  authority  which  their  usurpations  of 
power  have  merely  exceeded.  The  power  of  the 
first  Roman  emperor,  and  also  that  of  his  several 
modern  imitators,  was  political, — it  was  within  the 
governing  organism  of  the  state.  But  the  supreme 
and  super-governmental  power  now  exercised  by 
those  persons  who  own  or  control  the  newspaper 
press  never  was  conferred  upon  them  by  any  polit- 
ical body  or  power,  either  mihtary  or  civil,  nor 
through  any  constitutional  processes  of  political  so- 
ciety. It  is  an  extra-political  power,  utterly  lawless 
and  entirely  irresponsible,  exercised  arbitrarily  as 
the  purely  private  enterprise  of  any  individual  who 
manages  to  acquire  possession  and  control  of  a 
newspaper  publishing  plant. 

§  103.  Qualifications  of  the  Press.  The 
modern  newspaper  has  become  the  universal  and 
almost  exclusive  medium  through  which  current  in- 
formation and  ideas  reach  the  pubhc  from  day  to 
day.  Modern  newspapers  are  the  common  avenues 
of  public  intelligence.  The  power  to  control  these 
great  avenues  of  intelligence,  and  to  say  what  shall 
pass  and  what  shall  not  pass  through  them,  Is  the 
power  to  create  and  control  the  sentiments,  prej- 
udices and  opinions  of  the  public.     If  such  a  power 


128  Politics 

is  necessary  and  must  exist  somewhere,  it  ought  to 
be  a  responsible  political  power,  not  an  irresponsible 
private  and  non-political  or  anarchic  power;  and 
the  exercise  of  such  vast  power  should  be  committed 
to  those  only  who  are  in  the  highest  degree  qual- 
ified for  its  proper  and  legitimate  exercise.  But 
that  power,  as  it  now  exists,  is  a  non-political  and 
anarchic  power,  assumed  and  usurped  without  polit- 
ical sanction  or  authority,  by  self-appointed  private 
individuals  without  any  legal  restrictions  or  require- 
ments as  to  the  qualifications  and  fitness  of  those 
individuals  for  the  exercise  of  such  power.  Those 
who  control  and  direct  these  great  avenues  of  public 
intelligence  are  called  journalists,  and  Journalism 
has  become  a  recognized  profession.  But,  while 
other  professions,  such  as  those  of  Law  and  of 
Medicine,  everywhere  are  subjected  to  political 
control  and  regulation,  being  restricted  to  licensed 
persons  of  whom  certain  mental  and  moral  qualifi- 
cations are  required  before  they  are  permitted  to 
practice  those  professions,  and  whose  licenses  are 
revoked  if  they  abuse  their  right  to  practice, — yet 
the  profession  of  Journalism  (with  its  unlimited 
power  to  make  and  destroy  reputations,  both  pri- 
vate and  public,  and  to  undermine  and  destroy  public 
respect  for  laws  and  for  government)  is  not  only 
free  from  political  control  and  regulation  as  to  the 
qualifications   and  fitness   of   those   practicing   that 


Public  Opinion  129 

profession,  but  assumes  and  exercises  the  power  to 
control  and  regulate  all  political  powers  of  the 
state  itself.  Are  these  self-appointed  journalists 
qualified  to  control  the  destinies  of  the  state  by 
prescribing  and  ordering  the  conduct  of  statesmen 
and  jurists,  making  those  responsible  functionaries 
of  the  state  responsible  to  an  irresponsible  power 
that  controls  the  avenues  of  public  intelligence? 

§  104.  Incompetency  of  the  Press.  The 
just  principle  of  the  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the 
press  is  very  generally  misunderstood  and  miscon- 
strued as  licensing  seditious  and  inflammatory  utter- 
ances. Such  utterances  commonly  are  made  and 
published  by  persons  who  are  unconscious  of  their 
seditious  character,  and  who,  unschooled  and  un- 
skilled in  the  sciences  of  government  and  jurispru- 
dence, imagine  that  they  are  voicing  intelligent  criti- 
cism or  advocating  some  genuine  reform,  when  in 
fact  they  are  ignorantly  attacking  and  undermining 
the  very  foundation  of  social  order  and  civilization. 
The  peace  and  good  order  of  society  depend  upon 
popular  respect  for  and  submission  to  the  authority 
of  government;  yet  the  press,  especially  the  Amer- 
ican press,  constantly  undermines  that  authority  by 
spreading  broadcast  the  idea  that  whatever  is  the 
prevailing  public  opinion  (which  is  the  prevailing 
opinion  of  the  press)  is  the  supreme  authority,  to 


130  Politics 

which  the  constituted  authorities  of  government 
must  bow  in  submission.  Likewise,  the  indepen- 
dence of  the  judiciary  is  essential  and  indispensable 
to  the  administration  of  justice  and  the  develop- 
ment and  preservation  of  the  sound  principles  of 
jurisprudence;  yet  a  large  and  influential  part  of 
the  American  press  constantly  is  instilling  into  the 
minds  of  the  people  the  pernicious  idea  that  the 
judiciary  cannot  be  trusted  unless  the  judges  are 
elected  by  popular  vote  and  compelled  to  conform 
their  decisions  to  the  demands  of  that  public  opin- 
ion or  popular  sentiment  which  the  press  itself 
creates.  Thus  the  press,  in  ignorance  more  than  by 
design,  yet  impelled  by  its  conscious  love  of  power, 
steadily  spreads  an  insidious  form  of  sedition  which 
breeds  popular  contempt  for  the  constitutional  au- 
thority of  government,  corrupts  the  administration 
of  Justice,  and  encourages  the  spirit  of  anarchy 
which  now  is  a  menace  to  civilization.  Such  is  the 
power  and  such  the  effects  wrought  by  a  class  of 
self-appointed  and  self-constituted  censors  and  crit- 
ics of  governments,  and  of  sciences  which  they  do 
not  understand,  and  of  which  they  are  not  com- 
petent censors  or  critics. 

§  105.  Restraint  of  the  Press.  Only 
qualified  and  licensed  instructors  are  permitted  to 
teach  children  in  the  public  schools  of  the  United 


Public  Opinion  131 

States;  and  in  all  higher  institutions  of  learning, 
throughout  the  world,  the  several  arts  and  sciences 
are  taught  by  those  persons  only  who  are  distin- 
guished for  their  thorough  knowledge  of  or  skill 
in  the  particular  art  or  science  which  each  is  to 
teach.  The  obvious  reason  for  all  this  is,  that 
knowledge  can  be  imparted  by  those  only  who 
possess  it  themselves  and  are  able  to  impart  it  cor- 
rectly. The  press  has  become  the  teacher  of  the 
entire  public,  imparting  knowledge  of  all  current 
matters  and  events  which  affect  the  public  interest, 
and  assuming  the  important  function  of  leading  and 
directing  the  minds  and  thoughts  of  the  public.  If 
the  minds  of  the  public  are  to  be  thus  taught  and 
led  and  directed,  it  is  the  very  highest  concern  of 
society  to  see  to  it  that  the  minds  of  the  public  are 
taught  and  led  and  directed  correctly.  There  can 
be  no  greater  peril  to  society  than  that  of  permit- 
ting the  minds  of  the  general  public  to  be  misin- 
formed and  misled  in  matters  of  political  sciences 
by  persons  who  are  themselves  without  special 
knowledge  and  ability  fitting  them  to  teach  those 
sciences  correctly.  Experience  shows  that  the  teach- 
ings of  the  press  are  largely  political;  relating  to 
legislation,  jurisprudence,  and  the  multitudinous 
administrative  functions  of  government,  all  of  which 
are  matters  of  profound  scientific  knowledge  and 
trained  skill.     The  modern  newspaper  is  far  from 


132  Politics 

confining  itself  to  its  normal  function  of  impartially 
relating  current  facts  called  "news,"  but  is  filled 
largely  with  argumentative  propaganda  and  discus- 
sions, supposed  to  be  instructive,  upon  subjects  upon 
which  the  writers  more  often  than  not  are  incapable 
of  giving  instruction.  This  false  "instruction"  and 
"teaching"  has  smothered  the  voice  of  scientific 
knowledge,  and  is  rapidly  turning  political  order 
into  anarchical  chaos.  It  has  become  obvious  that 
there  must  be  governmental  restraint  of  the  press; 
not  an  arbitrary  restraint,  but  a  reasonable  and 
necessary  restraint  which  will  prevent  the  publica- 
tion of  the  false  teachings  of  those  who  are  not 
qualified  and  licensed  to  teach  any  particular  branch 
of  knowledge  which  they  may  attempt  to  teach, — 
precisely  as  other  educational  and  scientific  profes- 
sions now  are  protected,  restrained  and  controlled. 
False  teaching  through  the  press  is  a  fraud  upon 
the  public.  The  constitutional  guarantee  of  the 
"freedom  of  the  press"  does  not  license  fraud,  libel, 
or  sedition. 

§  106.  Licensing  Writers  And  Authors. 
One  of  the  recognized  duties  of  government  is  that 
of  protecting  the  public  against  fraud  and  imposi- 
tion. A  newspaper  editorial  comment,  an  article 
contributed  to  a  newspaper  or  other  periodical  pub- 
lication, or  a  book,  which  purports  to  give  informa- 


Public  Opinion  133 

tion  or  instruction  upon  any  subject  of  knowledge, 
if  written  by  one  who  is  without  sufficient  special 
knowledge  of  the  subject  to  entitle  him  to  impart 
information  or  instruction  to  others,  is  a  fraud  and 
an  imposition  against  which  the  public  is  entitled 
to  profection.  The  protection  to  which  the  public 
is  entitled,  in  such  case,  is  the  same  which  is  afforded 
to  the  public  in  the  case  of  one  who  seeks  to  teach 
in  the  public  schools.  One  wishing  to  teach  in  the 
public  schools  is  required  to  submit  to  an  examina- 
tion as  to  his  qualifications  for  teaching,  and  he  is 
given  a  certificate  which  is  his  license  and  authority 
to  teach  those  branches  of  knowledge,  only,  which 
he  is  found  qualified  to  teach.  Likewise,  one  who 
aspires  to  teach  the  general  public,  by  writing  for 
publication  upon  any  subject  of  science  or  philos- 
ophy, should  be  required  to  prove  to  an  authorized 
and  competent  examining  body  that  he  possesses 
the  requisite  knowledge  and  other  qualifications  to 
entitle  him  to  a  license  authorizing  the  publication 
of  his  writings  upon  that  subject;  and  the  printing 
and  publishing  of  the  works  of  unlicensed  writers 
should  be  forbidden  by  law.  Not  only  is  the  public 
entitled  to  such  protection  from  being  imposed  upon 
and  misled  by  incompetent  writers  upon  all  sub- 
jects, but,  as  to  political  writings,  this  protection 
and  safeguard  against  the  publication  of  false  and 
unscientific  teachings  is  absolutely  essential   to  the 


134  Politics 

existence  of  any  just  and  orderly  system  of  gov- 
ernment. 

§  107.  Commercialism  of  the  Press.  Pub- 
lishing is  a  commercial  business,  carried  on  for  the 
profit  or  advantage  of  the  publisher.  His  interest 
is  to  publish  that  for  which  there  is  a  demand  or 
for  which  a  demand  can  be  created  by  judicious 
advertising.  The  publisher,  whether  of  books  or 
of  a  periodical,  endeavors  to  produce  whatever  is 
popular  or  is  likely  to  become  popular.  He  is  not 
concerned  about  the  capabilities  of  the  writer  or  the 
quality  of  his  writings,  if  those  writings  are  likely 
to  interest  and  gratify  the  larger  number  of  readers. 
He  cannot  be  expected  to  bankrupt  his  business  by 
publishing  matter  which  is  opposed  to  prevailing 
popular  notions  and  tendencies,  however  unsound 
and  dangerous  to  society  those  notions  and  ten- 
dencies may  be.  Even  if  he  be  at  heart  a  patriot, 
the  average  publisher  is  a  better  judge  of  his  own 
pecuniary  interests  than  of  the  soundness  or  fallacy 
of  political  theories  or  of  the  interests  of  society  at 
large.  It  is,  after  all,  the  business  of  society  to 
protect  itself,  through  its  governing  organism, — 
the  visible  instrumentalities  of  government.  Gov- 
ernment is,  as  we  have  seen,  society  itself  in  its 
organic  state.  The  business  of  government  Is  to 
govern,  not  to  be  governed.     The  law  of  self-pres- 


Public  Opinion  135 

ervation  applies  to  society  and  its  governing  organ- 
ism as  forcibly  as  it  does  to  all  other  living  organ- 
isms. When  a  commercialized  press  insists  upon 
governing  the  government  by  wielding  the  unre- 
strained power  of  what  it  calls  "public  opinion," 
the  inexorable  law  of  self-preservation  decrees  that 
the  existing  governments  of  society  must  either 
perish  or  preserve  themselves  by  restraining  and 
controlling  the  press  and  its  so-called  "public  opin- 
ion." The  commercialism  of  the  press,  entrenching 
itself  behind  the  doctrine  of  the  "freedom  of  the 
press,"  cannot  be  trusted  to  create  a  "public  opinion" 
which  will  preserve  governments,  society,  and  civil- 
ization from  threatened  destruction.  Governments 
must  take  the  necessary  measures  to  preserve  them- 
selves and  the  civilization  of  which  they  are  the 
only  visible  and  active  organic  force.  That  done, 
it  is  the  business  and  imperative  duty  of  govern- 
ments to  inaugurate  a  system  by  which  only  the 
best  and  ablest  among  men  may  be  sought  out  and 
entrusted  with  the  exercise  of  the  powers  of  govern- 
ment; for  through  such  men,  only,  can  the  radical 
defects  of  modern  civilization  be  corrected,  and  the 
glaring  injustices  of  existing  social  and  economic 
systems,  which  are  the  perpetual  cause  of  all  social 
unrest  and  violence,  be  forever  removed.  Orderly 
government — not  a  lawless  and  ungoverned  press; 
not  the  blind  anarchy  of  misguided  public  opinion — 


136  Politics 

must  undertake  the  task  of  preserving  and  perfect- 
ing the  civilization  that  we  have,  and  of  establish- 
ing a  reign  of  justice  among  men  and  nations. 

§  108.  Public  Mind.  The  assumption  that 
there  can  be  and  actually  is  such  a  thing  as  a  public 
opinion  presupposes  the  existence,  as  a  dynamic 
entity,  of  a  public  mind  which  is  capable  of  thinking 
and  forming  opinions.  And  no  assumption  is  more 
universally  acquiesced  in  than  that  there  is  such  a 
public  mind.  Great  statesmen  and  philosophers,  as 
well  as  poets,  constantly  are  appealing  to  the  "public 
mind"  as  to  an  oracle;  and  likewise  we  commonly 
hear  such  phrases  as  "the  public  conscience" ;  "public 
sentiment";  "the  public  will";  "the  soul  of  human- 
ity"; "the  heart  of  humanity."  If  there  be  such  a 
super-mind,  it  is  of  the  highest  importance  that  we 
should  understand  its  nature  and  learn  how  to  re- 
ceive and  interpret  its  wisdom.  But  if,  on  the  con- 
trary, this  supposed  "public  mind"  is  a  mere  myth, 
it  is  equally  important  that  we  should  ascertain  and 
recognize  that  fact,  and  clarify  our  minds  by  casting 
out  forever  a  falsehood  which  is  so  pregnant  with 
vital  and  fundamental  error. 

§  109.  Concretion  of  Minds.  The  theory 
(if  there  be  any  theory  at  all)  of  a  public  mind, 
necessarily  is  that  the  several  minds  of  all  people 


Public  Opinion  137 

may  be  considered  as  combined  and  united  so  as  to 
constitute  one  concrete  public  mind  which  is  more 
powerful  and  comprehensive  than  any  of  the  sev- 
eral constituent  minds.     Can  this  be  true  ? 

Each  human  mind,  as  well  as  each  human  being, 
is  an  entire  separate  and  distinct  entity;  not  a  deter- 
minate part  of  a  common  element,  like  a  gallon 
of  water;  not  a  mere  unit  of  a  common  force  or 
energy,  which  may  be  combined  with  other  like 
units  to  produce  a  proportionally  greater  force,  as 
we  would  combine  the  strength  of  two  horses  to 
draw  a  load  that  is  too  heavy  for  one.  While  it 
is  obvious  that  ten  men  of  equal  physical  strength 
represent  ten  times  the  strength  of  any  one  of  them, 
it  is  equally  obvious  that  ten  men  of  equal  stature 
cannot  be  so  combined  as  to  constitute  one  super- 
man ten  times  larger  than  any  one  of  them.  The 
difference  is,  that,  in  the  first  instance,  each  of  the 
ten  men  represents  a  unit  of  a  common  force,  and 
these  units  are  capable  of  being  combined  so  as  to 
produce  a  greater  force;  while,  in  the  second  in- 
stance, each  of  the  ten  men  is  a  separate  entity, 
and  these  ten  entities  are  incapable  of  being  com- 
bined in  a  single  concrete  entity,  or  super-man. 
Likewise,  the  minds  of  those  ten  men  are  incapable 
of  concretion  as  one  super-mind,  superior  to  any 
one  of  them.  This  is  the  truth  which  is  demon- 
strated, invariably,  whenever  any  number  of  men 


138  Politics 

meet  in  council  and  try  to  combine  the  wisdom  of 
all.  They  may  compare  ideas,  and  enlighten  each 
other's  minds,  but,  far  from  realizing  the  aggregate 
wisdom  of  all,  the  wisdom  of  any  deliberate  body 
never  exceeds,  but  often  falls  short  of,  the  average 
wisdom  and  intelligence  of  the  several  individual 
members.  If  deliberative  bodies  cannot  combine 
the  minds  of  their  members  so  as  to  constitute  a 
concrete  mind  which  is  superior  to  any  of  the  indi- 
vidual minds  composing  it,  how  can  the  general  pub- 
lic, who  cannot  meet  and  confer  together  as  a  body, 
be  supposed  to  constitute  a  public  mind? 

§  110.  Minds  of  the  Public.  In  so  seri- 
ously controverting  the  existence  of  a  single,  con- 
crete public  mind,  we  may  be  accused  of  attacking 
an  absurd  proposition  which  nobody  seriously  as- 
serts. It  may  be  said  that  the  phrase  "the  public 
mind"  commonly  and  properly  is  understood  to 
mean,  not  the  super-mind  that  we  have  described, 
but  merely  the  several  minds  of  the  people  who 
constitute  the  public.  And  this  is  precisely  our  con- 
tention. The  term  "public  mind"  is  an  absurdity 
unless  given  the  plural  significance  of  the  minds  of 
the  public.  But  what  becomes  of  the  supposed 
oracular  authority  of  the  public  mind,  when  it 
means  only  the  several  minds  of  the  individuals  who 
constitute  the  public?     Each  of  those  several  minds 


Public  Opinion  139 

is  merely  the  mind  of  one  person,  subject  to  the 
limitations  and  imperfections  of  every  human  mind 
according  to  its  individual  capacity  and  sanity. 
There  is  great  variety  among  minds  in  respect  to 
their  quality;  those  of  superior  quality  being  less 
numerous  than  ordinary  and  inferior  minds.  The 
judgments  of  superior  minds  are  more  apt  to  be 
right  than  those  of  ordinary  and  inferior  minds, 
opportunities  of  observation  and  experience  being 
equal.  But  the  question  whether  the  judgment  of 
any  mind  is  or  is  not  right,  is  determined  solely  by 
the  sufficiency  of  the  reason  upon  which  it  is  based; 
not  by  the  quality  of  the  mind  announcing  the  judg- 
ment, nor  by  the  number  of  other  minds  that  concur 
in  it.  And  the  same  is  true  of  any  opinion^  whether 
it  is  called  public  opinion  or  private  opinion. 

§  111.  Opinions  of  the  Public.  The  same 
reasons  which  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  phrase 
"public  mind"  means  only  the  minds  of  the  public, 
and  possibly  can  have  no  other  rational  meaning, 
point  to  the  conclusion  that  the  phrase  "public 
opinion"  means  only  the  opinions  of  the  public,  and 
can  have  no  other  rational  meaning.  But  the  far- 
reaching  importance  of  the  latter  conclusion  re- 
quires that  there  should  be  no  doubt  about  its  cor- 
rectness, and  justifies  a  little  further  reflection.  As 
a  matter  of  common  observation  and  knowledge,  it 


140  Politics 

Is  well  known  that  a  great  majority  of  any  people 
entertain  and  tenaciously  adhere  to  many  opinions 
which  are  mere  suppositions  or  prejudices,  not 
founded  upon  any  evidence  or  knowledge  whatever ; 
and  that  even  highly  intelligent  persons  often  are 
found  to  hold  opinions  which  are  founded  upon 
little  or  no  evidence.  Such  unfounded  opinions 
acquire  no  added  weight  or  force  from  the  fact, 
which  often  is  the  case,  that  a  very  great  number 
of  persons,  perhaps  a  majority  of  mankind,  enter- 
tain the  same  opinion.  Such  may  be  called  "public" 
opinions,  but  they  are  the  several,  not  the  joint, 
opinions  of  those  who  entertain  them,  and  they  are 
no  more  authoritative  than  if  they  were  entertained 
by  only  one  person.  If  this  were  not  true  the 
advancement  of  knowledge  and  the  development 
of  civilization  would  have  been  impossible.  Every 
step  in  the  advancement  of  knowledge  has  been 
directed  by  some  single  individual,  often  against  the 
opposition  of  a  contrary  and  hostile  public  opinion; 
and  in  each  instance  the  single  individual  has 
triumphed  because  the  reason  which  supported  his 
opinion  outweighed  the  numbers  of  those  who  held 
the  contrary  public  opinion.  Another  matter  of 
common  knowledge  and  experience  Is,  that  the 
great  majority  of  mankind  Is  disposed  to  accept 
as  authoritative  the  opinions  of  the  more  Intel- 
lectual minority,   and  to   adopt  them  as  its  own, 


Public  Opinion  141 

upon  the  authority  of  those  from  whom  they  re- 
ceived them,  rather  than  upon  the  original  reason 
or  evidence  upon  which  those  opinions  are  founded. 
And,  particularly  in  the  realm  of  politics  and  gov- 
ernment, such  is  the  real  character  and  source  of  all 
"public"  opinion.  Any  opinion  which  receives  the 
assent  of  all  leading  minds  inevitably  becomes  public 
opinion.  Only  when  there  is  conflict  of  opinion 
among  those  who  are  regarded  as  leaders  do  we 
witness  a  division  and  conflict  of  public  opinion. 

§  112.  Competency  of  Minds.  The  prone- 
ness  of  the  public  to  recognize  and  follow  leaders 
in  matters  of  opinion  does  not,  by  any  means,  imply 
a  capacity  on  the  part  of  the  public  to  judge  the 
relative  merits  of  conflicting  opinions  among  those 
leaders.  Only  those  realms  of  thought,  such  as 
politics  and  religion,  in  which  the  public  is  appealed 
to  as  the  final  arbiters  of  conflicting  opinion,  are 
found  lagging,  in  hopeless  confusion,  far  behind  the 
general  advancement  of  knowledge  and  civilization. 
All  the  enlightening  and  beneficent  progress  in 
modern  times  has  been  made  in  those  departments 
of  human  thought  and  action,  only,  in  which  public 
opinion  has  been  utterly  ignored,  and  in  which  all 
conflicting  opinions  among  leading  minds  finally  are 
decided  by  the  survival  of  the  stronger  reason, 
based  upon  investigation  and  analysis  by  the  most 


142  Politics 

competent  minds,  which  ultimately  convinces  and 
satisfies  all  competent  minds;  and  such  final  deci- 
sions receive  the  universal  acquiescence  of  mankind. 
In  the  nature  of  things,  there  can  be  no  other  ra- 
tional way  of  determining  any  question  of  opinion 
or  knowledge.  Matters  of  knowledge  and  opinion 
always  and  of  necessity  are  matters  of  reason. 
Reason  is  the  faculty  by  which  the  mind  is  able  to 
draw  inferences  and  form  opinions  from  facts  and 
principles  which  are  apprehended  by  the  cognitive 
faculty.  No  mind  can  infer  from  facts  or  principles 
of  which  it  is  not  cognizant.  The  only  minds, 
therefore,  that  are  able  to  form  rational  opinions 
upon  any  given  subject,  are  those  which  are  cog- 
nizant of  the  facts  and  principles  relating  to  that 
subject.  It  follows,  that  the  minds  which  are  the 
most  thoroughly  cognizant  of  the  facts  and  prin- 
ciples relating  to  a  given  subject  are  the  most  com- 
petent to  form  correct  and  authoritative  opinions 
upon  that  subject.  This  principle  applies  to  opin- 
ions upon  political  subjects,  as  well  as  to  all  other 
subjects  of  human  thought  and  action.  Those 
minds  which  are  the  most  thoroughly  cognizant  of 
all  the  facts  and  principles  of  political  science  are 
the  most  competent  to  form  opinions  upon  and  to 
decide  political  questions.  The  public  in  general, 
not  being  cognizant  of  the  facts  and  principles  of 
political  science,  is  not  competent  to   form  correct 


Public  Opinion  143 

opinions  upon  or  to  decide  political  questions.  Nor 
is  any  other  arbitrary  and  despotic  power  compe- 
tent. The  determination  of  political  questions  by 
incompetent  authority  is  responsible  for  all  the  in- 
justice, confusion  and  disorder  that  is  disturbing 
the  peace  of  the  world. 

§  113.  Expression  of  Public  Opinion. 
The  formal  and  legal  mode  of  expression  of  public 
opinion,  in  the  so-called  "democracies"  of  the  pres- 
ent day,  is  by  the  ballot.  But  it  is  a  prevailing 
habit  among  statesmen  to  give  studious  attention  to 
every  informal  manifestation  of  popular  sentiment 
and  opinion,  not  only  such  as  is  indicated  by  the 
press,  but  to  public  agitation  and  demonstrations 
of  every  kind,  including  resolutions,  memorials, 
petitions  and  protests  from  public  and  private  or- 
ganizations, and  communications  from  individuals. 
It  behooves  all  public  officials  whose  tenure  of  office 
is  dependent  upon  popular  suffrage  to  give  heed  to 
the  varying  moods  of  so-called  public  sentiment. 
Political  parties,  likewise,  are  disposed  to  seek 
popular  favor  by  adjusting  their  "principles"  to  the 
exigencies  of  popular  sentiment.  Thus  every  in- 
formal manifestation  of  the  shifting  and  baseless 
opinions  of  the  public  becomes  immediately  effective 
in  influencing  the  conduct  of  all  branches  and  depart- 
ments of  government.     Public  officials,  even  those 


144  Politics 

who  are  faithful  and  efficient,  often  are  compelled 
to  devote  more  time  and  energy  to  the  cultivation  of 
popular  favor  than  to  the  proper  performance  of 
their  official  duties.  They  are  forced  to  engage 
in  constant  struggle  with  incompetent  enthusiasts 
and  unprincipled  demagogues  in  order  to  retain  the 
confidence  and  continued  support  of  their  constitu- 
encies. Men  of  the  highest  character  and  ability 
are  apt  to  shrink  with  disgust  from  such  sordid 
struggles,  while  men  of  less  scruple  and  of  inferior 
ability  frequently  are  elevated  to  the  highest  offices 
of  trust  and  honor  in  the  state. 

§  114.  The  Ballot.  As  already  stated,  the 
formal  and  legal  mode  of  expression  of  public  opin- 
ion, in  modern  popular  governments,  is  by  the 
ballot.  Normally,  the  ballot  is  merely  a  fair  and 
convenient  means  by  which  the  qualified  electors  of 
a  state  or  municipality  may  select  the  persons  who 
are  to  exercise  the  various  offices  of  state  and  local 
government,  or  determine  specific  local  questions 
which  may  be  submitted  to  the  voters  in  the  locality 
concerned.  In  some  states,  however,  the  ballot  is 
employed  also  as  a  means  of  direct  exercise  of  legis- 
lative power  by  the  people;  a  topic  which  is  dis- 
cussed in  a  previous  chapter.  It  is  sufficient,  in  this 
connection,  to  point  out  and  keep  clearly  In  mind 
the  obvious  truth  that  the  ballot,  for  whatever  pur- 


Public  Opinion  145 

pose  it  may  be  employed,  is  solely  and  purely  a 
means  of  giving  effect  to  the  opinions  or  will  of  the 
majority  of  those  voting.  Under  universal  suffrage, 
the  ballot  is  a  means  of  giving  effectual  expression 
to  so-called  public  opinion. 

§  115.  Qualified  Voters.  Since  the  forma- 
tion and  expression  of  an  opinion  is  an  act  of  reason; 
and  since  cognition  is  a  condition  precedent  without 
which  reason  cannot  act;  it  is  clear  that  the  ballot 
can  be  the  means  of  expressing  a  rational  opinion 
only  when  cast  by  persons  who  are  cognizant  of  all 
facts  and  principles  pertaining  to  the  subject  upon 
which  the  opinion  is  to  be  expressed.  Upon  this 
indubitable  principle,  universal  suffrage  stands  con- 
demned; for  it  never  happens  that  all  citizens  are 
cognizant  of  all  that  pertains  to  any  given  subject. 
Likewise,  a  limited  suffrage  is  ineffectual  as  a  true 
expression  of  the  opinions  of  a  majority  of  those 
voting,  unless  the  ballot  is  limited  strictly  to  those 
persons  who  are  cognizant  of  all  that  pertains  to 
the  subject  upon  which  their  opinion  is  to  be  ex- 
pressed; for,  otherwise,  it  never  can  be  known 
whether  the  apparent  majority  really  is  a  majority 
of  those  who  are  cognizant  of  the  subject  voted 
upon.  But  it  would  be  clearly  impracticable  to 
determine,  by  this  test,  those  who  are  qualified  to 
vote  upon  each  particular  subject.     As  a  matter  of 


146  Politics 

fact,  in  the  selection  of  one  from  several  candidates 
to  fill  a  public  office,  practically  none  of  those  who 
vote  are  at  all  cognizant  of  the  relative  mental  and 
moral  fitness  of  the  several  candidates;  and  logically, 
therefore,  all  voters  are  incapable  of  making  any 
intelligent  and  rational  selection.  The  simple  truth 
is,  that  the  public  ballot  is  an  unscientific,  unintelli- 
gent, and  utterly  irrational  way  of  making  any 
selection  or  decision  whatever.  And  this  brings  us  to 
the  important  subject  of  scientific  political  selection. 


CHAPTER    VI 


POLITICAL    SELECTION 


§  116.  Selection.  Selection,  m  the  fullest 
meaning  of  the  term,  embraces  every  act,  process, 
operation,  or  proceeding, — whether  natural  or  arti- 
ficial, conscious  or  unconscious — by  which  any  things 
or  persons  are  taken,  chosen,  or  preferred  from 
among  others.  Natural  selection  is  the  process,  or 
law,  by  which  variations  originate  in  individuals 
and  species,  and  the  fittest  survive  in  the  universal 
struggle  for  existence, —  including  man's  struggle 
for  existence  and  survival  in  his  natural  state.  In 
the  operation  of  Natural  Selection,  the  fittest  is  that 
individual,  or  species  of  individuals,  whose  organic 
development  affords  some  decisive  advantage,  such 
as  superior  adaptation  to  environment,  or  superior 
means  of  offense  or  defense,  in  the  struggle  for 
existence  and  survival.  Thus  the  process  of  Natu- 
ral Selection  is,  in  fact,  a  state  of  perpetual  and 
merciless  warfare  among  individuals  and  species  of 
every  kind;  a  warfare  from  which  man  never  has 
entirely  delivered  himself,  even  in  his  most  highly 

147 


148  Politics 

developed  state  of  civilization.  Considered  as  in- 
dividuals, men  still  are  savages;  society,  only,  is 
civilized, — holding  the  individual  man  in  restraint, 
and  thus  substituting  artificial  for  natural  selection. 
But  artificial  selection  through  social  organization 
itself  is  a  product  of  evolution  by  variation  and 
selection,  extended  to  the  higher,  but  still  natural, 
order  of  reasoning  and  social  beings.  The  institu- 
tion of  political  society,  with  its  artificial  restraints 
upon  individual  action,  is,  after  all,  but  a  higher 
manifestation  of  the  natural  laws  of  selection. 

§  117.  Survival  OF  THE  Fittest.  The  evo- 
lution of  man  as  an  intellectual  and  moral  being 
must  have  been  arrested  and  stayed  at  a  stage  little 
beyond  that  of  the  brute,  but  for  the  invention  of 
social  restraints  upon  individual  action.  Every 
human  being,  in  common  with  all  animate  creatures, 
by  nature  is  selfish.  In  the  universal  struggle  for 
existence  and  survival,  his  chief  concern  is,  of  neces- 
sity, for  his  own  individual  survival  and  prosperity. 
Normally  he  is  egoistic,  not  altruistic.  But  each 
individual  has  a  selfish  interest  in  restraining  all 
others  from  interfering  with  his  purposes  and  pleas- 
ures, however  impatient  he  may  be  of  restraints 
imposed  upon  himself.  The  only  possible  avenue 
of  escape  from  the  perpetual  private  warfare  of 
natural  selection  by  the   competition  of  individual 


Political  Selection  149 

force  and  cunning  always  was,  and  always  will  be, 
the  association  of  men  for  mutual  restraint  and  com- 
mon advantage  in  the  struggle  for  existence; — 
which  is  the  origin  and  the  beginning  of  political 
society.  Thus  it  is  evident  that  political  society  is 
the  substitution  of  Inter-dependent  social  action  in 
lieu  of  Independent  individual  action — the  substitu- 
tion of  artificial  for  natural  selection — in  the  eternal 
and  universal  struggle  for  existence  and  survival. 

As  natural  selection  results  In  the  survival  of  the 
fittest,  the  fittest  being  those  Individuals  who  excel 
in  the  qualities  and  virtues  which  are  appropriate 
and  advantageous  in  a  savage  state  of  nature;  so, 
also,  political  selection  ought  to  result  In  the  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest,  the  fittest  in  that  case  being 
those  individuals  who  excel  In  the  qualities  and  vir- 
tues which  are  appropriate  and  advantageous  in  a 
civilized  state  of  society.  But  natural  selection 
ascertains  the  fittest  by  the  Independent  action  of  the 
individual  In  combat  with  savage  forces;  whereas 
political  selection  can  ascertain  the  fittest  only  by 
the  action  of  society,  through  the  rational  processes 
of  examination,  comparison,  and  classification.  So- 
ciety, however,  always  has  failed  to  act,  by  any 
process  whatever,  for  the  ascertainment  of  the  fittest 
among  Its  members;  though  some  modern  govern- 
ments have  begun  to  develop  scientific  systems  of 
examination,  comparison  and  classification  for  the 


150  Politics 

selection  of  persons  to  fill  certain  classes  of  subor- 
dinate civil  and  military  offices  and  employments. 

§  118.  Scope  OF  Scientific  Selection.  We 
have  seen  that  natural  selection  is  the  effective 
though  savage  process  of  nature  for  the  evolution 
of  all  creatures,  including  man;  that  the  process  of 
natural  selection  operates  through  individual  action 
and  adaptation,  to  secure  the  survival  of  the  fittest; 
that  individual  action,  unrestrained,  is  ineffectual 
for,  and  precludes,  the  higher  moral  and  intellec- 
tual evolution  of  man;  that  the  institution  of  society 
is  the  only  effective  means  of  restraining  individual 
action;  that  the  restraints  of  society  necessarily  in- 
terrupt the  process  of  natural  selection,  by  imposing 
restraints  upon  the  freedom  of  individual  action, 
thereby  necessitating  some  artificial  process  of  selec- 
tion by  social  and  political  action; — and  from  these 
observations  it  would  seem  to  follow,  that  society 
must  utterly  fail  as  a  means  for  the  higher  evolution 
of  man,  unless  society  undertakes  to  secure  the  sur- 
vival of  the  fittest  by  some  rational  process  of 
selection  by  social  action,  thus  attaining  the  end 
which  otherwise  natural  selection  would  attain 
through  unrestrained  individual  action. 

Furthermore,  since  natural  selection  operates  for 
the  benefit  of  individuals  and  species,  as  well  as  for 
the  benefit  of  nature  in  general,  so,  also,  any  process 


Political  Selection  151 

which  society  substitutes  for  natural  selection  ought 
to  operate  for  the  benefit  of  the  individual  members 
of  society  as  well  as  for  the  benefit  of  society  in 
general^  This  principle  would  require  that  any 
process  of  selection  by  social  action  ought  to  ascer- 
tain the  relative  adaptations,  aptitudes  and  fitness  of 
all  individuals,  and  facilitate  their  development, 
thus  doing  for  each  individual  the  service  which  the 
restraints  of  society  prevent  him  from  doing,  or 
attempting  to  do,  for  himself;  and  securing  to  each 
the  position  in  society  for  which  he  is  adapted  and 
fitted,  instead  of  leaving  him  to  contend  for  his 
proper  position  while  handicapped  by  social  re- 
straints. Such  is  the  scope  of  any  rational  and 
scientific  process  of  selection, — a  process  which  is 
indispensable  to  the  ascertainment  and  selection  of 
the  fittest  persons  for  the  exercise  of  political  offices 
and  employments. 

§  119.  Processes  of  Selection.  As  nature 
secures  the  survival  and  higher  development  of 
species  by  the  operation  of  the  law  of  variation  and 
selection  upon  the  individuals  of  each  species;  like- 
wise society  can  secure  the  survival  and  higher  de- 
velopment of  the  social  organism  only  by  some 
process  of  selection  which  takes  account  of  and 
operates  upon  the  variations  among  the  individuals 
who  compose  society.     And  as  the  process  of  natu- 


152  Politics 

ral  selection  secures  the  survival  of  the  fittest  among 
the  individuals  of  a  species,  and  the  consequent 
improvement  of  the  species,  by  ascertaining  the  rela- 
tive fitness  of  all  individuals  of  the  species;  so,  also, 
any  process  of  artificial  selection  must  secure  the 
survival  and  dominance  of  the  fittest  members  of 
society,  by  ascertaining  the  relative  fitness  of  all 
individual  members  of  society.  In  no  other  way 
can  a  higher  evolution  and  development  of  society 
be  accomplished.  Any  process  of  selection,  whether 
natural  or  artificial,  of  necessity  must  recognize  and 
operate  upon  the  constant  variation  that  exists 
among  individuals  of  every  species,  including  man; 
for  there  can  be  no  selection  where  there  is  absolute 
uniformity — an  entire  absence  of  variation — among 
the  subjects  of  selection. 

Hence  it  must  follow,  (1)  that  there  can  be  no 
evolution  and  further  development  and  improve- 
ment of  civilized  society  without  some  process  of 
selection  which  is  applied  to  all  the  individual  mem- 
bers of  society;  and  (2)  that  no  process  of  selection 
is  possible  which  does  not  take  account  of  and  oper- 
ate upon  the  variations  that  exist  among  individuals 
in  character,  adaptation,  aptitude,  and  genius.  It 
therefore  becomes  important  to  inquire  by  what 
process  society  has  advanced  to  its  present  state 
of  civilization,  and  by  what  better  process  further 
advancement  may  be  made  possible. 


Political  Selection  153 

We  have  observed  that  the  origin  of  political 
society  is  in  the  necessity  of  association  for  mutual 
restraint,  in  the  struggle  for  existence  and  survival. 
The  inevitable  effect  of  political  power  and  action 
is  to  restrain  and  control  the  freedom  of  individual 
action.  But  the  competitive  struggle  for  existence 
and  advantage  between  individuals,  though  limited 
by  restraints,  will  continue,  unless  society  removes 
the  occasion  for  struggle  by  securing  to  every  indi- 
vidual his  proper  place  and  sphere  of  action  in  the 
social  economy.  This,  however,  no  political  system 
ever  has  done  or  attempted  to  do;  the  present  state 
of  civilization  has  been  attained  by  the  negative 
process  of  restraints  upon  individual  action,  allow- 
ing the  primeval  struggle  of  natural  selection  to 
proceed,  within  the  limits  of  specific  restraints. 
Thus  the  existing  process  of  political  selection  is 
merely  a  sort  of  modified  natural  selection;  the  re- 
straints being,  in  principle,  identical  with  the  rules 
of  a  modern  prize  fight. 

Opposed  to  this  process  of  selection,  and,  indeed, 
to  any  process  of  selection  applicable  to  all  indi- 
viduals, are  the  various  so-called  socialistic  theories 
and  doctrines,  which  seem  to  ignore  the  universal 
fact  of  variation  among  individuals,  and  would  es- 
tablish a  uniformity  and  equality  of  individuals; 
theories  which,  if  possible  of  realization,  would 
arrest   the    further   evolution   and   development   of 


154  Politics 

man,  and  render  superfluous  any  process  of  selec- 
tion, whether  natural  or  artificial. 

It  now  is  becoming  apparent  that  the  chief  diffi- 
culties and  conflicting  opinions  that  are  disturbing 
society  and  threatening  the  stability  of  governments 
everywhere,  all  relate  to  the  fundamental  problem 
of  variation  and  selection;  and  the  contending  theo- 
ries may  be  classified  and  grouped  as  follows: 

A — Those  which  recognize  and  are  based  upon 
the  fact  of  variation  among  individuals  of  the  human 
species,  and  the  consequent  necessity  for  some  pro- 
cess of  selection;  but  embracing  two  fundamentally 
different  theories  of  selection,  viz., 

(1)  Selection  by  individual  action;  which  is  the 
prevailing  system  of  modified  natural  selection,  or 
private  warfare  under  political  restraints  and  regu- 
lations; and 

(2)  Selection  by  social  or  state  action;  which  is 
the  rational  and  scientific  process  of  selection  by 
examination,  comparison,  and  classification. 

B — Those  which  deny  or  ignore  both  the  fact  of 
variation  and  the  necessity  for  selection,  but  are 
based  upon  a  supposed  uniformity  and  equality  of 
individuals;  embracing  many  theories,  which  can  be 
grouped  only  according  to  their  general  tendencies, 
as  follows : 

( 1 )  Elimination  of  class  distinction,  by  the  ab- 
solute domination  of  the  most  numerous  class; 


Political  Selection  155 

(2)  Community  of  goods  and  property; 

(3)  Equality, — political,  economic,  and  social. 

§  120.  Modified  Natural  Selection.  Nat- 
ural selection,  like  all  other  processes  of  nature, 
is  lavishly  prodigal  in  its  wastefulness.  It  secures 
the  survival  of  the  fittest,  not  by  seeking  out  and 
fostering  the  development  of  the  peculiar  fitness  of 
each  individual  of  a  species,  but  by  exposing  all 
individuals  to  a  merciless  struggle  for  existence 
under  conditions  which  none  but  the  most  fortunate 
of  the  fittest  can  survive,  leaving  the  unfortunate, 
as  well  as  the  unfit,  to  perish;  but  nature,  unassisted, 
rarely  permits  the  unfit  to  survive. 

The  modified  natural  selection  which  prevails  in 
civilized  society,  by  imposing  restraints  upon  indi- 
vidual action,  prevents  much  of  the  wastefulness  of 
nature's  process,  but  in  doing  so  permits  the  unfit 
as  well  as  the  fit  to  survive,  while  leaving  the  un- 
fortunate fit,  as  well  as  the  unfit,  to  exist  in  misery 
or  to  perish.  In  the  selfish  and  merciless  struggle 
for  existence,  fortuitous  circumstances,  as  well  as 
individual  fitness  and  enterprise,  often  determine 
the  question  of  survival  in  favor  of  the  unfit,  leaving 
the  fittest  individuals  to  perish  miserably.  This  is 
true,  both  in  the  competition  of  private  enterprise 
and  in  rivalries  for  political  preferment. 

In  the   realm  of  private   enterprise,   individuals 


156  Politics 

are  left  to  discover  for  themselves,  as  best  they 
can,  their  several  adaptations,  aptitudes  and  pecu- 
liar genius,  and  to  strive  independently,  with  such 
means  as  they  find  available,  for  the  attainment  of 
their  proper  places  in  the  social  economy;  but  the 
gross  inequalities  of  environment  and  opportunity 
deny  to  many  the  means  of  discovering  their  own 
individual  fitness  and  the  possibility  of  entering  into 
their  proper  spheres  of  action;  while  many  others, 
whose  environment  and  fortunes  are  more  favor- 
able, are  elevated  to  social  positions  and  spheres 
of  action  for  which  they  are  unfit.  The  operation 
of  natural  selection  upon  individual  enterprise  is 
aptly  illustrated  by  the  parable  of  the  sower,  who 
scattered  seeds  without  regard  to  the  ground  upon 
which  they  might  fall,  some  of  which  lodged  in 
fertile  soil  where  they  grew  and  prospered  irrespec- 
tive of  the  nature  of  the  seeds,  while  others  fell 
upon  barren  places  in  which  the  most  perfect  were 
certain  to  perish;  imitating  nature's  process,  by 
which  millions  of  various  seeds  are  scattered,  few 
of  which  are  destined  to  survive  and  develop  all 
their  possibilities,  their  selection  being  purely  for- 
tuitous. But  modern  agriculture,  discarding  the 
wasteful  process  of  natural  selection,  adopts  the 
rational  process  of  examination,  comparison  and 
classification,  for  selecting  the  fittest  and  best  seeds, 
and  secures  the  survival  of  the  fittest  by  planting 


Political  Selection  157 

them  in  the  soils  and  environments  to  which  the 
several  kinds  of  seeds  are  best  adapted,  encourag- 
ing their  growth  with  fostering  care.  Applying 
these  analogies  to  the  higher  order  of  social  being, 
— the  multitude  of  individuals  are  the  seeds,  and 
society  is  the  careless  sower,  who  has  not  yet  learned 
the  art  of  rational  selection. 

In  the  domain  of  political  as  distinguished  from 
individual  action,  we  encounter  the  primary  neces- 
sity for  the  selection  of  organs  by  means  of  which, 
alone,  organized  society  can  be  capable  of  any  action 
at  all.  The  organism  of  political  society  is  called 
government,  and  the  organs  are  the  human  instru- 
mentalities, the  individual  men,  who  perform  the 
several  functions  of  government.  The  selection  of 
these  instruments  of  government  is,  necessarily,  the 
beginning  of  political  action,  and  the  condition  of 
its  continuance.  Obviously,  the  fittest  individuals, 
those  best  adapted,  ought  to  be  selected  as  organs 
for  the  several  kinds  of  political  action.  Here, 
again,  natural  selection  is  wholly  inadequate  and 
intolerably  wasteful,  operating  by  the  slow  and 
destructive  process  of  eliminating  every  government 
whose  human  organs  of  action  are,  or  become,  so 
unfit  as  to  be  incapable  of  performing  their  func- 
tions successfully,  and  permitting  the  temporary 
survival  of  those  governments,  only,  whose  organs 
are  capable  of  successful  performance.     Here  again 


158  Politics 

society  is  the  careless  sower,  who  has  not  yet  learned 
the  art  of  rational  selection,  but  sows  broadcast 
both  the  fit  and  the  unfit  who  are  candidates  for 
public  office,  trusting  their  selection  to  the  fortuitous 
circumstances  of  force,  fraud,  cunning,  or  popular- 
ity, by  which  the  fittest  rarely  are  selected.  Thus 
society  arrests  or  retards  its  own  development,  and 
sometimes  destroys  its  own  organism,  by  its  failure 
to  recognize  and  avail  itself  of  the  services  of  those 
who  otherwise  might  have  become  its  efficient  organs 
of  action.  Such  is  the  effect  of  the  prevailing  sys- 
tems of  modified  natural  selection,  as  revealed  by 
the  tragic  history  of  man's  constant  endeavor  to 
develop  a  higher  and  better  civilization. 

§  121.  Principles  of  Natural  Selection. 
Thus  far  in  the  present  chapter  our  inquiry  has  been 
directed  to  the  general  subject  of  variation  and  se- 
lection,  in  its  bearing  upon  the  problems  of  civilized 
society,  in  the  course  of  which  we  have  observed: 
that  natural  selection  secures  the  survival  of  the 
fittest  in  a  purely  savage  and  totally  uncivilized  state 
of  nature  only;  that  in  the  savage  state,  only,  is 
absolute  freedom  of  individual  action  possible;  that 
this  savage  freedom  includes  freedom  of  attack  as 
well  as  defense;  that  such  individual  freedom  of 
attack  involves  the.  necessity  of  individual  defense; 
that  this   necessity   of   defense   requires   individual 


Political  Selection  159 

preparation  to  repel  attacks, — which  is  a  state  of 
perpetual  and  universal  private  warfare;  that  this 
state  of  universal  warfare  leads  to  the  association 
of  individuals  for  common  purposes  of  attack  or 
defense;  that  such  association  necessitates  authorita- 
tive leadership,  which  involves  the  submission  of 
the  associated  individuals  to  the  authority  of  their 
leader;  that  this  submission  to  authority  involves 
corresponding  restraints  upon  the  freedom  of  indi- 
vidual action;  that  such  restraints  necessarily  inter- 
rupt and  interfere  with  the  operation  of  natural 
selection;  that  such  interference  with  natural  selec- 
tion tends  both  to  prevent  the  survival  of  the  fittest 
and  to  permit  the  survival  of  the  unfit;  that  this  ten- 
dency has  persisted  since  the  beginning  of  civiliza- 
tion until  the  present  day,  and  is  responsible  for  the 
decadence  and  ultimate  failure  of  every  form  of 
political  society;  and,  finally,  that  the  development 
of  a  rational  system  of  selection,  which  will  perform 
the  interrupted  function  of  natural  selection  in 
securing  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  is  necessary  to 
the  attainment  of  a  sound,  just  and  enduring  civiliza- 
tion. It  now  remains  to  ascertain  and  state  the 
principles  upon  which  any  rational  and  scientific 
process  of  selection  must  be  based,  before  proceed- 
ing to  a  consideration  of  the  possibility  and  the 
feasibility  of  such  a  process. 


160  Politics 

§  122.  Adaptation  of  Organs.  —  Political 
society,  like  any  other  living  organism,  is  capable  of 
action  only  when  equipped  with  organs  which  are 
adapted  to  action;  and  the  quality  of  any  action  is 
wholly  dependent  upon  the  adaptation  and  fitness 
of  the  organ  whose  function  it  is  to  perform  that 
action.  Those  organs  are  developed  from  and  of 
the  constituent  elements  of  the  organic  body  of 
which  they  are  part.  As  the  constituent  elem-cnts 
of  the  body  politic  are  individual  human  beings,  its 
organs  must  be  human  beings,  and  they  must  be 
evolved  from  the  body  politic  by  some  mode  or 
process  of  selection.  The  individuals  selected  con- 
stitute the  organism,  or  government  of  the  body 
politic;  and  the  mode  or  process  of  selection  deter- 
mines the  form  of  such  government.  The  efficient 
and  proper  performance  of  the  several  functions  of 
the  body  politic  necessarily  depend  entirely  upon 
the  adaptation  and  fitness  of  the  persons  who  are 
selected  to  serve  as  organs  for  the  performance  of 
those  functions.  The  selection  of  governing  per- 
sons who  are  in  the  highest  degree  qualified  and 
fitted  for  the  performance  of  the  several  functions 
of  government,  is  as  essential  to  the  existence  and 
survival  of  organized  society  as  is  the  development 
of  suitable  organs  to  the  existence  and  survival  of 
any  other  living  organism.  Our  solemn  and  earnest 
insistence  upon  such  an  obvious  principle  would  be 


Political  Selection  161 

absurd  and  inexcusable,  but  for  the  amazing  fact 
that  the  most  highly  civilized  governments  at  this 
day  deny  in  practice  the  principle  which  we  are 
insisting  upon,  and  recognize  both  fit  and  unfit  per- 
sons as  alike  eligible  for  selection  to  the  highest 
offices  of  government.  It  seems  necessary,  there- 
fore, to  reiterate  the  statement  that  the  first  and 
most  vital  problem  of  civilized  society  is  the  selec- 
tion of  fit  persons  (or,  rather,  to  prevent  the  selec- 
tion of  unfit  persons)  to  perform  governmental 
functions;  and  to  warn  mankind  that  governments, 
in  the  past,  have  perished,  and  those  of  today  are 
in  deadly  peril,  all  for  want  of  a  rational  and  scien- 
tific mode  of  ascertaining  and  selecting  governing 
persons  who  are  fit  to  govern. 

§  123.  Sovereignty  and  Subordination. 
No  organic  body  can  exist  and  survive  unless  its 
governing  organism  can  maintain  sovereign  control 
over  its  constituent  atoms,  holding  them  in  subor- 
dination, in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  nature. 
Neither  can  the  body  politic  of  organized  society 
exist  and  survive  unless  its  governing  organism,  or 
government,  can  maintain  sovereign  control  over 
the  individuals  who  are  the  constituent  atoms  of  the 
body  politic,  in  accordance  with  the  natural  laws 
of  social  being.  But,  in  either  case,  the  governing 
organism   cannot   maintain   such   sovereign   control 


162  Politics 

unless  the  several  organs  by  means  of  which  such 
control  must  be  exercised  are  adapted  to  and  capable 
of  the  proper  performance  of  their  several  func- 
tions. If  those  functions  are  imperfectly  performed 
the  whole  organism  becomes  decadent  and  weak, 
and  its  constituent  atoms  develop  insubordination 
and  disintegration.  The  individual  members  of 
society  become  impatient  and  insubordinate  under 
the  arbitrary  restraints  and  exactions  of  incapable 
rulers,  but  submit  contentedly  to  the  reasonable 
regulations  of  a  just  and  efficient  government.  Even 
a  docile  horse  grows  restive  and  unmanageable 
under  the  uncertain  guidance  of  an  unskilled  hand, 
but  it  is  quickly  responsive  and  quiet  when  the  reins 
are  taken  by  a  skilled  driver.  Thus  the  peace  and 
order  of  society,  and  the  contentment  and  prosper- 
ity of  the  individual,  are  dependent  upon  the  char- 
acter and  efficiency  of  the  persons  who  are  entrusted 
with  the  several  offices  and  employments  of  govern- 
ment. It  is  obvious,  therefore,  that  the  voluntary 
subordination  of  a  people  to  the  sovereignty  of 
government  can  best  be  secured  by  the  operation  of 
some  rational  method  of  definitely  ascertaining  the 
relative  character,  efficiency,  and  fitness  of  all  per- 
sons who  otherwise  are  eligible  candidates  for 
political  office,  to  the  end  that  the  fittest  may  be 
selected.     If  this  is  impossible,  then  a  better  state 


Political  Selection  163 

of   society   and   government   than   that  which   now 
exists  is  impossible. 

§  124.  Possibility  of  Scientific  Selec- 
tion. While  the  possibility  of  selecting  governing 
persons,  or  rulers,  by  the  criterion  of  superior  merit 
scientifically  ascertained,  never  has  been  demon- 
strated by  actual  experiment;  yet  the  possibility  of 
such  selection  of  persons  for  many  of  the  less  con- 
spicuous offices  and  employments  in  the  service  of 
the  state  is  abundantly  attested  by  past  and  present 
experience.  Not  only  have  various  more  or  less 
scientific  methods  of  selecting  men  for  military  and 
naval  service  been  practiced  extensively  in  many 
countries,  but  such  methods  have  been,  and  are, 
employed  and  developed  scientifically  in  the  civil 
service  of  the  state,  and  in  numerous  industrial  and 
commercial  enterprises,  as  well  as  in  the  conduct  of 
schools  and  all  higher  institutions  of  learning.  In 
the  latter,  especially,  thoroughly  scientific  systems 
and  processes  of  examination,  comparison,  classi- 
fication, and  selection  have  been  developed  to  a  very 
high  state  of  perfection,  and  are  in  successful  opera- 
tion, justly  and  accurately  grading  and  classifying 
at  regular  intervals,  according  to  their  respective 
adaptions,  aptitudes,  and  attainments,  a  large  pro- 
portion of  the  youthful  population  of  enlightened 
countries.     In  view  of  all  this  practical  experience, 


164  Politics 

it  can  hardly  be  affirmed  that  the  application  of  like 
scientific  methods  to  the  selection  of  rulers,  as  well 
as  minor  functionaries,  is  impossible.  If  it  is  pos- 
sible, then  reason  and  justice  command  that  it  shall 
be  done.  Conceding  the  possibility  of  such  rational 
and  scientific  selection,  and  assuming  that  the  adop- 
tion of  some  feasible  method  of  ascertaining  and 
selecting  the  fittest  persons  to  perform  the  several 
offices  and  functions  of  government  is  absolutely 
necessary  and  indispensable  to  any  higher  develop- 
ment of  civilization,  it  seems  necessary  to  inquire 
still  more  closely  into  the  underlying  principles  that 
must  limit  and  govern  the  operation  of  any  such 
method. 

§  125.  Subjects  for  Selection.  The  first 
step  in  any  rational  process  of  selection,  whether 
applied  to  persons  or  to  things,  is  to  determine 
the  eligible  subjects  from  among  which  the  selec- 
tion is  to  be  made.  In  the  selection  of  fit  persons 
for  any  particular  grade  or  employment,  the  sub- 
jects usually  are  limited  to  the  number  of  persons 
who  seek  or  offer  themselves  for  that  grade  or 
employment.  But  the  state,  being  sovereign,  has 
the  undoubted  power  of  conscription,  by  which  it 
may  require  the  services  of  any  person  who  is  sub- 
ject to  its  sovereignty.  An  instructive  example  of 
the  exercise  of  that  power,  accompanied  by  an  elabo- 


Political  Selection  165 

rate  and  a  scientific  process  of  selection  applied  to 
many  millions  of  persons,  is  afforded  by  the  recent 
"selective  draft"  in  the  United  States.  The  subjects 
of  selection  included  all  males  between  the  ages  of 
eighteen  and  forty-five,  perhaps  twenty  miUions  of 
persons.  While  only  about  one-fifth  of  that  vast 
number  were  actually  selected,  all  were  subjected  to 
examination  by  means  of  exhaustive  "question- 
naires," and  their  enrollment  and  submission  to 
examination  were  compulsory.  This  was  the  most 
comprehensive  survey  of  a  nation's  human  resources 
of  which  we  have  definite  knowledge  and  it  seems 
to  demonstrate  both  the  possibility  and  the  practica- 
bility of  extending  a  similar  and  still  more  compre- 
hensive survey  to  the  entire  population. 

§  126.  Conscription.  As  there  are  but  two 
known  methods  of  obtaining  men  for  the  military 
service  of  the  state,  namely,  (1)  voluntary  enlist- 
ment, and  (2)  compulsory  enlistment,  called  con- 
scription, it  is  evident  that  the  enlistment  of  men  for 
any  other  service  must  be  either  voluntary  or  com- 
pulsory. But  conscription,  even  for  military  service, 
is  regarded  universally  as  an  invasion  of  individual 
liberty  which  is  justifiable  only  by  the  stress  of  public 
peril  and  necessity.  But  such  public  peril  and  neces- 
sity may  arise  from  causes  other  than  war.  In  times 
of  public  calamity,  such  as  conflagration,  pestilence, 


166  Politics 

or  famine,  there  is  no  doubt  of  the  power  and  right 
of  the  state  to  compel  the  performance  of  labor  or 
other  service  when  it  is  deemed  necessary  in  order 
to  avert  or  mitigate  the  public  disaster.  Yet  it  might 
be  that  still  greater  perils,  fraught  with  more  vital 
and  lasting  consequence,  might  arise  from  the  reluc- 
tance of  capable  and  fit  persons  to  undertake  the 
exercise  and  administration  of  the  powers  and  func- 
tions of  government,  leaving  the  state  to  decay  and 
perish  for  want  of  suitable  governing  persons  to 
serve  as  the  organs  by  which  alone  the  organism  of 
government  can  properly  perform  its  functions  and 
survive.  And  this  is,  in  fact,  the  supreme  peril  that 
now  threatens  modern  civilization;  because  the  al- 
lurements and  rewards  of  private  enterprise  are 
depriving  the  state  of  the  services  of  many  of  the 
most  capable  and  efficient  minds,  and  many  such, 
who  would  sacrifice  self-interest  to  serve  the  state, 
are  ignored  by  the  prevailing  arbitrary  and  irra- 
tional methods  of  political  selection.  This  is  a  con- 
dition of  peril  and  necessity  as  great  as  war,  which 
justifies  a  resort  to  conscription, — if  conscription  is 
necessary  in  order  to  obtain  the  best  men  for  the 
service  of  the  state.  If  conscription  is  necessary, 
it  may  properly  take  the  form  of  another  "selective 
draft"  which  shall  comprehend  a  complete  survey 
of  all  human  resources  of  the  state,  as  the  basis  for 
the  selection  of  the  best  men  in  the  state  for  every 


Political  Selection  167 

public  service,  including  the  highest  legislative,  ex- 
ecutive, and  judicial  functionaries,  as  well  as  minor 
offices  and  employments. 

§  127.  Necessity  for  Conscription.  A 
necessity  for  resorting  to  conscription  can  exist  only 
when  there  is  no  other  practicable  way  of  obtaining 
capable  persons  for  the  required  service.  In  view 
of  the  fact  that  all  fields  of  human  endeavor,  save 
only  the  service  of  the  state,  are  able  to  enlist  the 
services  of  the  ablest  minds  without  conscription 
or  compulsion,  it  is  important  to  inquire  why  it  is 
that  the  state,  alone,  is  unable  to  do  so.  What  are 
the  essential  differences  between  the  allurements  and 
rewards  of  private  enterprise  and  those  of  public 
or  political  enterprise?  The  answer  is  obvious: 
The  rewards  of  private  endeavor  and  enterprise 
are  distributed  by  the  grim  and  savage  justice  of 
natural  selection  by  conflict  among  individuals  and 
the  survival  of  the  fittest  or  most  capable;  while 
political  honors  and  rewards  are  distributed  arbi- 
trarily or  by  accident,  usually  to  the  most  eager, 
selfish  and  unscrupulous,  without  any  justice  at  all. 
The  laws  of  natural  selection  and  survival  of  the 
fittest  operate  with  some  approximation  to  natural 
justice  in  sifting  and  separating  the  efficient  from 
the  inefficient  and  advancing  the  most  efficient  to 
the  highest  places;  while  the  highest  places  of  power 


168  Politics 

and  honor  In  the  state  are  distributed  either  by 
military  usurpation,  or  by  the  accident  of  birth,  or 
by  arbitrary  popular  favor, — without  any  approxi- 
mation to  the  justice  of  either  natural  or  scientific 
selection. 

The  allurements  and  rewards  of  private  endeavor 
that  attract  great  men  never  are  merely  pecuniary; 
often  the  ablest  minds  are  devoted  to  arduous  scien- 
tific endeavor  without  hope  or  expectation  of  pecu- 
niary reward,  and  even  at  a  voluntary  pecuniary 
sacrifice.  Desire  for  riches  for  the  sake  of  riches 
never  Is  the  Incentive  to  endeavor  of  great  minds; 
though  some  may  seek  wealth  as  a  necessary  means 
to  the  attainment  of  a  higher  end.  Those  who  have 
added  to  the  accumulating  treasure  of  human  knowl- 
edge have  been  the  world's  greatest  benefactors; 
but  the  satisfaction  of  worthy  achievement  usually 
has  been  their  sole  reward.  The  state  needs  such 
men;  but  such  men  are  not  self-seeking,  and  the  state 
must  seek  them  if  it  would  enlist  their  services. 
Experience  in  popular  governments  constantly  re- 
veals the  fact  that  those  who  seek  and  struggle  to 
obtain  the  powers  and  emoluments  of  poHtical  office 
seldom,  If  ever,  are  the  persons  who  are  the  best 
qualified  and  fitted  for  the  offices  sought.  The 
fittest  are  both  unwilling  and  unable  to  compete  with 
the  unscrupulous  demagogues  In  flattering,  cajoling 
and  corrupting  electoral  constituencies  who  have  no 


Political  Selection  169 

adequate  means  of  measuring  and  judging  the  rela- 
tive merits  and  qualifications  of  opposing  candidates, 
and  who  easily  are  imposed  upon  by  flattering  false- 
hoods, dignified  fraud,  and  eloquent  or  hypocritical 
fanaticism.  The  result  is  (and  it  is  a  notorious 
fact)  that  men  of  the  highest  character  and  ability 
rarely  can  be  induced  to  enter  into  a  contest  which 
is  so  repulsive  to  the  nature  of  such  men,  and  natu- 
rally they  turn  to  pursuits  in  which  the  law  of 
natural  selection,  as  it  operates  in  commerce  and  in 
the  arts  and  sciences,  at  least  offers  them  some 
opportunity  for  achievement  without  moral  and 
intellectual  degradation;  and  thus  the  state  is  de- 
prived of  the  services  of  its  best  men.  But,  since 
the  prevailing  irrational  and  unjust  methods  of 
political  selection  are  the  cause  of  the  reluctance  of 
good  men  to  seek  pohtical  office,  there  can  be  no 
necessity  for  conscription  of  the  best  men  when  that 
cause  is  removed  by  the  adoption  of  a  method  of 
selection  which  insures  the  selection  of  the  fittest 
persons,  and  makes  impossible  the  successful  compe- 
tition of  the  unfit. 

§  128.  Merit  and  Favor.  The  state  needs 
the  services  of  its  greatest  men,  but  really  great  men 
will  not  court  popular  favor  in  order  to  obtain  high 
offices  in  the  state.  When  those  offices  can  be  gained 
only  by  obtaining  the  votes  of  a  popular  majority, 


170  Politics 

they  seldom  can  be  gained  without  appealing  to  pop- 
ular and  class  prejudices,  and  promising  to  gratify 
the  sordid  selfishness  of  a  supposed  majority  at  the 
expense  of  an  unfortunate  minority.  Yet  great  men, 
very  naturally,  covet  honors  and  political  power,  if 
bestowed  upon  them  as  a  recognition  of  proved  and 
acknowledged  superiority.  Honest  men,  great  and 
small,  prize  whatever  they  gain  by  earning  and 
deserving,  but  no  honest  man  rejoices  in  the  pos- 
session of  that  which  another  has  earned  and  de- 
serves. In  the  arts  and  sciences  other  than  those 
of  politics,  the  great  are  given  opportunity  to  prove 
their  superiority  by  honest  endeavor  and  achieve- 
ment, and  the  honors  are  awarded  according  to 
superior  merit  by  those  who  are  competent  to  judge, 
— never  by  popular  vote,  solicited  by  rival  candi- 
dates for  honors  regardless  of  merit.  Great  men, 
whom  the  state  sorely  needs,  will  scorn  the  honors 
of  state  so  long  as  those  honors  are  bestowed  by 
incompetent  hands  and  without  regard  to  merit; 
but  they  will  seek  those  honors  eagerly  if  they  are 
denied  to  all  who  cannot  claim  them  by  right  of 
proved  superiority.  The  fit  will  seek  political  offices 
when  the  unfit  are  barred  from  them, — and  not 
until  then.  Good  men  do  not  seek  admittance  into 
bad  company.  The  only  way  effectually  to  exclude 
the  unfit  is  by  competitive  examinations  which  the 
unfit  cannot  survive.     Competitive  examinations  are 


Political  Selection  171 

essential  to  a  true  merit  system  of  selection,  and  a 
merit  system  always  is  attractive  to  superior  merit, 
but  repellant  to  inferiority.  The  fundamental  error 
in  all  prevailing  methods  of  selection  for  political 
office  lies  in  the  fact  that  every  office  is  bestowed 
as  a  favor  by  those  having  the  power  of  bestowal, — 
never  as  the  right  of  the  recipient.  Any  rational 
and  just  method  of  selection  must  be  based  upon  the 
fundamental  principle  that  every  office  belongs  by 
right  to  the  person  who  is  best  qualified  and  fitted 
for  the  performance  of  the  functions  and  duties  of 
the  office,  and  the  equally  fundamental  principle  that 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  state  to  ascertain  the  persons 
who  are  thus  entitled  to  the  respective  offices.  The 
bestowal  of  public  offices  by  popular  favor  invites 
and  encourages  the  candidacy  of  the  most  unworthy 
and  unscrupulous,  who  easily  gain  popular  favor  by 
methods  which  worthier  candidates  will  not  employ; 
and  those  who,  by  superior  merit,  are  entitled  to 
the  offices  as  matter  of  right,  are  discouraged  from 
entering  such  an  unequal  contest  to  obtain  that  which 
is  their  right,  and  rarely  succeed  if  they  attempt 
to  do  so. 

§  129.  The  Right  of  Merit.  The  right  to 
rule  always  has  been  claimed;  formerly  by  kings, 
by  right  of  divine  appointment;  and  latterly,  by  all 
other  rulers,  by  right  of  human  appointment,  in  the 


172  Politics 

form  of  the  submission,  the  consent,  or  the  choice 
of  the  governed.  But  a  claimed  right  to  rule  never 
has  been  based  upon  superior  merit  or  fitness  to 
rule.  Yet  the  only  possible  ri^ht  to  rule  must  be 
based  solely  upon  superior  merit  and  fitness  to  rule. 
The  right  to  rule  is  a  right  to  serve;  it  is  the  right 
to  serve  as  the  directing  and  controlling  intelligence 
of  the  organized  body  politic.  There  can  be  no 
right  to  serve  without  ability  to  serve;  and,  among 
those  who  are  endowed  with  ability  to  serve,  the 
superior  right  is  in  the  one  who  is  endowed  with 
superior  ability.  Although  this  principle  is  ignored 
in  the  selection  of  rulers,  it  is  recognized  and  fol- 
lowed in  the  selection  of  persons  for  service  in  many 
of  the  subordinate  offices  and  employments  of  the 
state;  and  its  observance  is  recognized  universally 
as  essential  to  the  successful  conduct  of  private 
commercial  and  industrial  enterprises,  and  all  other 
enterprises  (excepting  only  those  of  the  state)  which 
require  organized  effort.  The  right  of  merit  Is  the 
basic  principle  of  the  systems  of  "classified  civil 
service"  which  have  been  inaugurated  and  gradually 
are  being  perfected  in  the  United  States,  and  in  some 
other  countries,  employing  the  rational  process  of 
examination,  comparison  and  classification  as  the 
only  rational  means  of  eliminating  the  unfit  and 
ascertaining  those  who,  by  right  of  superior  merit, 
are  entitled  to  the  several  offices  and  employments 


Political  Selection  173 

which  are  included  in  the  scheme  of  classified  service. 
If  this  principle  is  sound  when  applied  to  subordinate 
offices  and  employments  in  the  state,  it  is  difficult  to 
perceive  any  valid  reason  why  it  would  not  be  equally 
sound  if  applied  to  the  supreme  offices  of  legislation, 
judicature,  and  executive  administration.  Experi- 
ence, in  every  kind  of  organized  effort,  demonstrates 
that  the  fitness  of  the  one  who  directs  the  effort  is 
of  more  importance  than  that  of  his  subordinates. 
There  is  a  manifest  incongruity  in  requiring  higher 
qualifications  for  minor  offices  and  employments 
than  are  required  for  the  supreme  offices  of  the 
state. 

§  130.  Right  of  Classification.  The 
principle  of  selection  according  to  merit  for  political 
offices  is  only  an  aspect  of  the  fundamental  principle 
of  variation  and  selection^ — or,  to  state  it  with 
greater  precision,  the  fundamental  principle  of  selec- 
tion of  the  fittest  according  to  the  law  of  variation 
among  individuals  of  every  species.  Nature  accom- 
plishes such  selection,  in  the  lower  orders  of  living 
things,  by  subjecting  the  individuals  to  a  physical 
struggle  for  existence  and  survival;  but  the  moral 
nature  of  man  superadds  the  moral  elements  of 
right,  duty,  and  justice,  which  require  the  applica- 
tion of  man's  reason,  in  accordance  with  his  natural 
sense  of  right  and  justice,  to  the  problem  of  the 


174  Politics 

selection  of  the  fittest  according  to  the  law  of  varia- 
tion among  individuals  of  the  human  species.  Varia- 
tion among  individuals,  and  the  necessity  of  compe- 
tition among  them  for  existence  and  survival,  are 
universal  facts;  and  selection  is  a  necessary  conse- 
quence of  those  facts.  The  moral  nature  of  man, 
however,  requires  the  substitution  of  moral  and 
intellectual  competition,  and  a  rational  comparison 
and  classification  of  men,  as  means  of  selection,  in 
lieu  of  nature's  plan  of  selection  by  survival  in  a 
physical  struggle  for  existence.  But  human  society 
has  fallen  far  short  of  a  complete  fulfillment  of  that 
requirement,  by  its  utter  failure  to  secure  any  ra- 
tional and  just  classification  of  individuals,  and  its 
persistent  and  perverse  efforts  to  repress  the  natu- 
ral and  irrepressible  tendency  to  classification. 

The  modern  doctrine  of  universal  equality  (which 
involves  a  denial  of  the  universal  and  undeniable 
fact  of  variability)  originated  In  a  righteous  revolt 
against  the  intolerable  injustice  of  an  arbitrary 
classification  which  elevated  a  select  few  to  the 
wholly  artificial  ranks  of  hereditary  or  accidental 
aristocracy,  nobility,  or  royalty,  and  degraded  the 
many  to  a  hopeless  condition  of  poverty  or  unde- 
served humiliation.  Such  arbitrary  and  unjust 
classification  was  the  logical  consequence  of  the 
operation  of  natural  selection  as  modified  by  the 
restraints   and   interferences    of   defective    political 


Political  Selection  175 

organisms.  But  the  doctrine  of  equality  permits 
the  continued  operation  of  the  same  modified  natu- 
ral selection  which  produced  the  unjust  classification 
complained  of;  while  it  encourages  an  equally  arbi- 
trary and  unjust,  and  less  rational,  classification,  by 
making  the  fit  and  the  unfit  alike  eligible  to  the 
highest  social  and  pohtical  honors,  and  by  distribut- 
ing those  honors  by  popular  favor  regardless  of 
merit.  Furthermore,  the  modern  doctrine  of  equal- 
ity actually  results,  in  its  practical  application,  in 
the  grossest  inequality, — which  arises  from  both 
economic  and  political  competition  among  individ- 
uals, producing  a  purely  arbitrary  classification  of 
persons  by  the  criterions  of  wealth  or  popularity, 
instead  of  merit.  Wealth  and  popularity  now  are 
the  only  avenues  to  social  position  and  political 
power,  and  both  those  avenues  are  available  to  the 
most  undeserving,  unworthy  and  unscrupulous  per- 
sons as  well  as  to  the  really  deserving,  worthy  and 
scrupulous, — the  former  having  the  advantage  in 
the  selfish  and  ignoble  struggle  for  wealth  and  pop- 
ularity. In  the  acquisition  of  wealth,  undeserving 
avarice  easily  surpasses  deserving  merit;  while 
popularity  is  more  often  the  reward  of  false  but 
specious  pretensions  and  agreeable  hypocrisy  than 
of  true  merit  and  ability.  Thus  the  possession  of 
wealth,  or  of  popularity,  or  of  both,  determines 
both  the  social  and  the  political  position  and  classi- 


176  Politics 

fication  of  the  individual ;  while  merit  alone,  without 
either  wealth  or  popularity,  counts  for  nothing. 
Individual  wealth  is  measured  by  money;  individual 
popularity  is  measured  by  general  indications  of 
public  approbation  or  by  the  counted  votes  of  the 
public;  but  individual  merit  can  be  measured  only 
by  the  rational  process  of  examination,  comparison 
and  classification,  in  accordance  with  the  principles 
of  natural  justice.  The  moral  sense  of  mankind 
revolts  against  the  classification  of  individuals  by 
the  criterions  of  wealth  or  popularity,  as  well  as 
those  of  lineage  or  royal  favor;  and  this  revolt  is 
manifested  in  the  prevailing  social  unrest  and  politi- 
cal disturbance  in  all  countries  and  under  all  forms 
of  government.  But  the  moral  sense  of  mankind 
would  approve  a  just  classification  by  the  criterion 
of  merit  properly  ascertained  and  proved;  and  such 
classification  is  the  undeniable  right  of  every  human 
being. 

But  society  does  deny  this  undeniable  right;  and 
society  thereby  fails  to  perform  its  primary  function 
of  substituting  a  rational  and  just  process  of  classi- 
fication and  selection  for  the  crude  and  savage  pro- 
cess of  natural  selection,  which  society  supersedes. 
In  consequence  of  this  failure  of  society,  worthy  but 
modest  persons,  in  every  community,  are  condemned 
to  obscurity,  neglect,  degradation  and  contempt, 
while   self-seeking  but  unworthy  persons   are  per- 


Political  Selection  177 

mitted  to  force  their  way  into  social  or  political 
prominence  and  power  and  to  usurp  honors  which 
do  not  belong  to  them.  Such  are  not  rare  and 
exceptional  cases;  the  exceptional  cases  are  those  in 
which  social  and  political  honors  are  bestowed  upon 
the  persons  who  are  the  most  worthy  of  them.  And 
this  is  not  because  of  any  lack  of  deserving  persons 
upon  whom  to  bestow  such  honors;  it  is  because  the 
public  are  unable  to  discriminate  between  the  worthy 
and  the  unworthy,  and  society  has  failed  to  provide 
competent  instrumentalities  by  which  such  discrimi- 
nation can  be  made.  So  universal  is  this  great  social 
injustice  that  thoughtful  observers  are  wont  to  de- 
clare that  the  world  is  "insane,"  and  to  exclaim,  with 
Shakespeare,  that 

The  times  have  grown  so  bad  that  wrens; 

do  perch 
Where  eagles  dare  not  prey. 

§  131.  Rights  of  Genius.  Genius  is  "the 
peculiar  structure  of  mind  with  which  each  indi- 
vidual is  endowed  by  nature;  that  disposition  or 
aptitude  of  mind  which  is  peculiar  to  each  man, 
and  which  qualifies  him  for  certain  kinds  of  action 
or  special  success  in  any  employment  or  pursuit." 
It  is  in  this  broad  sense,  rather  than  the  particular 
but  popular  sense   of  "distinguished  mental   supe- 


178  Politics 

riority"  or  "superior  power  of  invention  or  origin- 
ality," that  we  here  employ  the  word  genius  to 
designate  the  peculiar  aptitude  and  fitness  of  each 
individual  for  some  particular  kind  of  action,  em- 
ployment, or  pursuit.  Every  normal  human  being 
is  endowed  by  nature  with  some  peculiar  structure 
and  aptitude  of  mind  which  specially  qualifies  and 
disposes  him  for  some  particular  kind  of  action. 
The  happiness  of  the  individual,  and  his  value  to 
society,  depend  upon  his  employment  in  the  kind  of 
action  for  which  he  is  specially  endowed  and  quali- 
fied by  nature.  Every  man,  in  common  with  every 
living  creature,  naturally  is  disposed  to  pursue  that 
course  of  action  for  which  his  natural  endowments 
best  qualify  him,  and,  therefore,  desires  to  do  that 
which  nature  has  given  him  the  special  genius  for 
doing.  This  is  the  natural  law  of  genius,  and  the 
right  of  genius  is  the  right  to  obey  that  law.  As 
the  development  of  society  is  dependent  upon  the 
development  of  the  genius  of  its  individual  members, 
it  must  be  the  paramount  duty  of  society  to  ascer- 
tain, recognize,  foster,  and  protect  the  genius  of 
each  of  the  several  members  of  society,  and  to  see 
to  it  that  none  is  deprived  of  the  right  or  oppor- 
tunity to  obey  the  law  of  his  genius.  But  this  para- 
mount duty  always  has  been  and  now  is  absolutely 
neglected  by  every  state  of  society;  and  the  social 
unrest  and  disturbance  that  afflict  every  state  are, 


Political  Selection  179 

in  reality,  the  rebellious  protests  of  neglected  genius. 
Unrecognized  genius  is  apt  to  become  the  embit- 
tered enemy  of  the  social  and  political  systems  that 
have  suppressed  and  thwarted  it.  The  denial  of 
the  right  of  genius,  and  the  consequent  perversions 
of  human  nature,  constitute  the  chief  source  of 
human  misery  and  crime. 

Genius  of  the  highest  order  is  modest,  not  arro- 
gant and  self-seeking;  it  is  the  most  valuable  asset 
of  society,  which  should  be  sought  out,  recognized 
and  nurtured  by  society;  it  abhors  the  sordid  strug- 
gle for  wealth  with  which  to  purchase  recognition; 
it  scorns  the  false  and  hypocritical  pretensions  or 
sycophancy  by  which  recognition  may  be  obtained 
without  the  trappings  of  wealth;  it  seldom  is  accom- 
panied by  those  faculties  which  are  requisite  for 
the  acquisition  of  wealth,  favor  or  popularity;  and 
society,  therefore,  is  deprived  of  the  benefit  of 
all  superior  genius  that  is  not  favored  by  the  for- 
tunate circumstances  of  wealth,  favor,  popularity, 
or  by  sheer  "luck."  This  loss  to  society  is  incalcu- 
lable. Society  has  lost  not  only  the  benefits  which 
it  might  have  derived  from  genius  which  has  been 
unjustly  repressed,  but  also  has  suffered  untold 
detriment  from  disturbances  and  insurrections  that 
have  been  inspired  and  led  by  neglected  and  rebel- 
lious genius.  And  it  is  problematical  how  much  of 
the  crime  that  afflicts  society  is  attributable  to  the 


180  Politics 

private  and  lawless  reprisals  of  disappointed  genius 
which  has  been  deprived  of  opportunity  for  its 
natural  and  legitimate  expression.  Who  can  say 
that  the  most  dangerous  enemies  of  society  today 
might  not  have  been  exemplary  citizens,  if  the  bet- 
ter aptitudes  of  their  genius  had  been  recognized 
and  encouraged  in  youth  and  afforded  adequate  op- 
portunity for  development  and  expression  through- 
out life? 

Men  of  superior  genius  are  conscious  of  their 
superiority;  but  only  in  rare  instances  does  it  hap- 
pen that  those  who  are  born  and  reared  in  poverty 
and  obscurity  are  able  to  develop  their  genius  and 
obtain  recognition.  The  discovery  and  recognition 
of  genius,  and  opportunity  for  its  development  and 
expression  are  not  only  rights  of  individuals,  but 
they  are  imperative  duties  of  society;  and  the  neglect 
of  those  duties  has  been  society's  undoing. 

§  132.  Mental  and  Physical  Merits. 
Since  natural  selection  is  nature's  way  of  securing 
the  fittest  physical  organisms  by  a  physical  competi- 
tion of  individual  organisms,  thereby  accompHshing 
a  natural  differentiation  and  classification  of  organ- 
isms according  to  their  various  physical  adaptations 
and  relative  physical  fitness ;  and  since  the  moral  and 
mental  faculties  of  man  require  a  moral  and  rational 
plan  of  securing  the  survival  and  supremacy  of  the 


Political  Selection  181 

fittest  mental  organisms  by  a  mental  competition  of 
individual   men,   wliich   will   accomplish   a   morally- 
right  and  just  differentiation  and  classification  of 
men  according  to  their  various  mental  adaptations 
and  relative  moral  and  intellectual  fitness;  and  since, 
also,  the  activities  of  men,  physical  and  mental  alike, 
all  are  expressions  of  the  moral  sense  and  intelli- 
gent purpose  of  man, — his  physical  action  without 
such   sense    and   purpose   necessarily   being   wholly 
abortive  and  contrary  to  both  nature  and  reason; 
it  follows  that  any  rational  and  scientific  process  of 
selection  which  is  intended  to  accomplish  a  right  and 
just  differentiation  and  classification  of  men  must 
be  based  upon  an  examination  of  the  various  mental 
adaptations  and  relative  moral  and  intellectual  fit- 
ness of  individual  men,  in  order  to  accomplish  their 
classification  according  to  their  relative  mental  adap- 
tations and  moral  fitness.     Social  classification  and 
political  selection  must,  therefore,  be  based  wholly 
upon  the  mental  and  moral  fitness  of  individuals, 
and  not  at  all  upon  mere  physical  fitness.     In  this 
connection  it  is  important  to  observe  the  scientific 
inaccuracy  of  the  distinction  that  commonly  is  made 
between  mental  and  physical  effort,  and  to  call  atten- 
tion to  the  fact  that  every  kind  of  so-called  physical 
labor  is  nothing  more  than  a  physical  manifestation 
of  mental  effort.     The  difference  between  the  labor 
of  the  man  who  manipulates  a  shovel  Intelligently, 


182  Politics 

and  that  of  the  man  who  manipulates  a  pen  intelli- 
gently, is  a  difference  in  manner  of  giving  physical 
expression  to  mental  effort  and  purpose.  Physical 
force  exerted  without  mind  and  purpose  is  mere 
force,  not  human  labor. 

§  133.  Practicability  of  Scientific  Selec- 
tion. The  results  of  the  present  inquiry,  thus  far, 
seem  to  justify  the  conclusions:  that  a  rational  and 
scientific  method  of  political  selection,  based  upon 
a  just  classification  of  individuals  according  to  the 
variety  and  diversity  of  individual  genius  and  merit, 
is  absolutely  necessary  to  the  attainment  of  any 
better  state  of  society  and  government  than  that 
which  now  exists;  that  such  scientific  classification 
and  selection  is  possible;  and  that  it  is  consistent  with 
and  required  by  the  fundamental  principles  and  laws 
of  natural  and  social  development  and  evolution. 
But  the  questions  still  remain:  Is  such  scientific 
selection  practicable?  How  will  the  persons  who 
operate  such  method  of  selection,  and  who  perform 
the  functions  of  examination  and  classification,  them- 
selves be  selected?  How  can  such  a  system  of  selec- 
tion be  inaugurated  and  put  in  operation?  What 
will  be  the  principal  effects  of  such  scientific  selec- 
tion? 

In  approaching  the  question  of  the  practicability 
of  scientific  selection,  as  applied  to  the  classification 


Political  Selection  183 

and  selection  of  human  beings,  we  fortunately  are 
not  without  the  instruction  and  guidance  of  experi- 
ence and  successful  experiment.  An  adequate  ac- 
count of  the  various  systems  of  examination,  classifi- 
cation and  selection  of  persons  for  civil  and  military 
service  in  all  civilized  countries,  and  of  similar  sys- 
tems in  schools  and  higher  institutions  of  learning 
throughout  the  world  alone  would  constitute  a 
volume  far  exceeding  the  limits  of  the  present  work. 
It  is  possible,  therefore,  to  examine  and  consider 
only  such  general  facts  and  features  of  those  systems 
as  are  most  likely  to  throw  light  upon  the  question 
of  the  practicability  of  extending  the  operation  of 
such  scientific  selection  so  as  to  include  the  entire 
population,  and  apply  to  all  offices  and  employments 
of  the  state. 

§  134.  Scholastic  Selection.  The  methods 
of  examination,  classification  and  graduation  of  in- 
dividuals, which  are  in  practical  operation  in  all 
schools,  colleges  and  universities,  especially  in  the 
United  States,  are  of  peculiar  importance  and  value 
because  nearly  the  entire  juvenile  population  of  the 
country  is  brought  within  their  operation,  embracing 
individuals  of  every  class  and  condition. 

The  process  of  examination  and  classification 
necessarily  begins  upon  the  pupil's  first  appearance 
In   school,   and(  thereafter  Is   repeated   at   regular 


184  Politics 

intervals  during  his  school  and  college  career.  At 
each  examination  his  proficiency  is  ascertained  with 
some  degree  of  accuracy,  and  he  is  assigned  to  the 
class  in  which  he  belongs.  Not  only  is  the  pupil  thus 
classified,  but  usually  he  is  given  the  relative  rank 
and  standing  in  his  class  to  which  he  is  entitled  by 
merit.  When  the  pupil  is  graduated  from  the  classes 
of  one  grade,  he  is  admitted  to  the  next  higher  grade 
to  which  his  proficiency  entitles  him,  and  so  on 
throughout  his  school-days.  Thus  the  grade  of 
school  and  the  class  in  that  grade  in  which  each  youth 
belongs,  and  his  relative  rank  or  standing  among 
his  fellows  in  his  classes,  all  are  definitely  known; 
and  natural  emulation  for  the  honors  of  advance- 
ment in  grade,  class,  and  rank,  more  than  the  desire 
for  knowledge  and  self-improvement,  constitutes  the 
chief,  but  sufficient,  incentive  to  earnest  endeavor 
among  the  young  in  school.  The  sufficiency  of 
worthy  emulation,  and  the  absence  of  any  necessity 
for  pecuniary  rewards,  as  an  incentive  to  youthful 
endeavor,  deserve  serious  consideration  in  connec- 
tion with  the  question  whether  pecuniary  rewards 
really  are  necessary  incentives  to  endeavor  among 
the  adult  population,  and  whether  such  emulation 
for  advancement  in  social  grade,  class  and  rank 
would  not,  throughout  life,  prove  to  be  a  sufficient 
incentive  to  worthy  endeavor  of  all  kinds — if  such 
social  grade,   class   and  rank  were    obtainable  by 


Political  Selection  185 

merit  and  proficiency  alone,  regardless  of  wealth 
and  popularity.  The  genuine  elements  of  human 
nature  are  more  truly  exhibited  by  youth  than  by 
adults. 

The  facts  of  experience,  in  the  case  of  educational 
institutions  demonstrate  the  practicability  of  scien- 
tific selection  when  applied  to  the  youthful  portion 
of  the  population,  and  the  sufficiency  of  worthy 
emulation  as  an  incentive  to  endeavor.  But  many 
persons  of  mature  years  have  entered  upon  and 
passed  through  the  same  educational  processes,  espe- 
cially in  colleges  and  universities,  and  always  with 
the  same  results;  which  fact  demonstrates  the  prac- 
ticability of  scientific  selection  by  educational  process 
in  its  application  to  youth  and  adult  alike.  Nor  is 
this  practical  experience  limited  to  ordinary  schools 
and  colleges.  The  institution  of  manual  training 
schools  and  particularly  of  opportunity  schools,  (the 
benefits  of  the  latter  being  available  alike  to  persons 
of  all  ages,  and  maintained  as  public  institutions), 
are  effective  in  discovering,  encouraging  and  develop- 
ing the  special  aptitudes  and  talents  of  individuals, 
and  also  operate  upon  the  principles  of  scientific 
examination,  classification  and  selection. 

A  very  considerable  proportion  of  the  entire  pop- 
ulation of  the  United  States  is  brought  within  the 
operation  of  these  several  educational  processes; 
and   both   the    necessity   and   the    practicability    of 


186  Politics 

scientific  selection  in  tlie  operation  of  educational 
processes,  are  fully  demonstrated.  But  does  the 
demonstrated  practicability  of  scientific  selection  in 
its  application  to  educational  processes  prove  that 
it  would  be  practicable  if  applied  to  other  social 
and  political  processes?  In  answer  to  this  pertinent 
question  it  may  be  said  that  human  life — individual, 
social,  and  political — is  a  continual  process  of  edu- 
cation, of  which  schools  and  colleges  are  only  a 
beginning;  and  that  there  is  no  valid  reason  why 
the  processes  of  periodical  examination  and  resulting 
classification  according  to  aptitude,  proficiency  and 
merit,  begun  in  schools  and  colleges,  should  not  be 
continued,  as  a  public  function,  throughout  the  life 
of  every  individual,  and  be  available  to  all  who 
are  inspired  by  worthy  emulation  in  the  universal 
competition  for  advancement  in  the  social  scale. 

§  135.  Military  Selection.  The  practica- 
bility of  selecting  fit  persons  for  public  service  by 
scientific  methods  is  demonstrated  constantly  by  the 
thoroughly  scientific  methods,  practiced  in  civilized 
countries,  of  examining  and  classifying  men  for  en- 
listment, and  also  for  promotion  from  the  ranks,  in 
military  and  naval  service.  The  adaptability  of 
individuals,  both  physical  and  mental,  is  ascertained 
accurately  by  examinations  and  tests,  and  those  only 
are  selected  who  are  found  to  be  adapted  to  and 


Political  Selection  187 

fit  for  the  particular  service  for  which  they  are 
enlisted  or  to  which  enlisted  men  are  promoted. 
And  there  is  an  increasing  tendency,  in  the  best 
organized  military  and  naval  establishments,  to 
extend  this  scientific  system  of  examinations  and 
tests  (called  the  "merit  system")  to  the  selection  of 
officers  for  promotion  in  the  higher  ranks.  This 
growing  tendency  is  the  result  of  experience,  which 
has  demonstrated  the  failure  of  arbitrary  selection 
by  official  or  popular  favor  as  a  means  of  selecting 
the  fittest  men  for  each  rank  and  service. 

But  the  recent  "selective  draft,"  by  which  ap- 
proximately four  millions  of  men  were  selected  for 
the  armies  of  the  United  States,  affords  a  complete 
demonstration,  not  only  of  the  practicability  of 
scientific  methods  of  selecting  the  fittest  persons  for 
every  kind  of  service  or  employment,  but  also  the 
practicability  of  a  complete  survey  of  the  human 
resources  of  a  nation,  and  an  accurate  classification 
of  all  persons,  as  the  basis  of  selection  for  all  kinds 
of  service  and  employment.  All  males  between  the 
ages  of  eighteen  and  forty-five,  comprising  probably 
a  large  majority  of  the  adult  male  population  of 
the  United  States,  were  successfully  and  accurately 
examined,  compared,  and  classified  according  to  in- 
dividual adaptability  and  fitness,  and  from  this  vast 
number  were  first  selected  those  who  were  found 
to  be  eligible  for  any  kind  of  war  service;  and  those 


188  Politics 

eligible  were  then  subjected  to  a  still  more  particular 
examination,  comparison  and  classification,  resulting 
in  the  final  selection  of  the  fittest  for  each  of  the 
several  kinds  of  service  and  employment  demanded 
by  the  exigencies  of  war. 

This  "selective  draft"  was  nothing  else  than  a 
practical  process  of  scientific  selection;  it  embodied 
all  the  essential  elements  of  examination,  comparison 
and  classification  of  the  subjects  of  selection.  It 
was  a  case  of  resorting  to  scientific  selection  to  meet 
the  exigencies  of  war,  and  it  was  successful.  The 
exigencies  of  peace,  and  of  Imperiled  civilization, 
equally  demand  a  resort  to  scientific  selection  in  all 
the  political  and  social  activities  of  every  civilized 
nation,  as  the  only  rational  and  effective  means  of 
securing  the  fittest  for  the  exercise  of  political  pow- 
ers and  functions;  for  the  realization  of  social  and 
political  justice,  and  the  prevention  of  future  wars, 
can  be  brought  about  by  those  persons  only  who 
are  the  fittest,  the  most  competent,  to  secure  those 
ultimate  objects  of  civilized  society. 

§  136.  Civil  Service  Selection.  More  than 
thirty  years  ago,  the  abuses  of  political  patronage 
and  favoritism  in  the  selection  and  appointment  of 
officials  and  employes  in  the  several  departments 
of  the  government  of  the  United  States  had  become 
so  flagrant  that  the  congress,  acting  upon  the  urgent 


Political  Selection  189 

recommendations  of  the  president,  enacted  legisla- 
tion to  bring  about  "civil  service  reform."  By  this 
legislation  a  permanent  governmental  agency  was 
created,  known  as  the  Civil  Service  Commission, 
whose  function  it  was  to  establish  and  maintain  an 
elaborate  and  fairly  scientific  system  for  the  exam- 
ination, comparison,  and  classification  of  applicants 
for  positions  in  certain  designated  kinds  and  classes 
of  employment  to  be  known  as  the  "Classified  Civil 
Service."  The  operation  of  the  system  was  limited 
to  such  offices  and  employments  as  the  president, 
by  executive  order  or  proclamation,  should  place  in 
the  Classified  Civil  Service;  but  which,  unfortun- 
ately, were  limited  strictly  to  subordinate  positions. 
This  Classified  Civil  Service  has  been  extended  from 
time  to  time,  as  the  beneficent  results  of  the  system 
have  become  more  and  more  apparent;  and  similar 
systems  have  been  inaugurated  and  are  in  successful 
operation  in  many  of  the  state  governments  and  in 
numerous  cities. 

The  system  of  Classified  Civil  Service  is  justly 
called  the  "merit  system,"  since  it  operates  by  the 
scientific  process  of  ascertaining  the  relative  merit 
and  fitness  of  the  several  applicants,  by  means  of 
competitive  examinations,  and  results  in  the  selection 
of  the  fittest.  The  methods  and  processes  of  this 
merit  system  gradually  are  being  improved,  and 
doubtless   are   susceptible   of   further   improvement 


190  Politics 

and  higher  development,  In  the  light  of  accumulating 
experience;  but  nevertheless  this  system  of  Classified 
Civil  Service  is  scientific  selection, — and  its  success- 
ful operation  is  an  absolute  and  unquestionable 
demonstration  of  the  practicability  of  scientific  selec- 
tion as  a  means  of  ascertaining  and  selecting  the 
fittest  persons  for  political  offices  and  employments. 
Furthermore,  the  gradual  extension  of  the  Classified 
Civil  Service,  which  has  taken  place  by  the  inclusion 
from  time  to  time,  of  higher  offices  and  employ- 
ments. In  its  operation,  demonstrates  not  only  the 
sound  vitality  and  practicability  of  the  system,  but 
also  its  adaptability  to  higher  political  agencies  and 
functionaries  of  government,  and  forecasts  the  ulti- 
mate extension  of  that  scientific  system  to  the  selec- 
tion of  persons  for  the  highest  offices  and  functions 
of  government.  It  is  the  beginning  of  political 
selection  according  to  merit,  and  foreshadows  the 
ending  of  political  selection  according  popularity  or 
arbitrary  and  autocratic  favor. 

Thus  the  practicability  of  ascertaining  the  rela- 
tive merit  and  fitness  of  persons,  by  the  scientific 
processes  of  examination,  comparison,  and  classifi- 
cation, and  of  selecting  the  fittest  persons  for  every 
kind  of  action  or  employment,  Is  demonstrated  by 
actual  experience,  (1)  in  educational  institutions  of 
all  kinds  throughout  the  world,  (2)  in  the  selection 
of  persons   for  military  service,   and    (3)    in   the 


Political  Selection  191 

Classified  Civil  Service  which  is  in  operation  in  the 
United  States  and  many  states  and  cities  of  the 
Union.  Other  proof  of  the  practicability  of  such 
processes  may  be  found  in  the  experience  of  com- 
mercial, industrial,  and  scientific  enterprises  of  every 
kind;  and  the  experience  of  such  enterprises  abun- 
dantly proves,  also,  the  practical  folly  and  disas- 
trous results  of  selecting  agents  or  employes  by  any 
other  criterion  than  that  of  fitness  and  merit. 

§  137.  Survey  and  Classification  of  Hu- 
man Resources.  The  obvious  impossibility  of 
ascertaining  and  knowing  who  are  the  fittest  per- 
sons in  a  state,  without  first  ascertaining  the  relative 
fitness  of  all  persons  in  the  state,  already  has  been 
observed.  It  is  equally  obvious  that,  in  order  to 
ascertain  the  relative  fitness  of  all  persons  in  a  state, 
an  examination  and  classification  of  all  persons  in 
the  state  is  necessary.  Is  such  examination  and 
classification  practicable?  This  question,  like  that 
of  the  practicability  of  scientific  selection  as  applied 
to  particular  classes  of  persons,  is  sufficiently  an- 
swered by  experience.  The  actual  examination  and 
classification  of  nearly  all  of  the  youthful  popula- 
tion, which  is  an  accomplished  fact  in  the  educational 
systems  of  the  United  States  and  of  some  other 
countries;  the  actual  examination  and  classification 
of  the  major  portion  of  the  adult  male  population 


192  Politics 

of  the  United  States,  which  was  accomplished  by 
the  "selective  draft"  in  1918;  the  actual  examination 
and  classification  of  vast  numbers  of  persons,  in  the 
aggregate,  including  adults  of  both  sexes,  which  is 
being  accomplished  continually  by  Civil  Service  sys- 
tems in  and  throughout  the  United  States;  and  the 
partial  examination  and  classification  of  all  persons, 
including  both  sexes  and  all  ages,  which  has  been 
accomplished  and  repeated  at  intervals  of  ten  years 
by  the  census; — all  these  accomplished  facts  of 
experience  would  seem  to  prove,  beyond  question, 
that  a  periodical  examination  and  classification  of 
all  persons  in  the  state  is  practicable.  All  these 
several  processes  have  a  common  relation  to  the 
general  problem  of  examination  and  classification  of 
persons.  It  certainly  is  possible  to  co-ordinate  and 
consolidate  those  cognate  processes  which  actual 
experience  already  has  developed  and  put  into  prac- 
tical operation;  and  the  result  of  such  co-ordination 
and  consolidation  would  furnish  the  ground-work, 
at  least,  of  a  comprehensive  survey  and  classifica- 
tion of  human  resources. 

§  138.  Inauguration  of  Scientific  Selec- 
tion. The  inauguration  of  a  scientific  system  of 
political  selection,  which  is  to  supersede  the  present 
autocratic  system  of  popular  elections  and  arbitrary 
appointments,  is  apt  to  strike  the  mind  as  a  formi- 


Political  Selection  193 

dable  undertaking.  But  the  formidable  character 
of  the  undertaking  disappears  when  we  realize  and 
consider  the  actual  facts  of  the  situation.  The  sev- 
eral processes  which  are  essential  to  such  a  scientific 
system  already  have  been  inaugurated,  and  they  now 
are  in  actual  operation.  All  that  remains  to  be  done, 
in  order  to  inaugurate  a  scientific  system  of  political 
selection,  is  to  co-ordinate,  unite,  perfect,  and  extend 
the  several  processes  which  already  are  inaugurated 
and  in  operation. 

The  several  processes  of  classification  according 
to  relative  merit  and  fitness,  which  now  operate, 
independently  of  each  other,  in  the  public  schools 
and  universities,  in  the  army  and  the  navy.  In  the 
Classified  Civil  Service,  in  the  Census  Bureau  of 
the  United  States,  and  in  commercial  and  industrial 
organizations,  surely  can  be  co-ordinated  and  com- 
bined in  a  concrete  system  of  examination  and  classi- 
fication, which  will  perform  the  proper  state  function 
of  ascertaining  the  relative  merit  and  special  apti- 
tudes and  fitness  of  every  person  in  the  state.  Like- 
wise, the  several  processes  of  selection  according  to 
superior  merit  and  fitness,  which  now  operate,  inde- 
pendently of  each  other,  in  state  educational  insti- 
tutions, in  military  and  civil  service  systems,  and  in 
industrial  and  commercial  enterprises,  can  be  co- 
ordinated and  combined  in  a  concrete  system  which 


194  Politics 

will  perform  the  proper  political  function  of  select- 
ing the  fittest  persons  for  public  service. 

The  formulation  in  detail  of  the  plans  and  pro- 
cedure for  accomplishing  such  co-ordination  and 
organization  is  the  proper  task  of  experts;  and 
assuredly  that  task  is  not  beyond  the  skill  of  experts 
such  as  those  who  have  conceived  and  worked  out 
the  complicated,  yet  thoroughly  scientific,  organiza- 
tion and  procedure  of  the  Classified  Civil  Service, 
and  that  of  the  recent  "selective  draft." 


CHAPTER   VII 

THE  SELECTIVE  ORGANISM 

§  139.  Self-Classification.  The  problem 
of  social  justice,  in  the  last  analysis,  is  the  problem 
of  the  classification  of  individuals  in  society.  The 
prevailing  unrest  which  disturbs  the  peace  of  the 
world  is  the  protest  of  classes  against  classification 
of  individuals  by  the  standards  of  wealth  and  pov- 
erty; a  classification  which  places  and  keeps  the 
unfortunate  and  complaining  classes  in  their  present 
condition  of  poverty  and  industrial  slavery. 

Classification  is  a  universal  and  inevitable  fact. 
The  classification  of  individual  human  beings,  in  one 
way  or  another,  is  an  unavoidable  necessity,  which 
arises  from  the  universal  fact  and  law  of  variation. 
It  is  the  duty  of  society  to  classify  its  members  by 
means  of  an  organized  and  intelligent  system;  a 
system  which  operates,  as  an  essential  part  of  the 
social  organism,  in  accordance  with  scientific  prin- 
ciples. Society  fails,  and  always  has  failed,  to  per- 
form that  duty;  and,  in  consequence  of  that  failure, 
individuals  are  left  to  the  necessity  of  classifying 
themselves  by  the  natural  but  merciless  process  of 

195 


196  Politics 

a  perpetual  and  selfish  struggle  for  the  means  of 
self-classification. 

In  ancient  and  medieval  times,  the  sword  was  the 
most  efficient  means  of  self-classification;  but,  in 
modern  times,  the  possession  of  material  wealth  has 
supplanted  armed  force  as  the  most  effective  means. 
The  fact,  that  the  possession  of  material  wealth  is 
the  most  effective  means  of  successful  self-classifica- 
tion— the  means  to  the  attainment  of  individual 
independence,  social  distinction,  and  power — has 
produced,  and  sustains,  the  present  universal  and  in- 
ordinate desire  for  the  possession  of  material  wealth. 
It  is  a  mistake,  and  an  insult  to  human  nature,  to 
attribute  the  inordinate  desire  for  wealth,  which 
now  possesses  the  souls  of  men,  to  a  natural  swinish 
instinct  which  impels  all  men  to  strive  for  wealth 
merely  to  gratify  a  supposed  universal  covetousness. 
An  inordinate  desire  for  the  possession  of  wealth 
now  is  practically  universal;  but  mean  and  sordid 
covetousness  is  by  no  means  universal;  therefore, 
if  we  look  for  the  true  motive  which  prompts  all 
men  to  engage  in  a  mad,  selfish  competition  for 
riches,  we  shall  find  it  in  the  universal  necessity  for 
self-classification,  and  the  consequent  necessity  for 
acquiring  the  means  of  successful  self-classification, 
— which  is  material  wealth. 

This  universal  craving  for  wealth,  therefore,  is 
a  desire  to  possess  the  means  to  the  attainment  of 


The  Selective  Organism  197 

an  end, — the  end  sought  being  a  satisfactory  classi- 
fication of  the  individual  in  society;  and  the  conse- 
quence of  that  fierce  desire  is  this  universal  struggle 
for  wealth,  which  necessarily  and  inevitably  results 
in  the  impoverishment  of  all  who  are  not  well 
adapted  and  qualified  for  success  in  such  a  sordid 
struggle.  Here,  then,  we  find  the  fundamental  cause 
of  the  present  congestion  of  wealth  in  the  hands  of 
a  fortunate  minority,  and  the  penury  and  want  which 
falls  to  the  lot  of  the  unfortunate  majority,  (which 
is  the  social  injustice  so  generally  complained  of) , — 
this  fundamental  cause  being  the  necessity  for  self- 
classification. 

If  the  necessity  for  self-classification  can  be  re- 
moved (by  means  of  a  scientific  system  of  classifica- 
tion whereby  society  can  perform  its  duty  of  justly 
classifying  its  individual  members),  then  the  cause 
of  the  prevailing  inordinate  desire  for  wealth  will 
be  removed.  With  the  disappearance  of  this  abnor- 
mal demand  for  wealth  as  the  necessary  means  of 
self-classification,  the  present  abnormal  congestion 
of  wealth,  and  consequent  impoverishment  of  the 
unfortunate  many,  will  disappear;  for,  under  nor- 
mal conditions,  ordinary  industry  and  frugality 
(which  now  do  not  suffice)  always  will  suffice  to 
insure  a  competency  in  a  land  of  abundance.  This 
reveals  a  remedy  which  not  only  respects  and  pre- 
serves the  right  of  property,  but  which  also  extends 


198  Politics 

to  the  many,  as  well  as  to  the  few,  the  full  enjoy- 
ment of  that  right. 

§  140.  Social  Classification.  Instead  of 
the  much-talked-of  socialization  of  industry  and 
commerce,  as  a  remedy  for  prevailing  social  injus- 
tice, the  way  to  a  just  state  of  society  lies  through 
the  socialization  of  individual  classification.  In- 
stead of  futile  and  destructive  attempts  to  obliterate 
class  distinctions  by  the  impossible  expedient  of 
reducing  all  members  of  society  to  a  common  level, 
a  constructive  effort  must  be  made  to  supplant  the 
present  unjust  system  of  classification  according  to 
individual  success  or  failure  in  the  scramble  for 
wealth,  by  a  scientific  and  just  system  of  classification 
according  to  individual  character  and  attainmei.ts. 
Instead  of  leaving  the  individual  under  the  necessity 
of  contending  for  the  pecuniary  means  wherewith 
he  can  place  himself  in  a  higher  class  in  the  social 
scale  irrespective  of  his  character  and  attainments, 
society  must  assume  and  perform  its  duty  to  place 
the  individual  in  the  class  in  which  he  belongs  by 
right  of  merit  only,  irrespective  of  his  pecuniary 
means.  Instead  of  tolerating  a  universal  struggle 
for  the  pecuniary  means  of  social  advancement, 
society  must  require  its  individual  members  to  en- 
gage in  the  more  worthy  competition  of  individual 
excellence,    knowledge,    and   skill   in    the    arts    and 


The  Selective  Organism  199 

sciences  and  in  the  sterling  qualities  of  manhood 
and  good  citizenship,  as  the  only  available  means  of 
advancement  in  the  social  scale.  This  is  the  primary 
and  most  essential  duty  of  society.  It  is  essential, 
not  only  to  the  attainment  of  social  justice  to  the 
individual,  but  also  the  attainment  of  individual 
justice  to  society,  and  the  preservation  and  perfec- 
tion of  the  social  organism  by  evolving  a  system  for 
equipping  that  organism  with  efficient  organs  for 
the  performance  of  its  functions. 

A  discussion  of  the  practical  organization  and 
operation  of  a  system  of  social  classification  and 
political  selection  is  the  purpose  of  the  remaining 
pages  of  this  chapter. 

§  141.  Initial  Legislation.  A  systematic 
classification  of  individuals  is  prerequisite  to  any 
scientific  process  of  political  selection.  Likewise,  a 
systematic  investigation  and  examination  of  persons 
is  required  before  they  can  be  classified  properly. 
Such  investigation  and  examination  of  individuals 
must  be  authorized  by  the  political  organism  of 
society;  and  necessarily,  therefore,  must  be  in  pur- 
suance of  legislation  which  authorizes  it,  and  which 
provides  the  necessary  means  and  instrumentalities 
for  the  formulation  of  a  plan  for  establishing  the 
system, — unless,  indeed,  the  legislature  itself  should 
undertake  the  formulation  of  such  plan.     Some  such 


200  Politics 

legislation,  therefore,  is  the  first  step  necessary  to 
the  inauguration  of  the  required  system. 

Such  initial  legislation  may  be  undertaken  (if  by 
or  within  the  United  States)  by  the  national  con- 
gress, or  by  the  legislature  of  a  state,  or  by  the 
proper  legislative  power  of  any  city  which  (as  in 
the  case  of  Denver,  and  a  few  other  cities  in  the 
state  of  Colorado)  enjoys  full  powers  and  indepen- 
dence in  respect  to  the  constitution  of  its  own  local 
government  and  the  conduct  and  regulation  of  its 
purely  local  affairs;  such  a  city  in  reality  being  a 
^tate, — though  a  subordinate  and  dependent  state. 

Proper  caution  and  conservatism  would  limit  such 
initial  legislation  to  the  creation  of  a  special  body  of 
experts,  composed  of  an  adequate  number  of  emi- 
nent sociologists,  jurists,  statesmen,  educators,  and, 
especially,  experienced  experts  in  the  organization 
and  operation  of  existing  educational,  industrial, 
mihtary,  and  civil  systems  of  examination  and  classi- 
fication; such  body  to  be  clothed  with  sufficient 
authority  and  provided  with  adequate  facilities  for 
a  thorough  investigation  and  consideration  of  the 
problems  presented.  Such  body  of  experts  should 
be  charged  with  the  duty  of  making  a  preHminary 
survey  of  the  people  and  their  vocational  distribu- 
tion in  the  state,  as  a  basis  upon  which  to  formulate  a 
plan  for  the  organization  of  a  comprehensive  system 
of  classification,  the  benefits  of  which  will  be  avail- 


The  Selective  Organism  201 

able  to  all  the  Inhabitants;  such  plan  to  be  reported 
to  the  legislative  authority,  together  with  a  formal 
draft  of  such  specific  legislation  as  the  body  shall 
recommend  for  the  establishment,  organization,  and 
operation  of  the  system. 

A  preliminary  survey  of  the  human  resources  of 
the  state  would  seem  to  be  necessary  as  a  basis  for 
any  complete  plan  of  organization  and  operation. 
The  general  facts  and  specific  data  required  for 
making  such  survey  might,  perhaps,  be  gathered 
and  compiled  from  the  latest  and  most  complete 
official  census.  The  required  facts  and  data  prob- 
ably would  comprise :  ( 1 )  The  total  population  of 
the  state,  and  what  proportions  thereof  are  males, 
females,  minors,  and  adults;  (2)  An  enumeration 
of  all  vocations, — professions,  arts,  crafts,  trades, 
pursuits  and  occupations  of  every  kind  in  which  the 
Inhabitants  of  the  state  are  engaged  and  the  total 
number  of  persons  who  are  engaged  in  each  of  them; 
and  (3)  the  territorial  distribution  of  the  persons 
who  are  engaged  in  each  vocation,  giving  the  number 
of  such  persons  in  each  political  subdivision  of  the 
state,  Including  the  smallest  subdivisions  and  munici- 
palities. With  these  and  such  other  facts  and  data 
as  may  be  found  necessary  or  desirable,  the  body  of 
experts  should  be  prepared  to  formulate  a  detailed 
plan  for  the  organization  and  operation  of  the  de- 
sired system. 


202  Politics 

The  present  treatise,  however,  would  seem  to  be 
incomplete  if  it  did  not  terminate  in  the  proposal 
of  some  tentative  plan  and  process  by  which  a  sys- 
tem of  social  classification  and  political  selection 
might  actually  be  organized  and  put  into  practical 
operation.  Therefore,  though  anxious  to  avoid  the 
slightest  appearance  of  a  grotesque  assumption  of 
oracular  authority,  the  author  must  yield  to  the 
apparent  necessity  of  setting  forth  his  own  concep- 
tion of  what  such  a  plan  and  process  should  be.  In 
so  doing,  and  for  the  sake  of  conciseness  as  well 
as  convenience,  the  proposed  system  will  be  referred 
to  simply  as  the  "System";  and  the  several  divisions 
and  subdivisions  of  the  System  will  be  called,  re- 
spectively, "Departments,"  "Regions"  and  "Dis- 
tricts." 

§  142.  Plan  of  Organization.  To  insure 
the  practicability  of  any  plan  of  organization,  it 
should  be  patterned  after  those  systems  of  organ- 
ization which  are  in  successful  operation;  avoiding, 
so  far  as  possible,  the  perils  of  original  experiment. 
The  proposed  System  should  adopt,  coordinate,  and 
develop  all  that  is  useful  to  its  purpose  in  the  sev- 
eral systems  of  examination  and  classification  which 
now  are  in  operation,  both  within  and  without  the 
political  organization  of  society.  Another  guiding 
principle  should  be,  that  the  functions  of  the  System 


The  Selective  Organism  203 

must  be  performed  by  the  System  itself — not  by 
men — by  the  operation  of  rules;  leaving  as  little 
as  possible  to  the  discretion  of  the  individual  officers 
and  agents  who  are  employed  in  its  operation. 

In  light  of  these  guiding  principles,  the  essential 
elements  of  a  practical  organization  reveal  them- 
selves, as  follows: 

( 1 )  The  System  must  be  co-extensive  with  the 
state  which  adopts  it,  and  must  be  under  the  direc- 
tion of  a  supreme  governing  body,  which  we  will 
call  the  Supreme  Directorate. 

(2)  The  System  must  be  divided  Into  as  many 
departments,  each  coextensive  with  the  state,  as 
there  are  distinct  vocations,  or  groups  of  similar 
vocations,  each  of  which  requires  a  process  of  ex- 
amination and  classification  peculiar  to  itself.  Each 
of  these  several  departments  will  be  referred  to  as 
a  Department. 

(3)  Each  Department,  independently  of  all 
other  Departments,  will  divide  the  state,  (for  the 
purposes  of  the  Department  only),  into  territorial 
divisions,  which  we  will  call  Regions. 

(4)  Each  Region  will  be  divided  Into  smaller 
territorial  divisions,  which  we  will  call  Districts. 

(5)  Each  Department  will  be  governed  by  a 
supreme  body,  which  we  will  call  the  Governing 
Board,  and  which  will  be  subordinate  only  to  the 
Supreme  Directorate. 


204  Politics 

(6)  The  several  Regions  will  be  under  the  im- 
mediate administration  of  bodies  of  experts,  which 
we  will  call  Regional  Boards, 

(7)  In  each  District  the  primary  functions  of 
the  System  will  be  performed  by  a  board  of  experts, 
which  we  will  call  the  District  Board,  and  the  sev- 
eral members  thereof  will  be  called  Examiners. 

I.  Supreme  Directorate. 

The  selection  and  appointment  of  the  persons  who 
are  to  constitute  the  Supreme  Directorate,  as  well 
as  the  selection  of  the  members  of  the  subordinate 
Boards,  necessarily  must  be  made,  at  the  outset,  by 
some  of  the  present  methods;  but  thereafter  the 
System  will  perform  this  service  for  itself,  as  well 
as  for  all  other  governmental  agencies. 

The  Supreme  Directorate  should  consist  of  such 
number  of  members  as  will  comprise  at  least  one 
eminent  specialist  In  each  of  the  following  sciences, 
viz.,  Sociology,  Jurisprudence,  Ethics,  Political 
Economy,  Mathematics,  Physiology,  and  Psychol- 
ogy; together  with  experienced  experts  in  the  exam- 
ination and  classification  of  persons  for  Civil  Service, 
Military  Service,  and  for  scholastic  purposes;  also 
experts  in  Industrial  Relations  and  Organizations, 
in  Commerce,  and  in  Statistics. 

The  Supreme  Directorate  will  effect  Its  own  or- 
ganization and  rules  of  procedure,  and  its  powers 
and  duties  will  be : 


The  Selective  Organism  205 

(a)  To  enumerate,  arrange  and  classify,  either 
singly  or  in  groups,  as  may  be  necessary,  all  of  the 
several  arts,  sciences,  professions,  trades,  pursuits, 
occupations  and  vocations  of  every  kind  which  are 
the  objects  of  legitimate  individual  endeavor,  and 
to  assign  each  to  the  Department  in  which  it  properly 
belongs. 

(b)  To  select  and  appoint  the  personnel  of  the 
Governing  Board  for  each  Department. 

(c)  To  determine  the  number  of  Departments 
that  are  required  for  the  efficient  performance  of 
the  functions  of  the  System. 

(d)  To  direct  and  supervise  the  organization  and 
co-ordination  of  the  several  Departments. 

(e)  To  formulate  and  establish  general  Rules 
and  Regulations  for  the  government  and  adminis- 
tration of  the  System,  and  the  several  Departments 
thereof. 

(f)  To  authorize,  confirm  or  revise  such  rules 
and  regulations  as  may  be  formulated  and  adopted 
by  the  Governing  Board  of  any  Department;  but 
only  so  far  as  necessary  to  preserve  the  integrity 
and  consistency  of  the  System. 

(g)  To  Investigate  and  adjust  any  disagreements 
or  disputes  which  may  arise  between  the  Governing 
Boards  of  any  of  the  several  Departments. 

(h)  To  hear  and  determine  all  appeals  from 
final  actions  or  decisions  of  any  Governing  Board. 


206  Politics 

(i)  To  receive,  compile,  classify,  and  make  rec- 
ord of  all  examinations  and  classifications  of  persons 
as  the  same  are  made  by  the  several  Departments 
and  reported  by  the  several  Governing  Boards  to 
the  Supreme  Directorate. 

(j)  To  determine,  from  the  reports  of  the  Gov- 
erning Boards  of  the  several  Departments,  the  final 
and  general  classification  of  every  classified  person 
in  the  state,  and  make  a  record  thereof. 

(k)  To  transmit  to  every  classified  person,  when 
he  Is  finally  classified,  a  certificate  stating  his  grade 
and  rank  in  each  Department  in  which  he  Is  classi- 
fied, and  his  final  class  and  rank  In  the  state. 

(1)  To  ascertain,  fix,  and  determine  (in  accord- 
ance with  general  rules  previously  formulated  and 
adopted)  the  class,  grade  and  rank  which  shall  be 
required  to  render  any  person  eligible  to  each  of 
the  several  offices  and  employments  in  the  state;  and 
to  formulate  and  establish  rules  for  the  determina- 
tion of  the  right  of  appointment  or  of  succession  to 
each  office  and  employment  in  the  state. 
II.  Departments. 

There  must  be  a  separate  Department  of  the 
System  for  every  distinct  department  of  human 
knowledge  and  skill  which  requires  methods  and 
rules  of  examination  and  classification  peculiar  to 
itself  and  not  adapted  to  any  other  department  of 
knowledge  and  skill.     For  example :  the  methods 


The  Selective  Organism  207 

and  rules  which  would  be  necessary  and  appropriate 
to  a  Department  of  Medicine  could  not  be  adapted 
to  the  requirements  of  a  Department  of  Mining,  nor 
to  those  of  any  other  distinct  professions  and 
trades.  Each  Department  will  be,  in  fact,  a  com- 
plete and  independent  organization  of  a  particular 
art,  science,  or  trade,  for  the  purpose  of  definitely 
ascertaining  and  determining  the  degree  of  knowl- 
edge or  skill  which  is  possessed  or  acquired  by  any 
and  every  person  in  the  state  who  desires  to  be 
examined  and  classified  for  that  purpose  in  each  or 
any  Department.  Each  Department  will  be  a  com- 
plete and  independent  system  for  the  purpose  of  the 
classification  of  persons  in  the  particular  art,  science, 
or  trade  for  which  it  is  organized;  but  all  Depart- 
ments will  be  under  the  control  and  supervision  of 
the  Supreme  Directorate  for  the  purposes,  only,  of, 
preserving  the  co-ordination  of  all  Departments  in 
the  System,  and  of  ascertaining  and  determining  the 
final  classification  of  each  classified  person  from  his 
grade  and  rank  in  each  of  the  several  Departments 
in  which  he  may  have  been  classified.  It  would  seem 
that  the  efficiency  of  the  System  would  be  propor- 
tionate to  the  number  and  specialization  of  the 
Departments;  because  a  large  number  of  highly 
specialized  Departments  will  afford  to  the  individual 
a  fuller  opportunity  to  prove  his  proficiency  and 
attainments  in  many  special  branches  of  knowledge 


208  Politics 

and  skill,  thus  advancing  himself  in  class  and  rank; 
besides  affording  a  more  comprehensive  and  satis- 
factory basis  for  the  general  classification  of  indi- 
viduals by  the  System. 

In  fact,  and  in  effect,  each  of  the  several  Depart- 
ments will  be  a  legally  established  system  by  which 
some  particular  art,  science  or  trade  is  enabled  to 
perform  for  itself  the  function  of  examining  and 
classifying  individual  proficiency  therein,  under  the 
rules  and  sanctions  of  the  law. 
III.  Departmental  Governing  Boards. 

The  Governing  Board  of  each  Department  must 
be  a  purely  expert  body, — not  in  any  sense  a  repre- 
sentative body,  other  than  as  it  represents  society, 
the  state,  and  the  law.  The  members  of  each  Gov- 
erning Board  should  be  selected  in  the  first  instance, 
by  the  Supreme  Directorate  of  the  System,  from 
among  the  most  eminent  specialists  who  can  be 
found  in  the  state  and  whose  services  are  available. 
The  personnel  of  each  Board  should  include :  ( 1 ) 
three  persons  who  are  pre-eminent  in  the  particular 
branch  of  knowledge  and  skill  which  is  represented 
by  the  Department  for  which  he  is  selected;  (2) 
three  experts  in  the  examination  and  classification 
of  persons, — one  of  whom  shall  be  an  expert  in 
military,  another  in  scholastic,  and  the  third  in  civil 
service  examination  and  classification;  and  (3)  three 
experts  in   social   and  industrial   organization  and 


The  Selective  Organism  209 

administration,  of  the  kind  which  shall  be  deemed 
to  be  best  adapted  to  the  Department  concerned. 

The  powers  and  duties  of  each  Governing  Board 
should  be:  (a)  to  ascertain  and  estimate,  from  such 
data  as  may  be  available,  the  probable  number  of 
persons  in  the  state  who  are  engaged  in  and  who 
may  be  expected  to  seek  examination  and  classifica- 
tion in  the  particular  art,  science  or  trade  which  is 
represented  by  the  Department,  and  their  distribu- 
tion in  the  state;  (b)  to  divide  the  state,  for  the 
purposes  of  the  Department,  into  such  number  of 
Regions  as  may  be  required  to  facilitate  the  work  of 
the  Department;  (c)  to  subdivide  the  several  Re- 
gions into  as  many  Districts  as  may  be  required  to 
facilitate  the  work  of  examination;  (d)  to  select  and 
appoint  the  members  of  Regional  Boards  until  the 
System  shall  select  them;  (e)  to  formulate  and  pre- 
scribe, subject  to  the  approval  of  the  Supreme  Direc- 
torate, general  rules  and  regulations  for  the  govern- 
ment and  guidance  of  the  Department  and  its  sev- 
eral Regional  and  District  Boards  and  Examiners  in 
the  performance  of  their  duties.  (f)  to  direct, 
supervise  and  revise  the  work  of  the  several  Re- 
gional Boards;  (g)  to  hear  and  determine  all  com- 
plaints of,  and  appeals  from,  any  final  action  of  any 
Regional  Board;  (h)  to  receive  and  keep  record  of 
all  examinations  and  reports  received  from  the 
several   Regional    Boards;   and    (i)    to    determine, 


210  Politics 

make  record  of,  and  report  to  the  Supreme  Direc- 
torate, the  class,  grade  and  rank  in  the  Department 
of  every  person  examined  and  classified  therein. 
IV.  Regional  Boards. 

The  several  Regional  Boards  in  each  Department 
will  be  chosen,  in  the  first  instance,  by  the  Governing 
Board  of  the  Department,  and  should  be  composed 
of  persons  who  are  especially  expert  in  the  particular 
art,  science  or  vocation  which  is  represented  by  that 
Department,  together  with  experts  in  the  existing 
systems  of  examination  and  classification  of  persons; 
the  number  of  members  required  for  each  Regional 
Board  to  be  determined  by  the  Governing  Board 
of  the  Department. 

The  powers  and  duties  of  the  Regional  Board 
will  be :  to  appoint  and  organize  the  several  District 
Boards;  to  supervise  and  regulate  the  conduct  of 
examinations  in  the  several  Districts;  to  require  and 
receive  from  District  Boards  reports  and  returns 
of  all  examinations;  to  make  reports  and  returns  to 
the  Departmental  Governing  Board  of  all  examina- 
tions made  in  the  Region  and  approved  by  the  Re- 
gional Board;  to  hear  and  determine  all  complaints 
and  charges  that  may  be  made  against  any  District 
Board,  its  Examiners  or  Agents,  for  any  dereliction 
of  duty;  to  allow  appeals  in  all  cases  of  complaint 
of  unfair  examinations,  and  to  transmit  to  the  De- 
partmental Governing  Board  all  papers  and  records, 


The  Selective  Organism  211 

or  copies  of  records,  pertinent  to  such  appeals;  and 
to  perform  such  other  duties  as  may  be  required  by 
the  rules  and  regulations  prescribed  by  the  Govern- 
ing Board  of  the  Department. 

The  reports  and  returns  made  to  the  Governing 
Board  by  the  several  Regional  Boards  in  each  De- 
partment, will  be  examined,  revised,  and  classified 
by  the  Governing  Board,  and  a  full  report  and 
return  thereof  made  to  the  Supreme  Directorate; 
whereupon  the  latter  will  make  a  complete  classifi- 
cation of  each  and  all  classified  persons  in  the  state, 
and  will  certify  to  each  of  such  persons  his  proper 
class,  rank  and  grade  in  the  state  as  determined  by 
his  knowledge,  skill  and  general  fitness  in  all  Depart- 
ments in  which  he  is  classified. 
V.  Districts  and  District  Boards. 

The  several  District  Boards  should  be  composed 
of  the  most  expert  Examiners  available,  and  in  such 
number  in  each  District  as  may  be  required.  The 
members  of  District  Boards  shall  be  the  Examiners 
for  their  respective  Districts;  the  District  Board 
assigning  to  each  member  a  certain  subdivision  of 
the  District,  and  furnishing  each  with  such  assistant 
examiners,  agents,  and  clerical  assistants  as  may  be 
required  for  the  proper  performance  of  their  duties. 

Each  District  Board  should  have  its  permanent 
official  headquarters  at  such  place  in  the  District 
as  may  be  most  accessible,  where  all  requests  for 


212  Politics 

examination  and  classification  may  be  made  either 
in  person  or  by  mail.  Requests  or  applications  for 
examination  will  be  referred  to  the  Examiner  for 
the  subdivision  in  which  the  applicant  resides;  and 
the  Examiner  will  notify  the  applicant  of  the  time 
and  place  when  and  where  his  examination  will  be 
held.  Each  examination  will  be  conducted  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  rules  and  regulations  which  are 
prescribed  by  the  Supreme  Directorate  as  well  as 
those  prescribed  by  the  Departmental  Governing 
Board,  and  in  accordance  with  such  forms,  blanks 
and  methods  of  examination  as  may  be  prescribed 
by  the  Governing  Board.  These  forms,  blanks,  and 
methods  will  be  such  as  are  best  adapted  to  exam- 
inations in  the  particular  art,  science  or  trade  which 
is  represented  by  the  Department  in  which  the  ex- 
amination is  had;  and  should  be  so  full  and  methodi- 
cal in  detail  as  to  leave  little  or  nothing  to  the 
discretion  of  the  Examiner.  When  physical  demon- 
stration of  skill  is  required,  it  must  be  conducted 
by  Examiners  who  have  been  chosen  for  their  special 
fitness  and  expertness  in  the  particular  subject  of 
such  examination  or  test;  in  which  case,  if  the  desired 
facts  cannot  be  established  by  written  questions  and 
answers,  a  detailed  statement  of  the  facts  of  such 
demonstration,  and  the  results  thereof,  must  be 
made  in  writing,  signed  by  the  Examiner  and  also 
by  the  person  examined.     In  all  examinations,  the 


The  Selective  Organism  213 

person  examined  may,  over  his  own  signature,  note 
his  objections  and  exceptions,  if  any  he  has,  to  the 
manner  or  the  results  of  his  examination.  A  de- 
tailed report,  together  with  all  papers  and  exhibits 
pertaining  to  each  examination,  and  any  objections 
or  exceptions  noted  and  signed  by  the  person  exam- 
ined, shall  be  delivered  by  the  Examiner  to  his 
District  Board,  to  be  included  by  the  latter  in  its 
regular  report  and  returns  made  to  the  Regional 
Board. 

§  143.  General  Operation  of  System.  It 
will  be  observed  that  the  examinations  conducted  by 
the  several  examiners,  as  revised  and  approved  by 
their  respective  District  Boards,  constitute  the 
groundwork  of  the  System.  The  Examiner  will  do 
no  more  than  to  make  the  examination  and  report 
it  to  his  District  Board.  Each  District  Board  will 
be  confined  to  the  duties  of  primarily  passing  upon 
the  sufficiency  of  examinations  and  reports  thereof 
made  by  the  several  Examiners,  requiring  them  to 
be  corrected  or  completed  when  necessary,  and  of 
transmitting  the  examinations  to  the  Regional  Board. 
The  Regional  Board  then  will  mark  and  grade  such 
examinations  in  accordance  with  prescribed  rules, 
and  make  report  and  return  of  all  such  examina- 
tions to  the  Governing  Board  of  the  Department. 
Thereupon  the  Governing  Board  will  finally  pass 


214  Politics 

upon  the  correctness  of  all  examinations  made  in 
its  Department,  and  will  determine  the  class,  rank 
and  grade  of  each  person  examined  in  that  Depart- 
ment; which  determination,  together  with  a  com- 
plete transcript  of  each  examination  and  their  report 
thereon,  wiU  be  transmitted  by  the  Governing  Board 
of  the  Department  to  the  Supreme  Directorate  of 
the  System. 

It  will  be  noted  that  each  of  the  several  Depart- 
ments serves  only  to  secure  the  fair  examination 
and  grading  of  all  persons  examined  therein,  and 
to  determine  the  grade  and  standing  of  each  of 
such  persons  in  that  particular  Department  of  hu- 
man enterprise. 

The  general  and  final  classification  of  persons 
will  be  made  only  by  the  Supreme  Directorate  of 
the  System.  This  will  be  done  by  ascertaining  and 
recording,  as  to  each  classified  person  in  the  state, 
his  grade  and  standing  in  each  of  the  several  De- 
partments in  which  he  has  been  examined  and 
graded.  Then,  by  general  rules  which  apply  alike 
to  all  persons,  and  upon  the  data  thus  obtained,  the 
Supreme  Directorate  will  classify  every  person  in 
the  state  who  has  sought  classification,  determining 
and  making  record  of  the  proper  class,  rank  and 
grade  of  each  person  as  determined  by  his  pro- 
ficiency, efficiency,  and  general  fitness  in  all  the 
Departments  in  which  he  has  been  examined,  and 


The  Selective  Organism  215 

will  deliver  to  each  of  such  persons  a  certificate  of 
his  class,  rank  and  grade  in  the  state. 

Thus  far,  the  System  has  secured  the  first  prime 
object  for  which  it  is  established,  namely,  the  classi- 
fication of  persons.  It  remains  to  consider  the 
process  of  selection,  which  is  to  be  based  upon  such 
classification. 

§  144.  Selective  Operation.  The  selection 
of  the  fittest  persons  for  the  several  offices  and 
employments  of  government  will  be  accomplished 
by  two  separate  processes,  which  together  constitute 
the  second  function  of  the  System.  The  first  of 
these  two  processes  is  that  of  determining  and  pre- 
scribing the  precise  class,  rank  and  grade  which  is 
required  for  the  efficient  performance  of  the  duties 
of  each  public  office  and  employment,  from  the 
highest  to  the  lowest;  and  this  must  be  accomplished 
in  accordance  with  rules  which  are  of  universal 
application.  The  second,  and  last,  process  is  that 
of  determining  the  right  of  appointment  or  of  suc- 
cession to  public  offices  and  employments.  This, 
also,  will  be  accomplished  in  accordance  with  rules 
which  are  of  universal  application,  and  which  will 
leave  as  little  as  possible  to  the  discretion  of  the 
Supreme  Directorate  or  its  members;  and  every 
public  office  and  employment  will  be  classified  ac- 
cording to  the  class,  rank,  and  grade  of  personal 


216  Politics 

knowledge,  attainments  and  fitness  which  is  required 
for  the  efficient  performance  of  the  duties  pertain- 
ing to  it. 

Whenever  a  new  public  office  or  employment  is 
created,  or  whenever  a  vacancy  occurs,  (either  by 
limitation  of  a  fixed  term  of  office  or  employment, 
or  by  the  resignation,  removal,  or  the  death  of  the 
incumbent)  the  Supreme  Directorate  will  ascertain, 
from  such  classification  of  offices  and  employments, 
the  particular  class,  rank  and  grade  which  must 
have  been  attained  in  order  to  render  any  person 
eligible  to  such  office  or  employment.  The  Supreme 
Directorate  then  will  ascertain  from  its  records  the 
persons  who  are  classified  in  the  required  class,  rank 
and  grade,  and  will  award  the  right  of  appointment, 
or  the  right  of  succession,  to  such  of  those  persons 
as  shall  be  found  to  hold  the  highest  grade  or  stand- 
ing in  the  required  class  and  rank,  and  will  notify 
such  person  of  his  right  of  appointment  or  succes- 
sion, and  of  the  time  within  which  he  must  avail 
himself  of  that  right  by  qualifying  and  entering 
upon  the  duties  of  such  office  or  employment.  If  any 
person  so  selected  declines  such  office  or  employ- 
ment, the  person  next  highest  in  grade  will  be  in- 
formed, in  like  manner,  of  his  right, — and  so  on, 
until  the  office  or  employment  is  filled  by  the  fittest 
person  obtainable.  In  case  several  persons  should 
be  found  to  have  equal  right  of  appointment  or  sue- 


The  Selective  Organism  217 

cession  to  a  particular  office  or  employment,  the 
selection  of  one  from  among  such  persons  must  be 
determined  by  lot  or  any  other  fair  means  which 
will  exclude  the  possibility  of  favor. 

The  plan  of  classification  and  selection  here  out- 
lined doubtless  will  be  criticised  and  found  defective 
in  many  respects;  but  it  is  hoped  that  it  will  be 
found  sufficient,  at  least,  to  show  the  possibility  of 
formulating  and  carrying  into  effect  a  better  con- 
ceived plan,  which  will  be  practicable  and  successful, 
and  by  which  an  efficient  system  of  social  classifica- 
tion and  political  selection  may  be  organized  and 
put  into  operation.  Such  a  consummation  certainly 
is  desirable,  for  its  effects  will  be  to  abolish,  or  at 
least  to  mitigate,  the  gross  injustice  which  now  re- 
sults from  self-classification  by  means  of  wealth, 
and  to  do  away  with  entirely  the  injustice,  both  to 
individuals  and  to  society,  of  permitting  inefficient 
and  unfit  persons  to  obtain  public  offices  and  em- 
ployments, while  depriving  fit  and  efficient  persons 
of  their  right  to  such  offices  and  employments. 

It  is  quite  evident  that  the  proposed  Selective 
Organism  will  constitute  a  new  and  independent 
power  in  the  organization  of  civil  government.  It 
will  not  be  merely  a  department  of  the  executive 
power;  it  will  be  a  fourth  power — the  selective 
power — transcending  in  importance  the  legislative, 
judicial,  and  executive  powers,  which  hitherto  have 


2 1 8  Politics 

been  regarded  as  comprising  all  powers  of  govern- 
ment. The  omission  of  this  fourth  power  from  the 
organism  of  government,  and  the  consequent  failure 
of  government  to  perform  the  selective  function,  is 
the  fatal  defect  which  is  responsible  for  the  universal 
and  invariable  failure  of  all  forms  of  government, 
in  all  ages,  and  among  all  peoples. 

Conclusion. 

It  has  not  been  the  purpose  of  this  investigation 
to  deal  with  or  attempt  the  solution  of  the  more 
specific  social  and  economic  problems  of  modern 
civilization,  the  solution  of  which  is  the  duty  of 
governments.  The  purpose  has  been  to  discover, 
if  possible,  the  fatal  defect  in  the  political  organiza- 
tion of  society  which  must  be  the  permanent  cause 
of  the  absolute  failure  of  every  form  of  government 
in  the  performance  of  that  duty,  and  to  find  the 
explanation  of  the  invariable  incapacity  of  govern- 
ments for  the  solution  of  those  problems, — with  the 
hope  of  discovering  and  pointing  out  a  way  of  sup- 
plying that  fatal  defect,  and  of  rendering  govern- 
ments capable  of  accomplishing  the  ends  for  which 
they  are  instituted. 

The  present  conflict  between  organized  labor  and 
organized  capital  is  a  struggle,  not  merely  for  the 
supremacy  of  one  of  them  over  the  other,  but  for 
supremacy  over  the  governing  organism  of  society. 


The  Selective  Organism  219 

It  is  a  conflict  of  classes.  Labor,  accusing  capital 
of  controlling  existing  governments  in  its  own  inter- 
est, openly  declares  its  purpose  to  wrest  that  alleged 
control  from  capital,  and  to  dominate  and  coerce 
governmental  action  in  the  interest  of  organized 
labor.  Capital  denies  that  it  either  claims  or  exer- 
cises any  control  over  government,  and  challenges 
labor's  claimed  right  of  supremacy  over  either  capi- 
tal or  government.  Labor  claims  to  be  the  creator 
of  all  wealth,  and  charges  that  governments  operate, 
in  the  interest  of  capital,  to  deprive  labor  of  the 
wealth  which  it  creates.  Capital  contends  that 
wealth  is  created  by  mental  and  physical  labor 
jointly,  neither  of  which  can  produce  wealth  without 
the  other,  and  that  those  who  direct  the  employment 
of  capital  in  industry  themselves  are  laborers,  and 
entitled  as  such  to  their  just  share  of  the  fruits  of 
the  combined  efforts  of  labor  and  capital.  But  the 
truth  is,  that  those  who  possess  and  direct  the  em- 
ployment of  capital  usually  obtain  and  hold  more 
than  their  just  share, — and  this  fact  is  the  crux  of 
all  the  trouble.  It  Is  not  denied  that  the  unjust 
distribution  of  wealth  Is  the  one  aggravating  cause 
of  public  disturbance  and  revolution. 

It  is  true  that  governments  are  responsible  for 
the  unjust  distribution  of  wealth,  of  which  the  labor- 
ing and  the  Impoverished  classes  complain;  but  it 
is  true,  also,  that  this  injustice  Is  due  more  to  the 


220  Politics 

fundamental  defects  of  political  science  than  to  any 
direct  and  intentional  domination  of  government  by 
a  capitalist  class.  Unfit  officials  doubtless  are  sub- 
ject to  corrupting  influences,  and  honest  officials 
often  are  Incapable;  but  If  all  were  fit  and  capable, 
the  injustice  complained  of  nevertheless  would  be 
irremediable,  so  long  as  government  is  based  upon 
the  sovereignty  of  men  instead  of  the  sovereignty  of 
law.  The  efforts  of  the  wisest  and  best  of  rulers 
and  legislators  to  bring  about  a  just  state  of  society 
must  be  unavailing,  when  their  wise  and  just  con- 
clusions may  be  overruled  and  annulled  by  the  selfish 
command  of  a  sovereign  person,  a  sovereign  class 
of  persons,  or  a  sovereign  majority  of  the  whole 
people. 

The  perennial  conflict  between  capital  and  labor, 
between  the  rich  and  the  poor,  always  Is  a  conflict 
between  the  beneficiaries  and  the  victims  of  Injustice. 
And  the  triumphant  supremacy  of  either  of  these 
classes,  with  power  to  enforce  Its  selfish  demands, 
never  can  result  In  anything  but  more  injustice. 
Justice  is  a  matter  of  principle,  a  matter  of  science, 
a  matter  of  law, — never  a  matter  of  arbitrary  will 
or  power.  Law  Is  justice  ascertained  and  enforced. 
A  just  government,  therefore,  must  be  one  which 
recognizes  and  acknowledges  the  sovereignty  of  law 
and  denies  the  sovereignty  of  men,  denying  to  every 
class  the  right  to  enforce  Its  own  will.    This  truth 


The  Selective  Organism  221 

is  embodied  in  the  desire  now  often  expressed  for 
a  "government  of  laws,  not  of  men."  This  is  No- 
mocracy. 

It  should  be  understood  that  Nomocracy  is  the 
antithesis  of  revolt  and  revolution.  It  is  not  the 
renouncing  of  the  authority  of  a  government,  nor 
is  it  the  setting  up  of  a  new  form  of  government. 
It  is  the  substitution  of  the  sound  principle  of  the 
sovereignty  of  the  law  for  the  unsound  principle  of 
the  sovereignty  of  men,  as  the  true  foundation  of 
any  form  of  government.  And  the  adoption  of 
Nomocracy  must  be  brought  about,  not  by  revolu- 
tionary force,  but  by  and  through  the  instrumen- 
talities of  existing  governments. 

Existing  governments,  and  the  persons  who  exer- 
cise the  powers  of  existing  governments,  are  not 
consciously  and  wilfully  hostile  to  any  sound  prin- 
ciple; on  the  contrary,  they  are  conscious  of  the 
fundamental  weakness  and  insecurity  of  every  form 
of  government,  and  are  searching  eagerly  for  the 
cause  of  and  the  remedy  for  this  weakness  and 
insecurity.  It  is  not  reasonable  to  presume  that  any 
government  now  existing  is  so  reckless  and  insane 
as  to  reject  an  undeniable  truth,  or  to  refuse  to 
adopt,  when  once  made  Isjiown,  a  sound  principle 
which  will  make  governments  strong  and  secure, 
capable  of  accomplishing  the  just  ends  of  govern- 


222  Politics 

ment,  and  which  will  rescue  governments  from  the 
perils  of  revolution. 

The  fundamental  weakness  of  all  existing  govern- 
ments now  stands  revealed.  It  is  the  absence  from 
the  organism  of  government  of  an  essential  and 
elemental  part  of  any  perfect  organism.  The  de- 
velopment of  suitable  organs,  by  the  selection  of 
the  individuals  who  are  to  serve  as  its  organs,  is 
an  essential  function  which  belongs  to  and  must  be 
performed  by  the  organism  of  government.  The 
power  to  perform  that  function  is  the  first  and  most 
essential  of  four  (not  three,  as  heretofore  always 
supposed)  elemental  powers  of  government:  the 
selective  power,  the  legislative  power,  the  judicial 
power,  and  the  executive  power.  The  selective 
power,  without  which  the  organism  of  government 
is  fatally  defective  and  Incomplete,  is  wanting,  and 
must  be  supplied. 


RECAPITULATION 

The  results  of  these  investigations,  whether 
pleasing  or  otherwise,  should  be  plainly  stated. 
They  may  be  summarized  and  reduced  to  the  fol- 
lowing definite  findings  and  conclusions,  some  of 
which,  at  least,  ultimately  must  be  accepted  as  car- 
dinal principles  of  a  true  science  of  Politics : 

(1)  Justice  among  men  is  necessary;  and  the 
necessity  of  justice  is  the  source,  the  basis,  and  the 
true  end  of  any  just  government. 

(2)  Natural  Law  is  the  law  of  justice,  and  is  the 
supreme  and  fundamental  law  of  society,  to  which 
the  will  of  sovereign  and  subject  alike  should  be 
subordinate. 

(3)  Cognition,  not  volition.  Is  the  faculty  by 
which  justice  and  natural  law  can  be  ascertained, 
and  by  means  of  which  alone  society  may  be  justly 
governed. 

(4)  Government,  not  according  to  the  just  con- 
clusions of  right  reason,  but  according  to  the  dictates 
of  will,  setting  human  will  above  natural  law,  i& 
autocratic  despotism. 

223 


224  Politics 

(5)  Every  existing  government,  whatever  its 
form,  sets  human  will  above  natural  law,  and  there- 
fore is  an  autocratic  despotism. 

(6)  Sovereignty  of  any  human  will,  whether  it 
be  the  will  of  a  monarch  or  the  will  of  a  majority, 
if  it  holds  itself  insubordinate  and  superior  to  natu- 
ral law  and  justice,  is  contrary  to  and  a  defiance  of 
the  fundamental  law  of  society. 

^^)  Democracy,  in  so  far  as  it  exists  in  fact,  is 
Anarchy;  in  so  far  as  it  exists  only  in  name  but  not 
in  fact,  it  is  a  mere  illusion;  as  a  form  of  govern- 
ment, it  is  impossible. 

..(8)  Public  Opinion,  in  the  sense  of  an  opinion 
of  a  public  mind  which  is  superior  to  the  individual 
mind,  is  purely  imaginary,  non-existent  in  fact,  and 
impossible. 

(9)  Opinions  and  decisions  of  competent  and 
responsible  experts  command  and  receive  the  respect 
and  assent  of  the  people;  but  the  people  have  little 
respect  for,  and  refuse  to  abide  by,  their  own  irre- 
sponsible opinions  and  decisions. 

ilO)  Popular  elections,  as  a  means  either  of 
selecting  public  officials  or  of  deciding  political 
questions,  are  irrational,  unscientific,  incompatible 
with  intelligent  and  efficient  government,  and  are 
contemned  and  detested  by  the  people  themselves. 

(11)  The  people  themselves  desire  neither  Dem- 
ocracy nor  Popular  Sovereignty;  they  desire  efficient. 


Recapitulation  225 

wise  and  just  government;  and  they  would  welcome 
the  inauguration  of  any  practical  method  or  system 
by  which  the  most  efficient,  wise,  and  just  men  in 
the  state  could  be  discovered  and  installed  in  the 
offices  of  government.  The  people  would  have 
confidence  in  and  respect  for  a  government  so  con- 
stituted. 

(12)  The  organization  of  a  rational  selective 
system  is  not  only  possible  and  practicable,  but  is 
to  a  considerable  extent  an  accomplished  fact  in 
educational  and  many  other  scientific  organizations 
and  also  in  the  selection  of  persons  for  minor  politi- 
cal offices  and  employments,  and  is  capable  of  devel- 
opment and  extension  to  all  social  relations  and 
activities. 

(13)  Individual  merit  is  the  sole  standard  of  a 
just  classification  and  gradation  of  men  in  society. 

(14)  The  system  of  classification  and  gradation 
according  to  the  standard  of  individual  merit  results, 
wherever  it  is  in  operation,  in  directing  the  energies 
of  men  to  worthy  emulation  in  striving  for  superior 
merit  as  means  to  personal  advancement  and  pro- 
motion. 

(15)  The  prevailing  systems  of  classification 
and  gradation  according  to  the  false  standards  of 
popularity  or  wealth  result  in  directing  the  energies 
of  men  to  unworthy  rivalry  in  the  pursuit  of  popu- 
larity or  wealth  as  the  only  available  means  to  the 


226  Politics 

attainment  of  political  preferment  and  power  or 
social  eminence. 

(16)  Necessity  and  desire  comprise  all  incentives 
to  human  endeavor.  These  incentives  continue  to 
operate,  and  with  greater  force  and  efficiency,  when- 
ever the  true  standard  of  merit  entirely  supersedes 
the  false  standards  of  popularity  and  wealth;  merit 
then  becomes  necessary  as  the  only  available  means 
to  the  attainment  of  social  eminence  or  political 
preferment  and  power;  while  both  popularity  and 
wealth  become  unnecessary  and  unavailing,  and 
therefore  no  longer  are  desired  as  means  to  those 
ends, — wealth  remaining  necessary  and  desirable 
only  for  its  proper  economic  uses  and  purposes. 

(17)  The  constitution  and  organization  of  the 
state  upon  the  sound  basis  of  a  rational  and  scientific 
classification,  gradation,  and  selection  of  men  by 
the  sole  standard  of  individual  merit  would  eliminate 
the  chief  inciting  cause  of  cupidity  and  excessive 
greed  for  wealth  (which  now  corrupts  and  deranges 
both  the  political  and  the  economic  life  of  nations), 
rendering  possible  the  attainment  of  social  justice; 
an  end  which,  otherwise,  Is  unattainable. 


THE  Eiro 


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II  mil  nil  II  II!  Ill  II II  III  II  nil  I 


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